THE MACEDONIANS

Their Past and Present



Ernest N. Damianopoulos

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

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To My Gallant Grandfathers, Christo and Dimitri,
Who Raised Me within Their Homeric Outlook on Life

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Preface

While pursuing graduate studies toward the Ph.D. degree at Syracuse University between the years of 1959 and 1962, I was a research assistant at the New York State Mental Hygiene Research Unit at Syracuse, NY. Elaine Cumming and W. E. Henry at this point were writing their classic work on aging called *Growing Old: The Process of Disengagement* (1961). A basic sociological study of a selected aging population sample in the Chicago area had been conducted, the data compiled and the findings written up, chapter by chapter. As I had come to the unit as a young researcher with a background in philosophy of science, I was invited by Elaine Cumming to be a reader in this, the preparatory stage, prior to the final version. The coauthor William E. Henry was at the University of Chicago and, thus, not immediately accessible, at this level, in those days prior to the Internet and computer. We would meet once a week to discuss the chapters as they were written and offer suggestions.

As the work progressed with each chapter containing the integrative and interpretive concepts to describe the specific findings, it appeared to me that a theory of aging was embedded within but presented in a piecemeal and unorganized manner. I suggested that the conceptual and theoretical material dispersed throughout the book be collected and put together into a single additional chapter devoted to a formal statement of the disengagement theory in ordinary language terms for greater clarity and precision. Thus, I wrote the nine postulates of the disengagement theory (chapter 12).[1] This chapter, following publication, became the highlight and focus of attention as apparently it had been an innovation that facilitated the reading and understanding of the entire work. It appeared also as a major factor in its success. Now some 46 years later, to my shock and great surprise, I find in a Google search citations indicating that I am indeed the author of the disengagement theory of aging and have been given sole credit for it. Even a greater surprise was to find the nine postulates of disengagement theory of chapter 12 as required

reading in a developmental course on aging in a major university.[2] I immediately hasten to add that the credit belongs elsewhere; to the two authors who had done the basic research and came up with the core explanatory concepts. At about the same time, a little later in 1967,[3] I published a theoretical model of Pavlovian conditioning, again stated in formal ordinary language terms. More importantly in 1987,[4] I published a comprehensive mathematical model of Pavlovian conditioning that would explain with 15 math formula equations the basic phenomena and processes in the area of animal learning. Somewhat later, in my new area of competence, neuroscience, I published two methodological papers[5] on how to identify a Pavlovian cocaine-conditioned response in animal models using voluntary locomotor responses as target response measures that in the past have and would otherwise lead to a variety of false positives. The significance of showing unambiguous cocaine drug conditioning to exteroceptive environmental stimuli is that Pavlovian drug conditioning is a primitive type of learning below conscious level of awareness that has been identified as the major mechanism mediating craving and relapse following therapeutic rehabilitation. Unfortunately, it is a mechanism that operates across drugs to reinstate a partial drug response and craving in the absence of a drug. Moreover, it is resistant to extinction by standard methods. Thus, relapse in abstinent individuals is a common phenomenon with obvious untoward societal implications.

The relevance of this background in theory construction, model formation, and methodology came to the fore when, after about ten years of research into the Macedonian ethnic identity, I was forced to accept the idea that ethnicity as a scientific concept was inadequately defined with no agreement in relation to objective anchoring markers to help identify an ethnic identity, unlike the related concepts of race and nationality. The influential analysis of Curta (2001), although coming too late, substantially confirmed this unsettled picture as to what ethnicity is exactly and what kinds of evidence apply. It was not as if definitions, including operational definitions, did not exist, but that there was no agreement as to the type of evidence entailed by each definition that would be necessary and sufficient for an inference of ethnic identity. Implicitly, the issue was and is that of construct validity; something needed if ethnicity is to ever become a useful scientific concept. In the face of this background of uncertainty, I fell back on my theory and model building experiences, as well as on my past experiences addressing convoluted methodological problems. Furthermore, my earlier background in philosophy of science suggested that nothing but a top-down approach was needed

where on my own I would have to develop both a theoretical model of ethnicity and decide also on what kinds of evidence apply; or more to the point, where that evidence is to be sourced from for a defensible inference of an ethnic identity. Inevitably, this was to become a bootstrap operation where I had to develop a general theoretical model of ethnicity at the same time as deciding on what kinds of evidence apply based on an independent logic function analysis of the ordinary language meaning of ethnicity. Finally, a rationale had to be developed and centered on basic science considerations to defend the choices made in terms of the nomological network of the general ethnicity model as well as the applicability of the independently derived domains of evidence. Essentially and in summary, it was a search for a solution to the problem of establishing construct validity for the concept of ethnic identity that is not to be found in the extant literature.

After the writing had been completed, a new domain of evidence appeared with immediate face validity fulfilling nicely the need for objective markers for ethnicity identification. This new domain was the genetic DNA studies of geographically defined European population samples roughly corresponding to parallel ethnically defined population groups, including a Macedonian sample and, for contrast/comparison, Greek and Bulgarian samples. This methodology was made possible by the discovery of haplotype bloc profiles uniquely characterizing each geographically defined ethnic population sampled. Unfortunately, however, this development was, in fact, a commercial application of genetic research technology basically focused on individuals rather than on ethnic or racial groups. Thus, the methodology in the application of sound genetic analysis procedures for such purposes may still be in question. This aspect of transduction of genetic DNA research from its normal linkage to disease syndromes to ethnicity identification had to be reexamined in detail before findings from this domain of evidence could be integrated into issues of ethnic identity. Some obvious problems in application are: how is ethnic identity that is socioculturally defined construct to be determined in the absence of independently defined phenotypes as is the case with genetically linked disease syndromes? How large must a sample be from a geographically defined population for a valid inference about a genetic DNA identification? Are the samples drawn need to be random? Finally, how many and what are the markers used to identity the unique haplotype blocs that characterize a selected group sample; and, are they same or different for the different comparison groups sampled?

Against this background of a multidiscipline approach and a convergent methodology to the problem of ethnicity identification of the present work, it should not be too shocking to state that I have no mentors to thank, no colleagues who might otherwise have helped me with the writing by their critiques and suggestions, nor, any guides to the complex problem of establishing construct validity; thus, I have an indebtedness only to those few authors of historical publications in the field that were a turning point in my decision to write. Enough shock, perhaps, and now comes the critical question every author has to face up to: "why write this book?"

When I came to America in early 1940 at age 12, my father had already been here (so also my two grandfathers before me who did not choose to stay). As my father was a successful businessmen, it was a "soft parachute landing," as immigrant experiences go, for my mother and I. The only real problem was the English language though, as might be anticipated, it was learned very quickly at that age. I was already bilingual by then; as I knew both the Macedonian and Greek languages. Herein, however, was a problem that would bedevil me in the later stages of my life. Given our non-Greek language, who were we as Macedonians? In my upbringing and later in my professional life, we were "Greeks," at worst, "Slavophone Greeks." The ancient Macedonians were Greek as found in coins and archaeological material remains, and we too, therefore, were Greek. However, many times we were insultingly called "Bulgarians" as my mother was by a Greek staff member at the American Consulate in Athens (my mother spoke only Macedonian). We were used to such insults in our native area; but all this was outweighed by the superb public school education offered to us, as well as by the idealistic young teachers, young women mostly, the best in Greece, the first generation to enter professional ranks, sent to us on a civilizing, humanitarian mission[6] (we had been only recently liberated from Ottoman Empire Turkish rule). Thus, I came to America with a "Greek consciousness" the global defining marker of Greek ethnicity and in this manner proceeded to walk through the middle age years of my life.

A background of conflicting information as to who we were based on public memory of critical historical events at the turn of the twentieth century of the native Macedonian insurgency from 1903 to 1908 and then the "liberation" of Macedonia by Greece in 1912/1913 increasingly occupied my thinking toward the end of my professional life and motivated casual exploration of the available historical texts both on modern as well as ancient Macedonia. The most influential was Eugene N. Borza's (1990) *In the Shadows of Olympus: The*

Emergence of Macedon. It was the first presentation where I would encounter the thesis that the ancient Macedonians had an identity apart from that of the ancient Greeks. The reading of Peter Green's (1991) *Alexander the Great from 358–325 BC* further confirmed this point of view through numerous examples showing that the small number of troops the Greek City States had placed under Alexander's command were never used as frontline troops and the Macedonians faced a far greater number of seasoned veteran Greek hoplites in the service of the enemy, the Persian emperor, Darius III. The earlier meticulous searches of Ernst Badian (1967) into the same question also confirmed this assessment of a separate Macedonian identity. All this background suggested a new start in the search for an answer on "who we are as Macedonians."

Another turn in my thinking came about due to Duncan M. Perry's (1988) work *The Politics of Terror: History of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement 1893–1903.* This work detailed the native Macedonian efforts toward autonomy and independence within the Ottoman Empire in the first decade of the twentieth century. The futile but noble and heroic struggle of the well-educated Macedonian youth at the cost of their lives left an indelible mark on me; even more so, the pictorial presentations shown in Polianski's (1971) *Gotse Delchev (VI).* The pictures of young Macedonians like me, had I lived in their time, all lost in their prime, touched me deeply as this part of our historical past had been cast aside, muted, and ground down by Greek historians (e.g., Martis, 1983; Vakalopoulos, 1991). Hitherto, this history was unavailable; only fragments in stories and songs were in my awareness as a youth growing up in Macedonia in the peaceful prewar years of 1940. Thus, it appeared to me that all the elements of the puzzle were now available and that it was my responsibility to the idealistic peers of my grandfather's day to give them voice and speak for them. Relying on some additional experiences in dealing with particularly difficult methodological issues in my own recent area of specialization in neuroscience, Pavlovian drug conditioning, I decided to solve the puzzle. That is, the perennial puzzle and question of "who are the Macedonians?"

It is customary for an author to state in the preface his aims, the sources, and authors who influenced him and his overall perspective. On one side of the ledger, the aim is to challenge the following myths about Macedonia: (1) there are no Macedonians, but only Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, and Albanians, that is, Macedonia is multiethnic; (2) the Slav-speaking majority population of Macedonia are of a Slavic ethnicity; (3) there is no connection between the modern Macedonians

and ancient Macedonians; and (4) the ancient Macedonians were of a Greek ethnicity, their language was Greek, and their symbols, heritage, and name are exclusively Greek. On the other side of the ledger, the intent is to (1) resolve the contradiction between a language-based ascription of a nonexistent Macedonian ethnic identity versus a hypothesized unitary, nonexclusionary Macedonian identity across language and region, based on critical sociocultural evidence; (2) develop a standard formulation of the Macedonian ethnic identity as a unitary ethnic identity across language and region anchored to observable and available historical, anthropological, sociocultural, and genetic DNA evidence (the principal theme of the present work); and (3) identify problems in development of the postulated unitary Macedonian ethnic identity.

I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the following authors and their major works on the development of ideas and methods in addressing the major issue of "Who the Macedonians Are." Thus, there is, as already mentioned, Duncan M. Perry's *The Politics of Terror: History of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement 1893–1903* (1988), Eugene N. Borza's *In the Shadows of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (1990), and Peter Green's, *Alexander of Macedon 358–325* (1991). Finally there is also Ernst Badian's (1967) research and his unrelenting, meticulous detective work in unearthing the evidence on the issue of "Greeks and Macedonians."

More than a token of appreciation needs to be acknowledged to Andrew Rossos (University of Toronto) and to Philip Shashko (University of Wisconsin), two historians, two fellow Macedonians with whom I have had some discussions and whose work has provided me invaluable documentary evidence at critical points in my thinking on "who the Macedonia are." George Vrantsidis, an engineer at St. Clair College, Windsor, Canada (from the Aegean part of Macedonia) and Goran Stojanov (from the Vardar part of Macedonia) both helped me with close reading of earlier drafts. They provided useful critical commentaries as well as additional sociocultural material on the dances and traditions of Macedonia. Professors Frank Middleton and Anthony Shrimpton both of SUNY Medical University at Syracuse (Syracuse, NY) were the two quintessential consultants who helped sort out the issues regarding applicability of the genetic DNA technology to issues of ethnic/race identity.

Finally, some general directions to the reader on how to read this book. The sequence of chapters is, of course, arbitrary; it may not be suitable to everyone. Each chapter is complete in itself and not dependent upon the others (modeled on Solzhenitsyn's memorable

autobiographical novel *The Cancer Ward*[7]). Thus, the reader may read and stop at any point. However, for the reader with little or no background, it is best to read the first three chapters in sequence and then choose and pick after that. For those with a professional background in history, anthropology, and/or political science, the first two chapters may be skipped entirely, as the present treatment is a top-down analysis of ethnicity complemented by available evidence on the selected topic of "Who the Macedonians Are." An anthropologist may start with the last chapter (10); that is, with the 10 postulates of the general ethnicity model before proceeding to the methodological chapter (3). After that, the course and sequence is arbitrary. A historian and/or a political scientist may start with chapter 4, "The Historical/Political Manifestations of the Macedonian Identity," and then continue to the end before returning to the second chapter for a statement of the problem and basic questions addressed in order to assess what has been accomplished. The chapter on genetic DNA evidence is not for everyone but is essential for historians and anthropologists as a source of unexpected "essentialist" evidence in ethnicity identification. Finally, the eclectic reader with absolute minimalist instincts need not proceed beyond the first chapter as it is a summary overview with plenty of quotable material to choose from, written in a nontechnical popular style to a heightened literary quality.

1

Summary Overview: Some Historical Facts on the Ground

Macedonia is largely a land-locked Balkan region with the Serbian frontier in the north and the Albanian frontier in the west. On the east and south are the Pirin and Aegean portions of Macedonia, now parts of Bulgaria and Greece. Within these confines there is, since 1991, a new Balkan country known by its official name as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which Greece recognizes internally as *Skopia*.[1] The term "Macedonia" in Greece is reserved for that region in Northern Greece that roughly corresponds to the ancient kingdom of Macedon at the time of Philip II and Alexander the Great. Later on, these borders would expand greatly in the Hellenistic era to include all three portions above. The Macedonians in FYROM have named their country *Republic of Macedonia,* and their official language is "Macedonian," a Slav-oriented dialect[2] that was codified as a language only in 1951 with the help of an American Harvard Slav-specialist, Horace G. Lunt. The Macedonians in Greece are rapidly being assimilated into a Greek identity (Karakasidou, 1994; 1997); and, in a parallel development, the Macedonians in Bulgaria into a Bulgarian identity (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). The reader, by now, can already see conflict, inconsistency, if not confusion, as to just who these Macedonians are; or, importantly, where these Macedonians are: in FYROM, in Northern Greece, in West Bulgaria, or in all three. An introduction suitable to this kind of complexity, where the name of a country, its people, and ethnicity—as well as its authenticity as a nation—are all in dispute, would at least need a summary overview of the material presented as a whole in order not to lose the reader right at the outset. That is the objective of the present chapter.

The narrative on the Macedonians begins with outside observers and their impressions while the Macedonians are in deep slumber,

completely ignorant of their past, quite innocent of their potential as a tinder box ready to be lit for insurrections and bloody Balkan wars at the dawn of the twentieth century. At this stage, Major William Leake was, perhaps, the first to explore the Macedonian ethnological landscape, and he did so on his way to the Janinna court of the colorful Albanian chieftain, Ali Pasha of Tepeleni. He gingerly reported to the British government on the "extent of the Bulgarian-speaking population of Macedonia" without comment or commitment as to who these Macedonians actually were (Plomer, 1935: 124–125). By the first decade of the nineteenth century, Ali Pasha was a major player in the region in the context of the then Ottoman Empire that included Albania, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria in the Balkans, the present-day Turkey in Asia Minor, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq in the Middle East, and Egypt and Libya in Africa. Ali Pasha held sway, if not absolute control, over Southern Albania, Western Macedonia, Epirus, and most of Western Greece including parts of Peloponnesus as a vassal overlord under the Turkish Sultan. Importantly for the rival powers of the day, France and Great Britain, Ali Pasha also controlled the strategically located Western Greek seaports opposite the French-held Ionian islands in this part of the Eastern Mediterranean over which French and British interests were centered (Brewer, 2001).

Ali Pasha was to provide a base as well as much-needed supplies such as lumber, food, and water to the rival naval contingents of France and Great Britain that were at war at the time. Major Leake's mission, therefore, was to secure an exclusive agreement toward these aims for his country and his country alone. To reach the court of Ali Pasha in Northwest Greece, he obviously had taken the overland route through Macedonia from Istanbul (Constantinople), the seat of the Ottoman Empire; and, with the peculiarly eccentric interests of an Englishman of his time, he made the reported insightful observation above (Plomer, 1935). Later on, such observations would provide a basis for language-based assessments of the Macedonian identity, all pointing to its nonexistence. To his credit, however, Major Leake never made such an inference.

With the massive conversion to Islam in the seventeenth century, Albania provided some of the most elite troops in the service of the Sultan as well as outstanding military officers and civilian heads of government dispersed all over the empire. In Egypt a minor Albanian functionary, originally from Kavala, Macedonia, Mohammed Ali Pasha, was sent there in 1800 at the turn of the century with a contingent of 300 Albanian troops to help native and British troops expel the French occupiers and to quell some local disturbances. Eventually

he established himself as a provincial governor and proved to be a resourceful ally for the Sultan in keeping check over restless regional disturbances including the rebellion in Greece.

By the early part of the nineteenth century Ali Pasha of Tepeleni was already well-established as a vassal overlord of the region (Brewer, 2001). He held court for civilian and diplomatic affairs with the outside world at the city of Janinna (Northwest Greece) and at Tepeleni (Southwest Albania), which served as his military base and center of operations. Traveling on horseback from Janinna, Lord Byron, the famed English poet, went to Tepeleni and visited his court. He subsequently recalled his impressions in his long poem *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (see appendix 1), pointedly identifying the men of Macedon with their blood-red scarves among Ali Pasha's multiethnic military as a distinct ethnic group. Thus, in the first documented instance, a cultural feature, namely, the crimson (blood-red) scarves over their vests and *foustanella*, marks the Macedonians as a separate ethnic identity in sharp contrast to the previous language-based tentative attempt by Major Leake to identify the Macedonians potentially as Bulgarians.

Here is a first glance into the Macedonians; there is already a question as to who they are. Are they Macedonians or Bulgarians?

Ali Pasha, in his time, was well known in Europe's social as well as diplomatic and military circles. The French novelist Alexandre Dumas mentions him favorably (but erroneously) as a person of noble character in his major work *The Count of Monte Cristo.* For the West, he was the little Napoleon of the Balkans, reflecting his talent for war and success in battle. At a more local level, there is to this day a lasting place for him in peoples' memories for his many daring exploits against competing bandit chieftains whom he subdued, but more so, for his repeated defiance and show of independence from Turkish absolutism that eventually would cost him his life a decade later.

Impressed by his military and diplomatic talents and show of local power, he was offered the overall command to lead the Greek revolution by the numerous *Kapitans* (chieftains) of the rebel guerrilla/outlaw bands operating in Rumeli (Epirus) and the Morea (Peloponnesus).[3] Almost all were Christian Albanians who had served him earlier in his court as pages and, later on in adulthood, as officers in his military contingents (Brewer, 2001; Plomer, 1935). They hoped that at this critical moment, he would abandon Islam, turn to Christianity, and lead them. They were turned down, as such offers, in his estimate, were made by men of doubtful character who had comically skirted

in the past between loyalty and treason. His distrust and paranoia of those around him could inspire no more than a momentary loyalty. Treason, treachery, and shifting loyalties were the rule of the day sapping effectiveness throughout the Sultan's realm. In time Ali the Lion, as he came to be known locally, passed on as a folk hero in the surrounding regions despite extreme cruelty to friends and foes alike, exceeding even the most imaginative depravity, treachery, and all-around mayhem (Plomer, 1935). His valor is still celebrated in Greek and Macedonian folk songs[4] as apparently, even a downtrodden, subjugated people need heroes; a most primitive Homeric need at that in those whom history has left behind; a need suppressing even elementary considerations as to decency and nobility in those that pass on from the past as heroes of the present. Hatred for Ottoman rule had by now reached such levels of desperation; and, already, outbreaks in Greece (1821) and Serbia (1815) were leading the way toward independence. Ali Pasha had shown them, and later on the Macedonians, that overwhelming Turkish military might could be defeated.

Macedonia was a quiescent *terra incognita* when Major Leake passed through; a *terra incognita* in the sense that the Macedonians were unknown to the outside world and the Macedonians themselves did not know who they were. No doubt, the centuries of occupation especially that of the preceding 400-year Ottoman Turkish rule had erased all public memory of who they were. They were functionally amnestic regarding Macedonia's past; and, thus, no organized movement against the conqueror could be formed. My own ancestor Damian (or *Damche* in the Macedonian vernacular), from whom we acquired the family name, helped build the Patriarchate Orthodox Church in Bitusha (Lerin/Florina) whereupon he gained his reputation as the strongest man in the village as he single-handedly lifted the large round stone on which, until the present time, the altar stood.

In the wake of Ali Pasha's recently acquired dominion over Western Macedonia, newly arrived Moslem Albanian settlers placed themselves in strategically located small hamlets among the mountain villages. They were to dominate and control the surrounding local population for the town-dwelling Turkish overlords in nearby Monastir/Bitola, soon to become an important military and diplomatic center in the empire. Down below in the fertile low lands were their large *ciflicks* (estates) that had been originally ceded to the conquering Ottoman Turks, the "Ghazis" in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As acolytes to the Turks, the Albanians were there to ensure peace over the tenant Christian farmers tiling the land. At times a Christian villager would rise up in rage and punish the Albanians and then leave for

the mountains or exile in America.[5] There was once a man called "Yankoula" who left our village never to return, save for one singular punitive raid selectively administered on culprit Albanians who had forced his wife into another marriage.

As the nineteenth century wore on, the role of the Albanians began to diminish. The Ottoman Empire was now modernizing its army along European lines; and, at best they were to become an irregular force in times of need or integrated into regular army units. Concurrently, as their role diminished, a drive to autonomy and independence was about to begin in their own native Albania.[6] All day long, the Albanians would remain idle in their *Koulas* (fortified guard towers) in the Christian villages, except when preoccupied by petty feuds, personal vendettas, and punitive raids on targeted villagers. Some served as field guards watching over Turkish as well as Christian-held lands. At the end of the day, they would return to their homes in small isolated hamlets. Thanks to their conversion to Islam and, importantly, their acquired right to bear arms, they would have the Christian villagers till their small plots of land on Sundays to provide life's bare necessities. The Albanians were a simple people, living a Spartan life, and were never to acquire the more sophisticated taste for luxury and polygamy of the indolent, city-dwelling Turks in towns nearby. Generally, according to traditional Albanian canon, they left untouched wives, children, and families of men they targeted for punishment. My mother's childhood stories even told of their piety as they would stoop to pick up from the ground the slightest bread crumb in a graceful/grateful acknowledgment to their Allah for such bounties as had been given them. Childhood stories of my mother also told of their tragic end, when in 1923, a decade after the Turkish overlords left Macedonia with the end of Ottoman rule, tattered and battered remnants from small hamlets trekked their way in loaded oxen carts toward Eastern Thrace and safety in Moslem Turkey (see also Karakasidou, 1997: 294). Few survived beyond the nearest mountain range, according to my mother's estimate.[7]

For more than 400 years the Ottomans had ruled Macedonia and the surrounding Balkan provinces that in time either alone or with the help of foreign powers would evolve into the present-day Serbia (1815), Greece (1831), and Bulgaria (1878). Ethnic identity had no real meaning, in the Turkish era, if it ever had any meaning at all. Long ago it had lost its significance in the daily life of the Christians in the empire, nor, did it ever have any in the preceding Roman, Eastern Roman, and Byzantine Empires. Now, only religion mattered since as Christians they could not bear arms nor take part in

the official life of the empire. In the absence of schools and/or other means of communication with the outside world, the Macedonians like their Greek Christian brethren further down south waited to be enlightened by outside observers, by outside experts, informed about their regional history and problems. The Greeks were more fortunate in this as there were strong sympathetic Philhellenic organizations in the capitals of most major powers in Europe (e.g., Lord Byron's circle in England); and, closer still for material and military expertise were the highly supportive branches of the Phanariote *Philike Etairia* (Friendship Society)[8] in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in Russia and Romania. This organization would in time rekindle Greek national consciousness and give it focus and direction (Brewer, 2001). Moreover, the Greek language presented, if nothing else, a demonstrable linkage with the ancient Greeks to the outside world and thus cleared the way for recognition by the Great Powers as a historically well-established ethnic identity with a justifiable claim to nationhood and independence.

By contrast, no such linguistic continuity existed for the Macedonians as the original ancient Macedonian language had been lost in the intervening millennia. Thus, for them, no external material and intellectual support would materialize. When it did come, in the form of schools, churches, and, eventually, small armed rebel-guerrilla bands toward the end of the same century and into the next century, it was foreign and divisive (Brailsford, 1906/1971; Perry, 1988; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). It took advantage of the linguistic fault lines of the then-existing Macedonia serving exclusively the expansionist dreams of the surrounding Balkan countries of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and even Romania that now claimed them as their own, that is, the Slav, Vlach, and Greek speakers of Ottoman Macedonia (Shashko, 1995). The intent was to win hearts and minds and turn the Macedonians into patriotic Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Romanians. Inevitably, these outside forces came into conflict not only among themselves, but also against an initially inconsequential native Macedonian revolutionary organization within Macedonia that was just now being formed by a small nucleus of an emerging educated elite of the majority Slav-speaking population. This was the infamous IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) that was to become, after a little more than a decade, Europe's most dreaded terrorist organization at a time when terrorism still had some degree of respectability. In this way, Macedonia entered the twentieth century divided in spirit and ideology with a tragic fratricidal civil war on its hands and an insurmountable

drain on resources and manpower for the planned struggle against the Ottoman Turks from 1896 to 1908 (Polianski, 1972). Against this backdrop of ignorance of the past, lack of international recognition as a separate ethnic identity, and lack of a native educated elite as a counter, events in Macedonia were completely dominated by foreign initiatives (Rossos, 1991b). Worse still, the Macedonians were splintered into numerous factions and ideologies even before the critical first decade of revolution and civil strife against the Ottomans, ending in a dismal failure, with catastrophic consequences, as nothing was resolved or achieved.

Such were the circumstances that set the stage for the subsequent vicious circle of misinformation, confusion, and distortion under the erroneous, foreign-imposed rubric of a multiethnic Macedonia that has since held Macedonia hostage to foreign initiatives and has given rise to the incredibly misplaced Macedonian Question (e.g., Danforth, 1991; Glenny, 1996; Ivanovski, 1992; Perry, 1988; Pettifer, 1992; Roudometof, 2000) based on an erroneous, undisclosed, unrecognized tacit assumption that language/linguistic dialect in the case of Macedonia could be used to ascribe ethnic identity as it had for Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece earlier. Had the Macedonians been accepted at the outset as Macedonians with a distinctive ethnic identity, there never would have been a Macedonian Question. That is, there never would have been a question as to "who the Macedonians are," "to whom Macedonia belongs," "how many of each, Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians," and "extent of geographical boundaries," all components of the perennially unsolved Macedonian Question (Danforth, 1991; Glenny, 1996; Ivanovski, 1992; Perry, 1988; Pettifer, 1992). This is a question that still haunts major power diplomacy today (Daskalovski, 2006); a question that baffles the Macedonians as to how it came to be; a question reluctantly addressed below; a hundred years later, a hundred years too late, perhaps.

The Macedonians, at the dawn of the twentieth century, had no inkling of what the ancient Macedonian language was, had mistakenly assumed that ancient Greek had been their language, and that, therefore, were Greek; importantly, they had no literary legacy left to them and, also, they themselves had only a rudimentary Slav-oriented dialect (written at times in the Greek or Cyrillic alphabets; also see note 2). The Macedonians could not speak for themselves, as they had no literary language of their own; worse still, there was a clear disconnect with the ancient Macedonians that was never bridged. They had no heritage, no history to appeal to, no native institutions, and total amnesia of the past. In a real sense, they were a lost people

with no defenses against divisive/destructive *deethnicization* outside influence in the form of schools, churches, and, eventually, armed rebel bands. By the end of the nineteenth century, after 500 years of Ottoman rule, this was the outcome.

It was in such circumstances that Sir Arthur J. Evans, the discoverer of the Minoan remains at Knossos, Crete, wrote his famous letter to the *Times* of London (September 29, 1903), stating emphatically that "there are no Macedonians," just "Bulgars, Greeks, Roumans (Vlachs), Albanians, Turks, and Gypsies." This conceptual framework became widely accepted by the Great Powers and it was tailor-made for the expansionist dreams of neighboring Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and even Romania (Shashko, 1995). These Balkan Powers had, for a long time, planned to carve up Macedonia, and these dreams were realized in the first and second Balkan wars of 1912/1913 following the failure of the Macedonian insurgency from 1903 to 1908 (Perry, 1988; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

Here is a second glance into the Macedonians; the Macedonians of a century ago attempting and failing to emerge as a nation against a backdrop of a confused historical past with no international support; or even the bare minimum, recognition as people.

In international diplomatic circles, the error of regarding the Macedonian identity as being multiethnic, that is, the assumption that there are no Macedonians, began quite early in the twentieth century when the hyphenated "Bulgarian-speaking," "Greek-speaking," "Vlach-speaking," and "Albanian-speaking" labels were dropped by subsequent surveyors of the Macedonian ethnological landscape (by Sir Arthur J. Evans, 1903, and H. N. Brailsford, 1906/1971, among others) in favor of the simplistic "Bulgarian," "Greek," "Vlach," and "Albanian" appellations as labels designating ethnic identity.[9] This multiple ethnicity categorization of the Macedonians at a time when they were just beginning to awaken following the 500-year dark age period could not be effectively countered by the small newly emergent Macedonian educated elite that itself had been misled along these mistaken ethnicity categorizations by the host countries of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Romania where the Macedonians had gone for higher education. This mislabeling, which continued throughout the twentieth century, had a devastating effect on the development of the Macedonian identity as it fostered the idea that *there are no Macedonians at all.* Macedonia was understood to be a region peopled by various ethnic groups—not a nation, but a region to be annexed by the surrounding "mother countries" upon the

expected demise of the "sick man of Europe" (i.e., the Ottoman Empire).

No one realized the enormity of the error then, this sleight of hand by which a language ascription could be turned into an ethnic identity ascription. Critically, the error was that of converting an ethnicity indicator (i.e., language) that has a degree of probability in correctly identifying an ethnic identity, but also a degree of error, into a definitive ethnicity identification that would leave no room for error or disagreement. The error was enormous because in the marginal probability that language might be an erroneous indicator of ethnicity lay the possibility that the Slav-Macedonian dialect or, equally, the Greek or Vlach dialects were acquired, not by population changes and displacements of the original Macedonian population as is implied by the linguistic criterion, but by linguistic adaptation of a conquered people to changing sets of rulers and circumstances, that is, a series of adaptive linguistic responses to the successive hegemony by Roman, Eastern Roman, Byzantine, Bulgarian, and Serbian Middle Age Empires. Scotland, Wales, and Ireland are patent examples of such a process and it is a process that can be easily observed in the present-day Aegean Macedonia, and it has been amply documented in recent anthropological studies showing a transition from a Slav- to a Greek-speaking native population (Karakasidou, 1993b; 1997).

To the major powers of Europe at the turn of the century, the idea of a multiethnic Macedonia was a congenial simplification as it provided a needed rationale for accepting the partition of Macedonia following the two Balkan wars by the Balkan Power Treaty of Bucharest in 1913. Ignored was the 1896–1908 struggle and insurgency against the Ottoman Turks and the drive for independence by the Macedonians themselves. For the outside world, there were no Macedonians; only Bulgars, Greeks, and Serbs, each fighting for an associated "mother" country. Moreover, this view of a multiethnic Macedonia was buttressed by a historical literature that was just beginning to emerge pointing to a major Slav migration southward into Macedonia in the sixth/seventh century AD. This was apparently, according to Florin Curta (2001), a nineteenth-century invention by European historians. However, if indeed it ever took place, some writers contend (Shea, 1997) this movement did not stop at Macedonia but continued southward to inundate the entire Greek peninsula, not just Macedonia. This sparsely documented historical account of how the Slav-Macedonian dialect came to be in Macedonia, that is, by displacement of the original native Macedonian population by Slav invaders, leaned heavily on anecdotal reports by distant

observers (Curta, 2001). Although it contradicted many of the surviving sociocultural features of the native Macedonian population, it became, nonetheless, an open license for the divergent and conflicting historical accounts of Macedonia by neighbor country historians (e.g., Bozhinov and Panayotov, 1978; Gounaris, 1996; Jovanovich, 1941; Martis, 1983; Kofos, 1983; 1989; Vakalopoulos, 1991) each suited to claims on the Macedonian population as being ethnically Greek, Bulgar, Serb, and/or Romanian. Pointedly in these accounts, the ancient Macedonians disappear as contributors to the ethnic mix, and the question of what happened to them was never considered. Ignored were such features as the native dress, folk dances, traditions in the home, systems of first and last names (before 1913), some of which show a linkage to the ancient Macedonians but all of them suggest evidence in direct opposition to the idea of a multiethnic Macedonia and specifically on the issue of the Macedonians as Slavs (e.g., the absence of Slavic first names in resurgent/revolutionary Macedonia of 1896–1908 (see chapter 6).

Language-based ascriptions of ethnicity, marginally tied to sixth/seventh century AD Slav incursions, which had worked well in the earlier Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian independence struggles, provided the European Powers a basis for accepting the partition of Macedonia by their client Balkan states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece in the aftermath of the Balkan wars and the ensuing Versailles Peace Treaties of World War I. Outside of Macedonia, it was generally assumed at this period that the Macedonian dialect was a version of the Bulgarian language—hence the label "Bulgars" (Brown, 2003: 12; Perry, 1992; 1993; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004) for the majority Slav-speaker population of Macedonia—but the Macedonian dialect is also similar to the Serbian language, hence the claim on them as "Old Serbs" by Serbia. For Greece, they were Greek Orthodox Christians; and, thus, "Bulgarophone Greeks"; but for the Ottoman Turks, all Christians regardless of ethnicity were "Rumlei," that is, "Romans" (as in Roman citizens). For the Christians, all Moslems in the empire were "Turks," that is, the Albanians, the Bosnians, the Pomacs, the Arabs, and others. As if to further punctuate this unexamined worldview of Macedonia, one could, in Paris, even choose from a restaurant menu an item called *la salade Macedoine*.

Here is a third glance into the Macedonians; Macedonia for the outside world: a multiethnic mix; a region to be annexed by the "mother" countries of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

In all these political/diplomatic machinations that led to the partition, that is, to the dismemberment of Macedonia in 1913, the

Macedonians had no say; they were never asked; there was no plebiscite; nor at this early stage in development could they have offered an informed voice against it. They were in their awakening. Their ethnic identity had not yet crystallized (Rossos, 1995). It lagged far behind the national consciousness that had inspired the drive to autonomy and independence from 1903 to 1908. Nonetheless, there were some attempts by various émigré Macedonian groups from Bulgaria to stop the dismemberment of Macedonia at the post–World War I Peace Conference negotiations for final border settlement in the Balkans, only to be coldly dismissed as being ethnic "Bulgarians" representing the losing party, Bulgaria, that had sided with the Central Powers.

Ethnic minorities wanted as candidate states for Self-determination Under President Wilson's 14-point plan: Irish and Macedonians need not apply.

Clearly for the Macedonians, there was to be no outside help as there was for Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria earlier. They were not a people. Once again, they had to look to themselves for salvation as in the revolutionary events of Ilinden in 1903. It was not until the next great war, World War II, that the opportunity would present itself for achieving nationhood. They then created the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as wartime partisans in Tito's partisan army as a component republic within the Federal Yugoslav Republic (1944) (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). As important as this step was, as Macedonia now became a nation for the first time, it included only the Vardar region of Macedonia. Much later, an independent Macedonian Republic emerged (1991) in the aftermath of the break-up of the Yugoslav state with already compromised borders (i.e., without the Aegean and Pirin regions of Macedonia that had become parts of Greece and Bulgaria by the Treaty of Bucharest since 1913).

Currently existing borders with Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria were reluctantly agreed upon to facilitate international recognition; especially, recognition by her close Balkan neighbors. These concessions notwithstanding, disputes regarding its name (with Greece), its ethnic identity and history (with Bulgaria), and its internal treatment of the Albanian minority surfaced all at once at international levels of diplomacy clouding its chances as a nation among nations threatening even its very survival (Daskalovski, 2006).

At the heart of these disputes lay the question of "Who the Macedonians Are," which remained an open issue in wide diplomatic circles, delaying full recognition in the community of nations. Here, the blame could be placed on no one but the Socialist Republic of Macedonia that, as a captive state within a South-Slav (Yugoslav)

culture from 1944 to 1991, was never able to achieve independent historical scholarship in addressing such basic questions as "Who the Macedonians Are" and the relation of the present-day Macedonians to the ancient Macedonians (e.g., Chorovich, 1990) whose 16-ray burst-sun symbol they, nevertheless, adopted as their first flag.

Right from the start, international recognition was beset by a major dilemma and there was a concrete basis for it. The problem was real; not a superficial concoction by her partitionist neighbors, Greece and Bulgaria as much as the Macedonians might have wanted to believe. The dilemma was as follows: on the one hand, if the Macedonians, according to accepted historical accounts, are descendants of the Slav invaders into Macedonia, how could they then claim to be Macedonians? On the other hand, current international practice as well recent anthropological concepts of ethnicity, both, by principle, allow an emerging nation to choose a name by which it wishes to be recognized. This dilemma, which will be addressed in the present work as a major theme, remains unresolved. Not surprisingly, disputes over its chosen name persist, especially with Greece as Greece claims exclusive ownership over the name, *Macedonia*, its symbols, and heritage. Modern scholarship would dispute such a claim as considerable surviving evidence suggests an ancient Macedonian ethnic identity apart from that of the Greek (e.g., Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990; Green, 1991). So far, however, this view has not reached a sufficient level of persuasiveness to influence international diplomacy except perhaps for the major powers that have, as a consequence, given full recognition to the Macedonian state with its chosen name.

Here is a fourth glance into the Macedonians; Macedonia, a country emerging as a nation among nations, with challenged legitimacy, with uncertain and confused claim to nationhood, a tangled historical past with a blockade on her borders by Greece.

Recollections handed down from my parents and grandparents and from my own early experiences in Greece up to World War II, at first glance, would appear to present an inside look into Macedonia by those who lived through its early critical years in the twentieth century. Quite obviously this is *public memory*; and, therefore, *anecdotal* as evidence, with all the shortcomings such a label implies. More to the point, these recollections eventually turned out to be flawed in light of later scholarly treatments of the same period. Shockingly for me, this source, which seemed rock-solid, as it was primary eyewitness oral evidence handed down to me, nonetheless, proved to be basically false, if not, completely false.

I realized for the first time how flawed this handed-down public memory was when I read Duncan Perry's *The Politics of Terror: A History of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement 1893–1903* (1988). For example, my grandfather saw the 1903–1908 native Macedonian insurgency and drive for autonomy/independence as essentially a choice for the native Macedonian population between siding with Greece or with Bulgaria. He assessed the IMRO revolutionary bands, commonly known as the "Comitadjis," to be nothing more than instruments of Bulgarian expansionist dreams on Macedonia. There was considerable suggestive evidence for this view as in fact it was led by Bulgarian-educated elite that had sizable support from Bulgaria at the early phase. Moreover, my grandfather, who remained outside the fray at the time, knew or suspected that there were trusted people who secretly worked for the IMRO in each village and he thought he knew who they were in his own village. This was, in his estimate, a conspiratorial arrangement tilting toward future annexation by Bulgaria. Overall, the choice of Greece over Bulgaria (about 60 percent versus 40 percent in the Florina region) after the calamitous 1903 uprising was based on the belief of a superior Greek culture, ancient and modern, an altogether familiar theme in Macedonian history. Besides, this was a Patriarchate village where my grandfather lived. However, unknown to my grandfather, the Macedonians had a shadow underground republic.

The activist secret membership of the IMRO in villages and towns throughout Macedonia in the period from about 1900 to 1908 was organized along a tiered two-track hierarchical system of organization (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). The committee was the basic unit of organization, hence, the common name, Comitadjis, for the IMRO rebel/guerrilla bands. This twin-track clandestine underground system of organization began at the bottom with the villages and towns, extending to counties and provinces as the geographical base with a central committee at the top located in the chief city of Salonica. There was also an antagonist/rival organization located in Sofia called the Supreme Committee—hence the confusion for many Macedonians. Power and control went from top to bottom over both the social/political and associated military committees or guerrilla bands. One or the other of these field level committees would exercise local control; but, usually, it was the commander of the military unit (often, the carrier of instructions and decisions from the top, that is, from the central committee). Advanced Socialist ideals were consciously and deliberately embedded in these underground organized societal units involving establishment of schools, court systems, finance, and

so on. For the most part, the rebel chiefs were Socialists by conviction and education. Democracy did exist in its roughest form in this shadowy underground government. More often than not, the charisma and reputation of a leader at any given level would prevail and he would exercise complete control. Against such a background of clandestine and secretive existence, the tight security that was needed was imposed with extreme severity, that is, with the death penalty. Had the Balkan Powers decided to help Macedonia, and not dismember her as they did in the Balkan wars of 1912/1913, Macedonia would have emerged as a nation among nations with a readymade legitimate government organized along modern Socialist/Democratic lines of development. The key was the high school and university education of almost all the top leadership at every level.

Not knowing the full nature of the IMRO drive to autonomy and independence, most villagers like my grandfather chose to remain neutral. Understandably, at a great cost as they unknowingly placed themselves in the cross-hairs of marauding, rampaging Turkish *bashi bouks* (irregular forces); or, worse still, rival revolutionary bands roving about the Macedonian countryside, hitting opportunistically targeted Turkish military units, rival bands or recalcitrant villagers. In critical moments, to escape such calamities, the villagers, forewarned, would seek safety in the fastness of large mountain forests for days at a time, leaving their homes, livestock, and fields hostage to murderous contending forces at war. At times, with no forewarning, a rival insurgent band would come and burn the whole village, killing women, children, and men in their own homes (i.e., the Greek mercenary bands, the "Andartes"); or, sparing women and children (i.e., the IMRO Comitadji bands). Ironically, Turkish military security units largely confined their actions to extermination of betrayed and trapped guerrilla bands in villages (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004).

What my grandfather and villagers like him did not know was that very quickly the Macedonians in the IMRO leadership (Delchev, Gruev, and Sugarev) saw through the machinations of the Bulgarian government and military staff who controlled the Supremist organization to eventually annex Macedonia to Bulgaria. At this point, the IMRO leadership broke away; and before long, suspected traitors in the ranks of each party were being eliminated. Thus, the drive to autonomy and independence was Macedonian in nature, not Bulgarian, and it was fought by Macedonians alone. Unfortunately under such circumstances, only a few trusted men in the ranks could be told the stark realities as outside support especially from Bulgaria was

considered crucial and no one really wanted a break from it. Moreover, consideration of morale in the field was also critical and, thus, the full story remained in the hands of the leadership. This contrasts strongly with the Greek revolution a century earlier and the outside support it received as expressed, for example, in the magnanimity of Lord Byron who would spend his fortune and life in its cause.

Duncan Perry's (1988) book revealed another tragic aspect in the IMRO drive to autonomy/independence, the need for a double level of secrecy. The IMRO leadership needed a double level of secrecy to keep its organization and operations secret from both the Turkish military and security forces and from the villagers and towns people who would and did betray them. In the meantime, the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian excursions into Macedonia with their schools, churches, and small armed bands had done their job well (Brailsford, 1906/1971). The Macedonians were led to believe in salvation only from the outside, from the "mother countries" that would come to help them break the harsh Turkish yoke. A "good guys—bad guys" scenario developed as a result with countrywide divided loyalties. A select few on each side knew something of what was happening but only on their side of the struggle. In the midst of this overwhelming need for security, there was not enough time for the IMRO leadership to properly inform and prepare the Macedonians as to the true nature of the armed struggle, which at the time of the August 2, 1903, Ilinden (St. Elija's Day) uprising, had developed into four-front war against the Ottoman Turks, Greek-sponsored rebel/guerrilla bands as well as those sponsored by Serbia and Bulgaria. All these outside forces aimed to defeat the native Macedonian struggle for autonomy and independence. By 1908, they largely succeeded.

Perhaps to convey the atmosphere of insecurity, uncertainty, and the daily dread of catastrophe in the Macedonian villages, the famous ballad of "Giorgi Sugareto" might be recalled. According to the ballad, Giorgi Sugarev was lured into a trap by a desperate plea sent to him from the village of Paralovo (an ominous name for a village): "Come save us from complete destruction by the murderous *bashi bouks*" (Turkish irregular forces). With his small rebel guerrilla/outlaw band, Giorgi heard the plea from Paralovo and hastened to rescue. On reaching the village, he found himself in a defenseless open field surrounded by regular Turkish Security Forces. Betrayed, the rebels were killed to the last man and Giorgi Sugarev, as the song goes, used the last bullet on himself. Whether the village was indeed threatened with extermination and the villagers decided to cooperate, and, thus, to save themselves, betrayed Giorgi Sugarev, or, whether

the betrayal was the work of a single traitor for a price is an issue that has never been cleared.

"Giorgi Sugareto," as he is famously known, was born in the provincial town of Monastir or Bitola in what is now *The Republic of Macedonia*. At the time, Monastir was not only an important administrative center in Ottoman-held Macedonia but it also had a Turkish Military Academy. Its most famous pupil was a fellow Macedonian, but a Moslem, *Kemal Ataturk,* then known as "Mustafa Kemal" (possibly of Albanian/Macedonian parentage) who eventually became the savior and creator of the modern Turkish State (Lord Kinross, 1963). Monastir was a hub of intense European diplomatic activity with Legations by all the major powers of Europe. Giorgi Sugarev was from a well to do cultured Macedonian family. He and his sister would play the violin and piano in soirees at his home. On one such night, a Sergeant with the Turkish Security Forces accompanied by two soldiers (the soldiers stayed outside) requested to speak to Giorgi Sugarev. Knowing what the visit was about, Giorgi asked the Turkish officer to wait until they were all outside before placing the handcuffs so as to avoid an ugly scene in front of guests and family. Thinking this was another young docile Macedonian student, the Sergeant complied. Once outside, young Giorgi (he was a student then) surprised the Sergeant, grabbed his pistol, and shot the two unsuspecting soldiers, and made off to the mountains, now a rebel/guerrilla outlaw like many Macedonians before him. Obviously, his membership in the secret IMRO organization was betrayed by someone close to him (Dimovski-Tsolev, 1968). This was the Macedonia of his time. Instead of support, more often than not, young Macedonians found treachery in their own people and death at the hands of Turkish Security/Extermination Squads. The similarity to events in revolutionary Ireland of the same period has been noted elsewhere (Rossos, 1994; Shea, 1997). In both countries, events suggest a deadly picture of young idealists struggling in the midst of an opportunistic moral relativism among more mature members of their society seeking to avoid the cross-hairs of murderous contending forces at war.

Outside of Macedonia, there were the enormous deliberate, "*realpolitic*" distortions and outright fabrications in the interpretation of the Macedonian identity as being multiethnic that was being promoted by neighboring Balkan states in order to annex Macedonian territory piecemeal and her population (Shashko, 1995: 179–180). Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that there was, to be sure, considerable sincerity on the part of the common Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian who was asked to support his side in the struggle, who

saw it as an attempt to liberate his brethren in occupied Macedonia from the harsh Ottoman rule they themselves had experienced. Mere focus on the *real-politic* policies of the surrounding Balkan countries does injustice to the common citizens who sincerely believed in the "liberation" of their follow countryman as a noble and worthy cause to support.[10] To this day, they are taken aback by a curious lack of respect for their "liberation" and as "liberators."

There were also some who came to Macedonia with eyes wide open: "we want Macedonia, not Macedonians." This perspective was to become official policy at the end of the Balkan hostilities before and after World War I. Worse still, such policies led to a "population exchange" between Greece and Bulgaria, which was "overseen" by a League of Nations Commission "to ensure its fairness" (Rossos, 1994; 1995). Self-reports by Macedonians to commission members that *they were not Bulgarians, Greeks, or Serbians—but Macedonians* never disturbed this well-meaning international machinery to ensure the "fairness" of the population exchanges. The dark reality was that these euphemistically called "population exchanges" were brutal ethnic cleansing actions by those who now occupied Macedonia in response to the slightest show of native resistance. Inevitable acculturation policies by the occupying powers in the interval between the two great wars that followed, as well as outbound mass immigration to Canada, Australia, and the United States sent the Macedonian identity into a downward devolutionary spiral toward oblivion with no hope for recovery.

Here is a fifth glance into the Macedonians; the Macedonians as people who never knew who they were, who never understood that the early armed struggle for autonomy and independence was by their own youth, their young elite, their best, almost all lost in the struggle. Lord Elgin was able to carve out the frontispiece friezes from the Parthenon as well as other Parthenon structures and ship them back to England without even a murmur of protest from the native Greek population. The Greeks were unwitting witnesses to this theft and desecration of their national heritage. They never knew. They had no remembrance of the past. The Macedonians a century later did not know; they too had no remembrance of the past when their land was being taken from right under them by Balkan neighbors posing as liberators.

These remarks above present a largely impressionistic/anecdotal account focused on the social/diplomatic/political developments in the modern history of Macedonia. If the reader found them obtuse, dense, and inaccessible, it is not a question of his intelligence nor that

of the writer and his talent. The reader may even feel that he now knows less about Macedonia and the Macedonians than before. This is a very typical response and it should not be a surprise. When it comes to writing about Macedonia, ancient and modern, the problem lies in the nature of the material presented. The ancient Macedonians left no writings about themselves, no written language, and not a clue as to who they were in their rush to adopt the advanced Greek culture of their neighboring Greek city states down south (Green, 1991). Who they were is still a "hot" scholarly issue (Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990; Cartledge, 2004; Hammond, 1991). Thus, the tangled distorted web of events and developments of Macedonia's problematic past confuses the present. For clarity, a complete paradigm shift is needed with an intense focus on the evidence from not one or another of the academic disciplines alone but from multiple relevant domains: historical/political sources, cognitive descriptor evidence, that is, self-reports by Macedonians to anthropologists and other investigators; sociocultural evidence encompassing psycholinguistic analysis of key features of the Macedonian Slav-dialect/language on the issue of its origins; and a detailed examination of the native dress, dances, family traditions, and of first and last name formulas. Thus, a multidimensional convergent methodology is used in the present work, drawing on the different domains of evidence all focused on the main issue "Who the Macedonians Are." This multidimensional approach can now be enriched by evidence from DNA genetic studies of the Macedonian ethnic identity and, for contrast and comparison, those of the neighboring Balkan states of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. As auxiliary but necessary material, a fully developed theoretical model of ethnicity is presented at the end, in chapter 10, as a top-down theoretical framework according to which the evidence sourced from the relevant domains is presented, evaluated, and integrated so that there is finally an informed answer to the question "Who the Macedonians Are."

2

Statement of the Problem and Basic Questions

Prolegomena

The central issue in writing about the Macedonians is simple: Who are the Macedonians? It is an old issue and a component part of the "Macedonian Question" (Glenny, 1996; Perry, 1988; Pettifer, 1992). The question of their ethnic identity has been asked regarding both the ancient and modern Macedonians. As to the ancient Macedonians, scholars such as Ernst Badian (1967) and Eugene Borza (1990) have provided critical original indirect evidence, that, contrary to the common notion, the ancient Macedonians had an ethnic identity apart from that of the Greeks.[1] Given, the significance of this scholarly development, the question can now be redirected to the modern Macedonians. Since the modern Macedonians already exist and are accessible to any historical and/or scientific inquiry, the issue appears to be deceptively simple: all one needs to do is to ask them—according to current thinking and practice in anthropology (Danforth, 1991; 1995; Karakasidou, 1997). However, for the Macedonians at the dawn of the twentieth century, this question of self-identity had no answer other than what Rossos (1995) has called a sense of *nie/nas*, *nashe*, or *nasheism* (we/us or ours), a practical mechanism to distinguish themselves from their neighbors, the Serbs, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Albanians. Whether there was a covert, suppressed, unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity in an underground existence (see results of the survey/questionnaire at the end of chapter 5) is a moot question at this early historical stage.

It should hardly be surprising that after more than 1,000 years of Roman, Eastern Roman, and Byzantine rule interspersed by intermittent Slav Bulgarian and Serbian Empire rule before the 500-year Ottoman Empire rule that followed, public memory was emptied of content and continuity with the past was lost. Thus, the issue of the

modern Macedonian identity is anything but simple; it is quite convoluted. There are so many layers of outside influence and an incredible degree of complexity as a result so that accessibility of the modern Macedonians for interview and self-report is hardly an advantage compared to the same question applied to the ancient Macedonians. Given another century of Serbian/Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, and Greek rule, the Macedonians are presently in no position to answer questions regarding their *ethnic* identity (as distinguished from their *national* identity) and any answers given by them (e.g., see Danforth, 1991; 1995; Karakasidou, 1997) are automatically suspect of being invalid due to outside influence in the form of cultural/political indoctrination. It is, nonetheless, the search for an answer, and, more importantly, the search for valid methods to unravel the complexities and complications in finding an answer that is the major subject of the present work, as well as the answer itself. For the moment, statement of the problem and basic questions should suffice as a start in the search for the Macedonian ethnic identity. That is the task of the present chapter.

On the question "Who the Macedonians Are," it was originally thought by foreign observers of the local scene that there are no Macedonians at all (Evans, 1903; Brailsford, 1907/1967; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). That is, there is no unique and separate Macedonian identity. This early simplistic assessment at the dawn of the twentieth century had a tragic consequence for the Macedonians in that Macedonia was now being presented to outside powers as a region with legitimate claims to it by neighboring Balkan states *rather than as a new nation waiting to emerge.* Thus, according to the best lights of the day, there were no Macedonians at all; and, therefore, there was no need for a Macedonia to be formed as a nation as had the neighboring states of Serbia (1815), Greece (1831), and Bulgaria (1878). Even a sometime enemy to the west, Albania, had managed to achieve recognition by the world powers at about the same time and did emerge as an independent nation after World War I. This was despite an absence of linguistic and/or historical continuity to their predecessors, the Illyrians. Why not the Macedonians?

The Macedonians had already gone through a failed bloody revolt in the summer of 1903 and this insurgency continued sporadically until 1912 (Perry, 1988; Pribichevich, 1982). Moreover, unlike the Albanians and the other Balkan ethnic groups, the Macedonians had a glorious past. Gladstone in recognition of this past declared for them in 1897 in a letter to the London *Times*, "why not Macedonia for the Macedonians." Earlier, Lord Byron had recognized them in

his long poem *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* as Macedonians by their blood-red crimson scarves (see appendix 1). Why then were the Macedonians set aside as people struggling for autonomy and independence from Ottoman rule and were never to receive outside help as had the Serbians, the Greeks, and the Bulgarians earlier? Why did the European powers accept the partition of Macedonia by the Balkan states in the post–World War I peace conferences? What were the peculiar characteristic features of the Macedonians that led to such overwhelming international denial and failure to assist at the birth of a new nation? *Again, why the assessment that there are no Macedonians*?

Initially, the assessment of a nonexistent Macedonian ethnic identity was made by unsophisticated professionals as well as by nonprofessionals; by travelers, archaeologists, and humanitarians who had come to Macedonia in the early part of the twentieth century to look into this then unknown region of the Balkans still within the Ottoman Empire (e.g., Evans, 1903; Brailsford, 1906/1971). This was a critical period for the Macedonians as they had just awakened from the long Turkish night, and their newly minted intellectual elite was immediately faced with the task of organizing a national struggle for autonomy and independence that was to lead to a four-front clandestine guerrilla/partisan war under conditions of utmost secrecy and security, from Turks, from rival outside groups aiming to annex Macedonian territories, and even, most painful of all, from their own village and towns' people (Sonnichesen, 1909/2004). Critically, at this early stage, they could not establish who they were ethnically either for themselves or for the outside powers (Rossos, 1994; 1995). They never understood the importance, the complexity of the issue, or the role it was to play in the arena of international politics.

Among the first to consider the issue of their identity and the most influential was the English archaeologist, Arthur J. Evans (1903). He had already uncovered the Minoan palace remains at Knossos, Crete; and, importantly, had traveled throughout Macedonia. After him, at the wake of the failed "Ilinden" revolt of 1903 came H. N. Brailsford from England to bring humanitarian aid to Macedonian victims of widespread Turkish atrocities and reprisals by competing outside insurgency bands. These self-made experts were all in agreement that there was no unique and separate Macedonian identity on the singular basis of language/dialect spoken (and/or religion) that, at the time, served as a marker for ethnic identity (see Badian, 1967, for an extensive discussion of this issue). Previously, the linguistic criterion had worked well for the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian identities and

even for the Albanians. In contrast, no thought was given to the possibility that language, in the case of Macedonia, might be a mistaken indicator as is the case with English in the British isles. As linguistic and historical continuity were the twin pillars of support in claims to nationhood and international recognition for Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria earlier, what happened in Macedonia? What and in what respect were the differences?

Linguistically, the majority population spoke a Slav-oriented dialect northward from the latitude of Salonica all the way to the Albanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian frontiers as shown in the *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Thernstrom et al., 1980: 609). In a southwestern direction from Salonica a small belt extending to the Epirus border spoke Greek as well as those to the southeast in the Chalkidike peninsula. Pockets of minority populations bordering on Epirus and Albania spoke Albanian and/or Vlach (Latin) dialects. Interspersed throughout were the Gypsies and the ruling Turks with their large country estates mostly dwelling in towns, enjoying, by now, the fruits of many centuries of occupation and rule. There were also Moslem Albanian villages in their midst. Nonetheless, this multilingual landscape should have been no surprise given the changing border situation where the Roman and then Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire control (Latin and/or "koine" Greek language influence) would intermittently changeover into Bulgarian and Serbian Slav Empire control (Slav language influence) in a span of about 500 years before and during the Middle Ages prior to the advance of the Ottoman Turks into the Balkans in the fourteenth century. What was lost sight of in this assessment of ethnicity by language was that the majority population spoke the Slav-oriented dialect that is intermediate between the Bulgarian and Serbian languages and that it was this single group that explicitly identified itself as "Macedonians" and sought to develop into a nation. What was also lost sight of and is of greater importance is that the Slav-Macedonian dialect had critical linguistic features suggesting linguistic adaptation to Bulgarian and Serbian Empire rule just prior to the Ottoman conquest; and not, as traditionally assumed, a reflection of large-scale population displacement by Slav settlers. In his book *The Making of the Slavs*, Florin Curta (2001) independently confirms this assessment through close examination and reinterpretation of Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire original documents as well as by archaeological studies of material cultural remains. Moreover, current genetically based investigations also suggest that there was no large-scale displacement of the original Macedonian population (Bosch et al., 2005). However,

these are rather late discoveries; too late for the Macedonians to fall back upon.

One simple answer to what went wrong for the Macedonians is that they could not show linguistic continuity with the ancient Macedonians as could the Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians. Though critical, it was not necessary, as the example of Albania would demonstrate. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that the language of the majority population was/is a Slav-oriented dialect *with no apparent relation to the ancient Macedonian (or to the "koine" Greek of the Hellenistic period)*. Worse yet, it was seen as a dialect of the Bulgarian language; thus, tilting the nationalistic Macedonians toward a Bulgarian ethnic identity (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). Moreover, the Macedonians could point to no modern pivotal events in their history as could the Serbians with their epic heroic battle at Kosovo Pole against the conquering Turks in 1354; or, in the case of the Bulgarians, their historical remembrance of migration from the Russian steppes into Bulgaria under their first ruler King Asparoukh (AD 681). For all these reasons, the Macedonians appeared to the outside world to have no legitimacy in their national struggle for autonomy and independence. In that there was a disjunction and bifurcation of the Macedonian national/political from the Macedonian ethnic identity (if not an outright contradiction), the struggle of the Macedonians for autonomy and nationhood in the first decade of the twentieth century was completely ignored. Moreover, the Macedonians were also presented to the outside world as *Bulgars, Old Serbs, or Bulgarophone/Slavophone Greeks* to be legitimately claimed by the surrounding "mother" countries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece (Rossos, 1991b; 1994). The Great Powers of Europe continued in this mistaken path against a background of shared political interests in maintaining geopolitical balance regarding the Dardanelles (i.e., keeping Turkey in Europe). Even after the unavoidable fall of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in 1912, the Great Powers, in one way or another, continued to support their own client states and helped them to legitimatize their control over portions of Macedonia in the post–World War I peace conferences (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

Against this massive and repressive international political and military strangle-hold, there was, however, a counterforce. This was the internal Macedonian political/military struggle toward autonomy and independence (Kofos, 1995; Perry, 1988; Rossos, 1991b; 1995; 1997) throughout the years before World War I, during the war years, and after World War II lasting for almost an entire century (described in some detail in chapter 4). This was a struggle that was

largely ignored by the West as the Macedonians were not recognized as Macedonians but as Bulgars, Slavophone Greeks, Old Serbs, and so on (Perry, 1988; Rossos, 1994). Thus, after a century-long struggle, including the interwar IMRO terrorist interlude, the Macedonians finally achieved nationhood in 1944 through another path, through the Communist Party's active participation in Tito's partisan war of liberation. Independence came 50 years later in 1991 with the break-up of the Yugoslav state. This new Balkan state was the Vardar portion of Macedonia the Socialist Republic of Macedonia from 1944 to 1991 within the then-Federal Yugoslav Republic. Nonetheless, more than half of Macedonia remained outside in Greece and Bulgaria, that is, Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, as a result of the Bucharest Treaty partition of Macedonia in 1913 and the post–World War I peace conferences. Strident extremist voices for unification had to be held down in exchange for a hoped for quick recognition that was slow in coming. In the end and for a long time, the European Community as well as the United States hesitated in recognizing the new nation with its chosen name "Republic of Macedonia," in deference to the European Community membership of Greece and its partnership as a NATO ally (Shea, 1997).

The world became well-versed in the Greek version of Macedonia's past history and of the Greek objections to the use of the name "Macedonia." These views gained worldwide attention through the media (Shea, 1997). In the absence of internationally accepted answers to the basic question "Who the Macedonians Are" and the associated question of their possible linkage to the ancient Macedonians, the Macedonians had very little to work with to counter this international media deluge weighted against them. As a member Republic of the Federal Yugoslav Republic within an overwhelming background of a dominant South Slav culture, weighted down by their Slav-Macedonian language, they were unprepared for the subsequent international challenges regarding use of their official name and self-identity. Early in 1993, the UN in a compromise solution recognized them as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), a despised name that has remained since as the official international name of the republic. At this point, the Macedonians in the Slav-speaking Macedonian Republic would not or could not say that they were not Slavs or of Slav ancestry to counter Greek claims as even their own historians accepted as factual an alleged sixth/seventh century AD massive Slav incursion/settlement into Macedonia (e.g., Chorovich, 1990). In the minds of many in the international community, this fact compromised their claim to a unique and independent Macedonian

ethnic identity. However, with the advent of Curta's work *The Making of the Slavs* (2001) published by the prestigious Cambridge University Press and other current studies of their genetic history (Bosch et al. 2005) it is now possible to point to hard evidence indicating that the Macedonians are not of Slav ancestry in spite of their linguistic impediment, that is, their Slav-Macedonian dialect. Using complex sociocultural analyses of accessible current characteristic features of the Macedonian culture and traditions, including an analysis of key characteristics of the Macedonian language itself, a parallel conclusion was arrived at independently in the present work (see chapter 6). Thus, the unsolved problem of "Who the Macedonians Are" that led the Macedonians into such turbulent history in the past century can now be restated, readdressed and, lately, by even well-established genetic/DNA haplotype bloc analyses (e.g., Gabriel, 2002).

The Ancient Macedonians

For a better understanding of the complexity of the modern Macedonian identity, it should be noted that the fog and mist that surrounds the modern Macedonian identity from the late nineteenth century to the present, strangely, had similarly hung over the ancient Macedonians. Who were they; or, equally, who are they? What was their ethnic identity? A clear-cut answer to this question, once provided, could then function as a starting point for a closer study of the modern Macedonian identity. Surprisingly, even now more than 2,000 years later, these questions have become cutting-edge issues occupying both classical Greek scholars as well as historians of ancient Greece (e.g., Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990; Green, 1991; Hammond, 1991; Cartledge, 2004).

While the documentation on the ancient Macedonians is all secondary as the original historical sources have been lost (mainly the memoirs of Ptolemy and Aristoboulos), the sources presently available are based primarily on five Greek and Roman writers (Arian, Plutarch, Diodorus, Quintus Curtius Rufus, and Justin) (Green, 1991). They wrote centuries after the death of Alexander the Great relying on diverse but conflicting original sources of which only some are named. In the meantime, the accumulated historical wealth of material on the military exploits of the ancient Macedonians under Alexander's generalship has completely overshadowed real creditable evidence as to who the ancient Macedonians were, ethnically speaking, and what their language was (Borza, 1990; Cartledge, 2004). While there is even a rich sociocultural lode regarding their customs

and practices, their style of life, their kings, and royal family, the ancient Macedonians themselves left very few clues as to their ethnic identity. Their apparent separate language and their absence from the surviving lists of Olympic champions (Badian, 1967) are the two pivotal markers pointing to a separate ethnic identity from the ancient Greeks. This last point needs to be underscored as a being crucial to any modern search for the Macedonian identity. In one respect, however, the modern and ancient Macedonians are alike; no one can say with a high degree of assurance who they were then (e.g., Badian, 1967) nor who they are now (e.g., Poulton, 1995; Shea, 1997).

Briefly, the ancient Macedonians led by Alexander the Great conquered the known world during the fourth century BC, beginning with Asia Minor, extending all the way to India, including Egypt in Africa (Green, 1991). Although culturally almost indistinguishable from the ancient Greeks, especially because of the Attic Greek used in formal communication, nonetheless, their military conquests broke-up the existing sociopolitical barriers between the Greek city state and "barbarian" worlds. A new Hellenistic era of universality came into being based on the common Greek language (*koine*) of the Hellenistic Empires of Alexander's successors and on the new centers of Hellenic culture, especially, Alexandria in Egypt. The release of huge treasures of stored gold from the capitals of the Persian Empire into the entire Near East led to an explosive growth in commerce and economic development throughout the successor Hellenistic Empires. Recent renewed interests in these achievements have emphasized the uniqueness of the Macedonian character that facilitated this explosive increase in global commerce and economic interaction, and the modest level of mutual acceptance and recognition among ethnic groups and nations of the world that followed (Bonnard, 1961; Borza, 1990; Hammond, 1991; Green, 1991).

If it can be successfully argued that the ancient Macedonians were unique and had an identity apart from that of the Greeks in the Greek city states, as recent scholarship seems to indicate (Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990; Green, 1991), this reassessment can now serve as a starting point for an inquiry into the possibility of a unitary modern Macedonian ethnicity possibly linked to the ancient Macedonians of the classical period but apart from that of the modern Greek identity. Recent newer treatments have taken this novel and divergent historical/anthropological direction regarding the modern Macedonian identity (e.g., Danforth, 1991; 1995; Poulton, 1995; Rossos, 1991b; 1991a; 1994; 1997; Shea, 1997). Within the context of this recent development, the aim of the present work is to provide an answer to

the question of "Who the Macedonians Are." The end result, at best, is only a theory or a plausible hypothesis as there are many alternative interpretations of the salient sociocultural sources of evidence as well as of the coexisting disputed historical accounts of Macedonia's recent and distant past, not to mention the subjective nature of cognitive self-reports on which anthropologists seem to rely-on for evidence.

Alternative interpretations of the Macedonian identity will continue to have plausibility as long as the Macedonian identity remains incompletely expressed/developed with many unresolved problems. *Nonetheless*, *a single, unitary, nonexclusionary, non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian identity is hypothesized across dialect and region linked to the ancient Macedonians by sparse but critically important sociocultural remains of the distant past.* The basis and rationale for this conclusion is that this hypothesis/theory of a modern unitary non-Slav Macedonian identity can integrate the disparate evidence from the different domains into a single unifying conception of a distinctive Macedonian identity and it recommends itself as the preferred interpretation on the basis of the well-recognized scientific principle of simplicity. Subsequent chapters will provide both the multidiscipline methodology employed, the supporting evidence sourced from the applicable domains that led to this conclusion, as well as the problems in development that must be resolved for a more confident statement.

World and Balkan State Perspectives on Macedonia

It is well at the outset to look into what appears to be a common world perspective on Macedonia and that of the surrounding Balkan countries that partitioned Macedonia in 1912/1913. The current prevailing worldview of Macedonia is that it is a geographical region populated by diverse internally contesting and contending ethnic groups who in one way or another have embroiled their Balkan neighbors into rivalry, conflict, and war for almost the entire twentieth century (Hammond, 1991: 1–10; Poulton, 1995; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). The emergence of an independent Macedonian state since 1991 in the aftermath of the failed Yugoslav state and the assertion of a Macedonian ethnicity, albeit a Slav-Macedonian ethnicity, has exacerbated the conflicting claims and counterclaims as to just who the Macedonians are, especially by the partitionist neighbors, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece that, overtly or covertly, currently oppose its existence as an independent state.

Recent historical accounts of modern Macedonia have characterized her turbulent past as the source and basis for the term "Balkanization," and as "History's Cauldron" (Kaplan, 1991: 92–104). James Pettifer (1992: 475–483) states: "all Balkan territorial disputes have their mythologies: that of the Macedonian question is that of the most bloody, complex and intractable of all, in a small peninsula already well burdened" (475). The intractability of the perennially unsolved Macedonian question specifically "Who the Macedonians Are," of Macedonia as a region, and its recent disputed emergence as an independent state in the Balkans can rightly be attributed to the existence of overlapping and conflicting official histories, all based on hugely mistaken underlying assumptions regarding—indicators of ethnicity. Tragically for the Macedonians, the ethnicity indicators were confined to one indicator, namely, their language and linguistic dialect (e.g., Anastasoff, 1945; Bracewell, 1991; Brailsford, 1906/1971; Evans, 1903; Poulton, 1995; Vacalopoulos, 1973). This misplaced use of language as an indicator of ethnicity in this one special case in the Balkans at the turn of the twentieth century is the basis for the present widely accepted alternatives as to who the Macedonians are; they are "Slavophone Greeks," "Bulgarians," "Slavs," "South Serbs," or '"Slav-Macedonians," depending on the origin and point of view of the writer and, more globally, country of origin. Such conflicted labeling at the outset of the twentieth century when the Macedonians were just emerging from a 500-year dark age period of Ottoman Turkish occupation to become aware of who they were other than being Christians served to mislead the world into thinking that, ethnically speaking, there were no Macedonians at all, but only Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Slavs, Gypsies, Turks, and others (e.g., Evans, as cited in Anastasoff, 1945: 35–37; Brailsford, 1906/1971). No attempts were made to look into other sociocultural indicators of ethnicity either by the Macedonians themselves or by the outside world that would clearly point toward another direction. Even present-day Macedonian writers of the currently established Macedonian Republic refer to themselves as Slav-Macedonians when they write with precision (Chorovich, 1990; Stardelov, Grozdanev, and Ristoski, 1993). It never occurred to them or to Arthur J. Evans, among others, that Macedonia might be a parallel example to that of Scotland where English is spoken as a daily language but all other sociocultural indicators point to another direction, that is, to a non-English ethnicity in the case of Scotland, or, to a non-Slav ethnicity in the case of Macedonia.

Buttressing these alternative conceptions of the Macedonian identity are the four official histories of Macedonia, all stemming from highly politicized and selectively biased interpretation of a partial sampling of past events. Given a core conception as to who the Macedonians are, historical events are then interpreted accordingly and organized so as to fit the chosen core conception. Thus, recurrent vicious circles often prevail in the historical accounts of Macedonia's recent past and are ongoing at present as the official histories are used to buttress a chosen core conception of the Macedonian identity although the same conception has already been used in the very selection and interpretation of the supportive historical evidence. This vicious circle process characterizes the entire twentieth-century Balkan historical accounts of Macedonia and is, currently, still operative. Karakasidou (1994: 35) has cited Greek intellectuals as being "profane advocates" on issues of national interest rather than being "objective scholars." Such commentary applies to other Balkan scholars as well; and, by implication suggests an underlying vicious circle that leads to such unscholarly behavior. Thus, there is then an official Greek history of Macedonia, a Bulgarian, a Yugoslav/Macedonian as well as a Serbian version. Each of these historiographic traditions, as suggested, includes a definitive conception of the Macedonian identity as a central organizing concept of the relevant historical sources of evidence. Particular assumptions about the Macedonian identity are adhered to with an uncompromising tenacity accompanied by an equal measure of contempt for alternative conceptions originating elsewhere (see Karakasidou, 1993: 1–28; 1994: 35–61). Conflicting versions are often recognized, but are seen as deliberate "falsifications" (Martis, 1983); or, more neutrally, as reflecting a historical process of "ethnogenesis and mutation" (Kofos, 1989: 229–267).

Balkan State Historiographic Traditions on Macedonia

Greek Perspective

In the Greek perspective (Gounaris, 1996: 409–426; Martis, 1983; Kofos, 1983; 1989: 229–267; Vakalopoulos, 1991), the core assumption is that "Macedonia is Greece" since all archaeological and historical documents of the ancient Macedonians point to a people who initially were on the periphery of the splendidly creative Greek cultural explosion during the classical Greek period but who subsequently were recognized as being of Hellenic ancestry as indicated by

official acceptance into Greek religious festivals as well entry into the Olympic games.[2]

There is not now and there never was a separate Macedonian ethnicity—contrary to Roman and Slav historical traditions. Therefore, only the Greek-speaking Macedonians are Macedonian and there is no Macedonia outside of Greece. Slav-speaking Macedonians of the Macedonian Republic are pseudo-Macedonians who presently seek to usurp the ancient name "Macedonia." These Macedonians, in reality, are descendants of Slav hordes who came into the Balkan peninsula from the sixth/seventh centuries AD.[3] Furthermore, during the 500-year-Ottoman Empire occupation, Macedonia became simply a nominal geographical region populated by Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Gypsies, and Turks as a consequence of movement of the many subject ethnic groups within the Ottoman-occupied Balkans (Vacalopoulos, 1973). Nonetheless, through post–World War I population exchanges, most non-Hellenic ethnic groups left Greek-Macedonia so that only the Macedonia that is now in Greece truly constitutes Macedonia. The so-called Republic of Macedonia just north of the Greek frontier is simply a troublesome pseudo-state that should, instead, call itself *Skopia*.[4] Moreover, although there is presently a Slav-Macedonian identity, ethnically speaking, the Slav-Macedonians are in reality "Bulgarians" as the Slav-Macedonian language is a west Bulgarian dialect (Andriotis, 1991: 19–37). Here in this version, one witnesses the phenomenon of shrinking borders as the Macedonian border for Macedonia as a region, according to the Greek version above, lies not far to the north, in the Skopia region, as is generally recognized, but on the northern Greek frontier.

As the language inscriptions found in tombs and other types of archaeological excavations invariably are all in the Greek language and, as Greek scholars tend to emphasize, are virtually identical to the Attic Greek of Classical Athens, they enthusiastically conclude that here finally is the concrete evidence that shows the ancient Macedonians to be of Greek ethnicity (e.g., Andronikos, 1984). As pointed out by Borza (1990), however, the problem that such scholarship overlooks is the distinct lack of a dialect difference. In short, how could the Macedonians 300 miles north of Athens show Attic Greek inscriptions unless Greek had been adopted as an official language of communication and sophistication in the Macedonian Royal Court. Language differences existed even within 100 miles from Athens; and, this is not too surprising given the mountainous terrain and other geographic features contributing to local isolation. To then find no dialect differences so far north from Athens implies that this could

not have been the native language of the local population. Indirectly then it may be concluded that there was another unwritten language, and Greek language use was of an official nature only. There are independent but indirect sources of evidence to support the assumption of a native Macedonian language (see Badian, 1967) that would thus make the Macedonians into "barbarians" according to Demosthenes' rhetoric.

Bulgarian Perspective

Surprisingly, the Bulgarian perspective (Bozhinov and Panayotov, 1978: 5–14) for the most part is in agreement with the Greek perspective, especially on the claim for a Bulgarian ethnicity of the Slav-speaking Macedonians. It differs only on the line of demarcation of Macedonia. Instead of being somewhat north of Salonica, it is in fact much closer to Mt. Olympus, that is, closer to the Greek-speaking portion just southwest from Salonica toward Mt. Olympus. With respect to shrinking borders, the Bulgarian version is even more extreme than the Greek version, since in this version, not only there is no Macedonian ethnicity as such, but there is no Macedonia at all, only an extended Bulgaria. Not surprisingly, the portion of Macedonia that lies in Bulgaria is simply called the Pirin region of Western Bulgaria and the name Macedonia disappears completely.

The Bulgarian claim to Macedonia is largely based on the several early and late Middle Age Bulgarian Empire occupations of Macedonia, and on the unimplemented Treaty of San Stefano that concluded the Bulgarian war of independence from the Ottoman Turkish Empire in 1878. The Bulgarians were assisted by the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 (Rossos, 1991b). After participating in two disastrous wars (World War I and World War II) aimed at regaining Macedonia based on these suppositions, Bulgaria today professes no territorial claims on Macedonia but does retain a claim to the Macedonian population of the Macedonian Republic as being ethnic Bulgarians and to the Slav-Macedonian language as being a West Bulgarian dialect. Importantly, it also claims ownership of the modern Macedonian historical heritage *as well as of the leaders at the turn of the century native (IMRO) Macedonian movement to liberate Macedonia from the Turks as being Bulgarians.* Thus, between Greece and Bulgaria, the Macedonian heritage, ancient and modern, has been spoken for, and contemporary Macedonians may wonder (or seethe in anger) at what is left for themselves to claim as their own. Unlike the Greek example, however, Bulgaria quickly

recognized the Macedonian Republic in 1991, and, presently, maintains friendly political and economic relations. Nonetheless, intense sociocultural conflicts exist but are confined to linguistic and historical claims and counterclaims about medieval and modern-day periods with no apparent conflicting political overflow (Drezov, 2001: 47–59; Poulton, 1995; Shea, 1997).

Serbian Perspective

The Serbian perspective is essentially the same as the Bulgarian perspective but the ethnicity claim on the Macedonians is that they are "Old Serbs" who during the period of intermittent Bulgarian hegemony from the ninth–fourteenth centuries AD may have intermarried with Bulgarians. Nonetheless, the Slavs of Macedonia were an important component of the medieval Serbian Empire of Kral Stephen Dushan just before the Ottoman occupation and, therefore, rightfully, the Macedonians should return back into the Serbian fold (Jovanovic, 1941; as cited in Rossos, 1994: 369–394). At least in the Serbian version there are no extremist/strident claims on the modern Macedonian heritage. Generally there was, apparently, little conflict with Serbia as the Yugoslav army pulled out peacefully from Macedonia following separation from the Yugoslav state between 1991 and 1992. Relations since have remained stable.

Macedonian/Yugoslav Republic Perspective

The Macedonian/Yugoslav Republic perspective (Chorovich, 1990: 5–18; Ivanovski, 1992: 56–59; Polianski, 1972; Stardelov, Grozdanev, and Ristoski, 1993) dates back to the formation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in 1944 during World War II based upon Marshall Tito's acceptance and recognition of a separate Slav Macedonian ethnicity. A well-known Slavicist from Harvard University, Horace G. Lunt, in 1951 helped with the final codification of the grammar of the Macedonian language and has since argued successfully at international scholarly levels that it is a separate language from the closely related Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian languages (Lunt, 1952; 1959; 1986: 729–734). This development established the all-important linguistic basis for a claim to a separate Slav-Macedonian identity (see Bracewell, 1991: 143–144) as well as a claim to the modern Macedonian historical heritage (which is being disputed by both Greek and Bulgarian scholars).

In this version of modern Macedonian history, the central organizing concept relative to the issue of Macedonian identity is that it developed from an inferred fusion of the original Macedonian

population with the allegedly incoming Slavs in the sixth and seventh centuries AD (which Curta, 2001, has labeled as a nineteenth-century creation by European historians). Energetic efforts were made to document historically this inferred ethnic fusion, creating a new national myth of origin (Drezov, 2001: 47–59; see also Kitromilides, 1989) for the dominant Slav-speaking Macedonian population of the Vardar Macedonian state. Accordingly, the historical beginning of the modern Macedonians in this version is invariably linked to the Slav Emperor Samuil who held sway over both Medieval Macedonia and Bulgaria and thus created the first Slav Macedonian state (Chorovich, 1990). Most historians, however, dismiss this claim and consider Samuil as a Bulgarian emperor of an early Middle Age Bulgarian Empire (circa 1011), which included Macedonia under its control (e.g., Drezov, 2001: 47–59). Exaggerated claims regarding the Slav-Macedonian dialect as being the language of Slav translations of the Bible from the original Greek that presently constitutes the church Slavonic language common to all Slav Eastern Orthodox countries are similarly challenged by experts in the field, especially by Bulgarian scholars (Lunt, 1986; 1988). With the advent of Curta's (2001) work and the distinct lack of evidence for a large-scale Slav input in the Macedonian ethnic mix, such historical writing, ultimately, has to be downgraded as politically inspired docu-fiction writing.

After the separation from the Yugoslav state in 1991, the Macedonians refocused on the issue of their possible ancient Macedonian ancestry with an uncompromising tenacity in total disregard of the widely accepted Greek hegemony over Macedonia's distant past (which has been challenged by modern writers—see Bonnard, 1961; Borza, 1990; Hammond, 1991; Danforth, 1995; Shea, 1997). The adoption of the 16-ray burst-sun emblem of the Royal Macedonian tombs at Vergina against a red background as the first national flag of the Macedonian Republic (now abandoned in favor of an 8-ray emblem) exacerbated existing conflicts with Greece to a fever pitch. Recent agreements between the two countries have forced a retreat from such extremist claims and counterclaims. At present, economic and commercial interchange is now reaching normal levels. Yet, the "name" issue with Greece remains; and is still unresolved. Understandably, a policy of "friendship with distance" is currently practiced by the Vardar Macedonian state relative to Greece and other Balkan states.

In brief and as described above, such is the turbulent and tortured history of modern Macedonia, or, more accurately stated, as described in the different versions of Macedonia's recent past by

Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Yugoslav/Macedonian historians. In the absence of metatheoretic rules for validating the divergent historical claims and counterclaims above of Macedonia's past and specifically on the issue of "Who the Macedonians Are," obviously, historiographic methods alone cannot provide an answer. At best, historical accounts of the past are indicators as to the existence of an ethnic/political identity but tell little about its nature. Thus, what is needed is a *paradigm shift* both in method of approach in order to make rational decisions as to what type of evidence can help identify the existence of an ethnic identity and its structural and dynamic dimensions, and possibly help formulate its nature when its existence/nonexistence as well as its characteristic features are all in dispute as in the Macedonian ethnic identity. The time has come to review and reevaluate the mistaken views of the past regarding the modern Macedonians and Macedonia especially now in the context of the newly presented archaeological evidence in Curta's (2001) *The Making of the Slavs,* and parallel genetically based studies (e.g., Bosch et al., 2005). Thus, a new approach and a new methodology is presented in the present work that is sufficiently complex to examine every facet of the basic issue "Who the Macedonians Are."

3

The Methodology of Ethnicity Research

The reader may be perplexed and confused by the introductory material presented hitherto in chapters 1 and 2 both as to the divergent and conflicting claims and counterclaims about Macedonia; and, importantly, on the Macedonian ethnic identity and the question of appropriate methodology by which some of these perplexities can be addressed. The subject of methodology is focused on in the present chapter in order to provide an overall framework of approach to the general issue of ethnic identity. The specific problem addressed is the circumscription of evidence, that is, the question of what counts as evidence for an ethnic identity. The approach taken in the present work is to look into methods beyond historiographic ones, into methods belonging to the behavioral sciences. This has already been done in part by anthropologists in their studies of the Macedonian identity (Danforth, 1995; Karakasidou, 1997).

In the basic sciences, an intractable problem to be addressed successfully needs a *paradigm shift* (Kuhn, 1970). A paradigm shift involves a conceptual restatement of the problem with a concomitant shift in the methodology of data identification, collection, and/or selection. A successful paradigm shift will encompass all these elements. As applied to the intractable problem of the Macedonian ethnic identity (in light of the 100-year legacy of the "Macedonian Question" with no end in sight), a paradigm shift would entail a shift away from conceptualizing the ethnicity of the Macedonians as a political/historical problem into a problem of science to be approached through application of multidiscipline behavioral science methods as found in anthropology, sociology, social, and political psychology, psycholinguistics, and, most recently, by archaeological methods. Historiographic methods are not excluded; rather, they are integrated as a part of the overall approach. At day's end, however,

the question still remains whether this new multidiscipline behavioral science approach would be a significant improvement over the current single-discipline historical and/or anthropological studies of ethnicity. There is apparently no gold standard against which the new methodology can be compared as in new drugs compared to a standard, well-established drug.

A recent application of an alternative well-developed methodology is the use of genetic DNA research protocols using haplotype blocs flanked by informative SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphisms) (see Glossary of Terms)[1] across select regions in the 23–46 human autosomal chromosomes focused on geographically defined European population samples roughly corresponding to parallel ethnically defined population groups, including a Macedonian sample and, for contrast/comparison, Greek and Bulgarian samples (Gentest.ch GmbH iGENEA, Schlossgasse 9, Postfach 7179, Zurich, Switzerland). In another, but this time, a scholarly study using a similar haplotype bloc analyses focused on determining characteristic features of the haplotype blocs and flanking SNPs that would differentiate selected large population groups, that is, European based, West African, Afro-American, and Asian population groups (Gabriel et al., 2002). In a subsequent but more comprehensive scholarly study, multiple DNA genetic analyses were carried out using a set of 199 from more than 650 diallelic markers previously identified as ancestry informative markers (AIMs) that included 165 SNPs and 34 insertion/deletion markers of specified distance across the 23–46 chromosomes with selection restriction criteria (Yang et al., 2005). The markers were mapped into k=4 to k=7 clusters on the basis of the genotype results taken from their samples by a standardized statistical analyses (STRUCTURE) in the European-based American sample (89) Mexican (94), South Asian (88), American Indian (72), West African (95), African American (94), and Puerto Rican (96) population groups. The various population groups were then distinguished in terms of differences within and across each cluster. In another alternative commercial approach, selected regions of the human genome, already in use in forensic genotyping with genotype profiles across 13 loci standardized for forensic genetic DNA identification in exclusion/inclusion outcomes pertaining to criminal suspects, were extended to the study of ethnicity and race (DNA Tribes: Genetic Ancestry Analysis, P0 Box 735, Arlington, VA 22216).

Potentially, anyone of these DNA genetic approaches briefly described above could provide the gold standard against which purely behavioral methodologies for studying ethnicity may be compared.

The new genetic/DNA methodology is well-based and is independent from extant behavioral approaches to be described below (historical, anthropological, sociocultural) and can address issues of ethnic identity. According to Yang et al. (2005: 190), "the current study demonstrates that a relatively modest set of diallelic markers can provide close correlation with self-reported ethnicity for individuals from disparate groups." Nonetheless, there are questions relative to this transduction of standard genetic DNA linkage analyses from association to disease syndromes (phenotypes) into commercial genetic DNA characterization/identification of ethnic groups and races circumscribed as geographically defined population groups. A major problem is the absence of objective phenotypes for "ethnicity" analogous to associated disease syndromes in genetic DNA linkage/associational analyses to determine the level of statistical association. This problem, however, may not be as insurmountable as it seems because a multifactorial genetic association to a disease syndrome or to a single genetic factor in the case of developmental abnormalities are expressed as associations first and then traced back to a disease syndrome through processes/mechanisms controlled by multiple genes at the specified region(s) in the genome. These processes/mechanisms that can interact with environmental risk factors determine the expression of the disease syndrome (phenotype). For Mendelian dominant/recessive allele factor analyses one can mathematically determine even exact association frequencies for specific developmental abnormalities. The difference as applied to race and ethnicity associations lies in the absence of causal or potentially causal linkage of observed genetic profiles found in common in a geographically located population group to ethnicity groupings. That being said, one is not prevented from assessing the frequency proportion of how many members of a genetically profiled group also map into a common ethnic identity. Association percentages may again vary for ethnicity as in disease syndromes. However, the linkage to self-reports for an ethnic identity is nominal as individuals may slip in and out of ethnicity; but, importantly, reliable estimates of association can be firmly established. In this manner, DNA genetic evidence may indeed become a gold standard. At this point, however, there is also the pointed question whether the commercial applications of DNA genetic analysis methodology has been adequately translated since the two scholarly studies cited above examined larger population groups (i.e., European based, etc.) with a larger set of markers than the ethnicity groupings mapped out by the commercial iGENEA and DNA Tribes organizations.

An important concern here is that a PubMed literature search cited hundreds of DNA genetic studies relating ethnicity to disease syndromes, but only three linking DNA genotype studies exclusively to ethnic identity over the past ten years. This lack of scholarly interest is pronounced and it may severely limit the acceptance of DNA genetic studies of ethnic identity as providing a potential gold standard for comparison with other methods of approach for studying ethnicity.

Statement of Methodology: Core Concepts and Conceptual Parameters

Introduction

As a first approximation in a multidiscipline approach, ethnicity or an ethnic identity may be conceptualized as a group characterization based on a defining set of sociopolitical group characteristics drawn from three different domains of evidence: (1) historical/political manifestations; (2) subjective idiographic cognitive self-descriptor reports; and (3) objective sociocultural characteristic features (with DNA genetic evidence, potentially, as a fourth domain). Of course, the term "defining set" refers to well-established ethnic identities, not readily to newly established ethnic identities of challenged existence as is the Macedonian ethnic identity.

Within the first domain, one can look for evidence in (1) the international political dynamics of a target group in interaction with other ethnic or national groups leaving behind an identifiable track record of events in which the target group participated as an actor/agent productive of—and reactive to—events; and in (2) the historical sociocultural dynamics of a within-group development of an ethnic self-identity out of which a name emerges to designate a target group. However, any attempt to state/document the role of historical manifestations of a target group as reliable and stable fingerprint marks is fraught with many confining contingencies in the selection and interpretation of relevant historical events.

As indicated in chapter 2, one of the confining contingencies and a particularly disturbing aspect of the historical domain of evidence is that it is subject to distortion, maximally in the Balkan states, due to high degree of politicization (Borza, 1990; Brown, 2003; Green, 1991; Hammond, 1991; Karakasidou, 1994). There can be, as a consequence, circularity in data and data source selection. Findings, conclusions, and their validity based on such highly politicized historical sources of evidence become suspect and clouded in doubt. Whether

genetic DNA markers for ethnic identity can be established through forensic type studies, by unique haplotype bloc profiles, or by use of a large number of diallelic markers to buttress or confirm/disconfirm interpretations of past historical/political manifestations as being relevant to the study of an ethnic identity is a question still in need of answers.

An ethnic identity, in addition to having historical and political fingerprint marks as an actor/agent, includes cognitive self-descriptors that, minimally, describe the meaning and significance of an ethnic identity for a member of a reference ethnic group and, maximally, identify the evidence used by that member in the cognitive construction of his ethnic self-identity. The more fundamental question beyond this end point outcome is how an ethnic identity emerges and is crystallized within a group out of an underlying dynamic of internally interacting social/political forces with or without externally imposed acculturation dynamics into a definitive within-group ethnic identity. This question, however, pertains more to historical/anthropological investigations, and, thus, is outside the scope of the present chapter (but see Barth, 1969; Curta, 2001; Jenkins, 1994; Jones, 1997; Service, 1987). However, there are, frequently, retroactive attempts to establish a historical point of origin in the emergence of an ethnic identity (e.g., the emergence of the first Slav Macedonian state under Emperor Samuil in the eleventh century AD for the Macedonians; or for the Bulgarians, the advent of Khan Asparoukh and his trans-Caucasian tribes into what is today's Bulgaria in the seventh century AD). Such developments have also been called "myths of origin" and/or "imagined communities" (Kitromilides, 1989) and, thus, severely challenged (Drezov, 2001).

The construction of a cognitive individual/group self-identity expressed in a chosen name and supporting rationale is the subjective/idiographic component of ethnic self-identity research. It is the generally accepted view of today's anthropologists of what ethnicity is and what it refers to (e.g., Curta, 2001; Danforth, 1995; Just, 1991; Karakasidou, 1997). Ethnic identity from this point of view can be assessed by simply asking a member of a target political/social group, within an oral or written format, to state and describe his ethnic identity; or, more basically, to say what he is, "Greek," "Serbian," "Albanian," or other. This is regarded as the bare minimum needed for an inference of ethnic identity and/or to assert a claim to an ethnic identity. What is being said is that a claim to an ethnicity is based exclusively on the existence of a group of people who have chosen a common self-identity designation or a shared name for themselves.

Ethnic identity in this conception is an outcome resulting from a historical process of cognitive creation at individual and/or group level. A self-chosen name by a sociopolitical group to designate itself can also be used to internationally establish a claim to nationhood, according to current usage and international practice.

In this style of thinking about ethnicity there is also a problem of validity, that is, the claim to authenticity of an ethnic identity as having face validity when confined to impressionistic/idiographic/emotive expressions. Such expressions, taken as evidence, place a claim to ethnicity outside the pale of objective truth verification. Definitionally and in the extreme case, a mad man's cognitive creation of an ethnic self-identity is no less valid than that of the most profound scholar in the absence of other necessary anchoring evidence. The Greek challenge to the name, Republic of Macedonia, is an example of a questioned validity of an assumed self-identity, that is, the claim of the Slav-speaking Macedonians as being of a unique Macedonian ethnic identity separate and apart from the Greek ethnic identity. True or not, the challenge itself illustrates how incommensurate the types of evidence presented by each side are and the lack of logical contact between them. The claims to evidence, on the one hand (Greek), are based on a historical past, while, on the other hand (Macedonian), to existing cognitive self-descriptor evidence and legalistic precedents of its use regarding a chosen self-identity designation. Epistemologically, the opposing claims are different kinds of statements. One is a testable material statement and the other an idiographic subjective/emotive expression. There is no *logical* contact of one to the other to allow a merit assessment of arguments based on such evidence. This may be seen as a unique characteristic of ethnicity research. It can then be concluded that cognitive self-reports, to be sure, do provide basic evidence for the existence of an ethnic identity but are not sufficient by themselves.

Beyond self-reports, there is also the other relevant domain to issues of ethnic identity and that is the domain of sociocultural features of a selected target group (material cultural evidence) that can be used to identify an ethnic identity. Herodotus was the first to use this approach to ascribe a common Hellenic ethnic identity in the Greek City States. He cites common language, common culture, common history, and common religion as markers for a shared Greek ethnic identity in the different populations of the Greek City States (Bowra, 1951; Cartledge, 2005). Moreover, this domain is also a part of the Webster's definition of ethnic identity (third college edition, 1988). In modern times, the most persuasive and blatantly obvious

example of an ethnic identity based on sociocultural features is that of the Scotsman and his identity in the context of his colorful tartan kilt, distinctive bagpipe music, sword dances, and highland games. Thus, beyond a shared historical past and self-reports regarding a chosen ethnicity identification, such sociocultural features are enough for any observer to set a Scotsman apart from the English, Welsh, or Irish ethnic groups in the British isles, even if one knew nothing of Scotland's historical past.

More recently, Curta (2001) called such evidence gleaned from surviving remains of the past "material cultural remains" and argued for their use in identifying the existence of an ethnic identity in a historical past; and, earlier by Barth (1969: 9–38). Such evidence can be used to decide an issue of identity in favor of one alternative or the other, when there are conflicting historical claims to—or denial of—an ethnic identity as well as when a single sociocultural indicator such as language or linguistic dialect, often used in the past, would be a misleading marker (Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990; Bracewell, 1991). Importantly, this domain of evidence provides a new source of raw materials alongside existing political/historical sources and cognitive self-reports to help formulate a solution for an ethnic identity in question; especially when data from all these domains show a convergence through an association to a target sociopolitical group. Moreover, this evidential source is entirely independent from historical evidence and/or cognitive core set of beliefs about one's ethnic identity. By itself, this source is also vulnerable as it can be dismissed as being merely folkloric and ephemeral.

The picture that emerges from this analysis of ethnicity and the problem of circumscription of applicable evidence is that there are at least three domains of evidence, historical, anthropological, and sociocultural, which are independent and where, importantly, the tie of evidence to ethnic identity is, at worst, nominal; or, at best, necessary, but not sufficient. In the medical sciences, one can entertain an inference of a microbe as underlying an infectious disease syndrome; and, such an inference is testable. Nothing like that exists in ethnicity research. What has been presented hitherto falls under the category of "assumptions," that is, assumptions about circumscription of applicable evidence; or, stated in another way, identification of proper domains of evidence. Can the assumptions made above of the three applicable domains of evidence (with genetic DNA evidence as a possible fourth domain) become rationalized by an appeal to more fundamental considerations? One direction to look into for an answer to this question is that of logical function of statements having to do

with the concept of ethnicity in ordinary language use. What do such statements refer to; what sources are appealed to?

The Logical Functions of Ethnicity

The concept of ethnicity, semantically interpreted, can be reduced to the three basic meanings already outlined but that now and in the next sections are differentiated by their respective logical functions. These semantic interpretations and their logical functions are: (1) ethnicity statements as referring to *historical claims* (or counterclaims) about a group's past record, for example, "the Macedonians are (or are not) descendants of the ancient Macedonians"; (2) ethnicity statements as referring to s*ubjective self-reports* as found in idiographic/emotive expressions which are neither true nor false, for example, "I am Macedonian"; and (3) ethnicity statements as referring to *directly observable sociocultural features* that characterize a target group such as language, religion, music, dances, traditions in the home, first and last name formulas (possibly also including "material cultural remains" from the past). Collectively, the applicable sources of evidence that can be explicitly identified as relevant domains in terms of these semantic interpretations of "ethnicity" can be found in (1) historical records of a target group as an actor/agent in the arena of world politics and history; (2) political/anthropological surveys of a target group concerning self-identity and/or appellation or, in simpler language, into surveys as to what name a group calls itself by and rationale presented for the chosen name and identity; and (3) sociocultural searches into evidence detailing characteristics of a target ethnic group such as language, customs, traditions in the home, national dress, and dances, religion, including archaeological material cultural remains from the past.

As might be expected from the introductory comments and the analysis above, the research into the Macedonian ethnic identity would encompass these three evidential domains involving distinctively separate research methods particularized by the sourced domains. This is a general description of the methodological approach taken here but it will also be independently anchored, wherever possible, to genetic DNA evidence from parallel geographically defined population groups (i.e., population groups having the same geographical locations as those of targeted ethnic identity groups). One remaining problem is that of weighting the evidence from the three evidential domains in terms of truth value ranging from zero, to probable, and to absolute (i.e., definitional). It is this range in truth values that is

the *salient* distinguishing logical function feature that differentiates the three semantic interpretations of "ethnicity" besides the differentiation of the evidence into three different domains that have no logical contact of one to the other. Essentially, these logical functions reduce to differences within domain testability of statements pertaining to an ethnic identity and are a highly atypical feature compared to any other research area in science.

Core Concepts and Theory

Given that evidence from the three different domains, as described above, may provide consistent, similar, conflicting, or entirely new answers to questions posed regarding any ethnicity, it is necessary to develop (or have available) a conceptual nomological network by which the evidence from the different domains can be organized, reconciled, and integrated into a single theoretical framework. This is necessary in order to provide what Cronbach and Meehl (1955) call "construct validity": in this case, to the concept of ethnicity. Construct validity would mean that the evidence from each of the three semantically interpreted meanings of ethnicity (domains) can lead to predictive/postdictive inferences as to what may be found via linkage to a nomological network. More generally, a nomological network in ethnicity research would provide rules for integrating evidence from the different domains especially when the evidence in each domain is independent and has no logical contact with evidence from the other domains. Minimally, one needs a core set of basic descriptive/classificatory concepts for this purpose that can subsequently be framed into a theory where the classificatory core concepts are organized into structural and dynamic functions so as to interpret and integrate evidence sourced from the three domains into a simple, consistent formulation of an ethnic identity; or, ideally, identify cases of conflicting evidence as problems in need of resolution before a formulation of an ethnic identity can be successfully achieved. The nomological network would also provide rules for selecting domains or sources of evidence on the input side and rules for confirmation/disconfirmation on the output testable side (i.e., a falsifiability component).

In the absence of any known physical markers or other types of commonly accepted essential indicators of an ethnicity and in order to provide such a framework, one has to ground it to the ordinary language meanings of "ethnicity," as was done above, so as to parcel out the logical functions of statements about ethnicity and from these

tease out useful remains for scientific usage. This means starting with definitions of basic concepts, in this case, those relating to ethnic identity. Thus, the method of approach taken here is going back to the beginning, that is into definition of basic concepts that are referenced to ethnicity epistemologically and these are the logical functions of ethnicity statements. The logical functions of "ethnicity," once identified, as they have been above, then, become a critical starting point for a behavioral scientist to determine what kinds of evidence apply and where that evidence is to be sourced from (i.e., circumscription of evidence). Given a decision on what kinds of evidence apply and from what domains the evidence is to be sourced, research methods follow according to the research requirements of the particular domains from where that evidence is to be sourced. In that, "ethnicity" refers to multiple logical functions (at least three as indicated) it follows, then, there must be a multiplicity of sources and, consequently, a multiplicity of methods all converging upon identification/formulation of an ethnic identity of a targeted socio/political group. This is best described as a methodology of convergence, and is the approach taken in the present work. However, the sources of evidence on the input side need to be related to a nomological network with which expectations about new or confirming/disconfirming evidence on the output side can be determined. With the general ethnicity model provided in chapter 10, the present effort can be characterized as a top-down approach, complete in itself, independent of other competing single-discipline approaches to issues of ethnic identity.

Identification of Core Concepts and Technical Vocabulary

The basic theoretical vocabulary of the general ethnicity model that is designed to interpret and integrate evidence from the three source domains toward resolving issues of ethnic identity is presented in chapter 10. The general ethnicity model has three core concepts: *ethnicity indicators, ethnicity descriptors,* and *ethnicity ascriptors.* These concepts are used to help identify relevant domains of evidence and to assign weight to them in terms of credibility/truth value. In addition, these core concepts explain how the evidence, categorized according to core concept, function in the integration of any given type of evidence with other types of evidence in the formulation/identification of an ethnic identity. For example, a target ethnic group may have historical fingerprints as to origin ("imagined communities"), records of interaction with other ethnic or national groups, in wars, in peace, or in revolutionary insurgencies seeking to gain autonomy and independence including names of such organizations. Collectively, such

historical manifestations would function in the model as *ethnicity indicators*. Associated claims and counterclaims about a selected past would then have a probabilistic truth value, and, logically, are testable material statements with truth values determined by the authenticity of the selected evidence and comprehensiveness of relevant documentation. At the end, it should be noted that such evidence can point to but not describe the nature of an ethnic identity; hence the term "ethnicity indicator."

A group or members of a group can state in a self-report or in a reply to a question regarding their ethnic identity a name by which they wish to be recognized, for example, that they are "Macedonian," "Greek." Collectively, such statements would function in the model as *ethnicity descriptors*. By themselves, as already pointed out, such self-reports are idiographic (subjective) expressions that can be neither true nor false, that is, they are not testable material statements. Such statements simply designate a name or a label for an ethnic identity. They have no truth value, only an existential reality as facts. They ideographically describe what is and what an ethnic identity means to a bearer of that ethnicity, hence the term *ethnicity descriptor*.

An ethnic group can also be described by identification of sociocultural features by which it presents itself to the world. For example, a Scot, as already indicated, is characterized and identified by his tartan kilt; and, specifically, by the tartan pattern, by his bagpipes, by his unique sword dance over crossed swords (celebrating survival in the aftermath of a skirmish) and by the distinctive Scottish Field Games. These sociocultural features in the model are *ethnicity ascriptors*. That is, collectively, such selected sociocultural features ascribe an ethnic identity. In the Scottish example, they *partially define* the Scotsman to the world as to his ethnicity. Descriptive statements referring to such evidence can be regarded as true or false resting on *ahistorical*, immediately accessible existing/nonexisting objective sociocultural markers.

In summary and to distinguish these core concepts in terms of truth value, *ethnicity indicators* are probabilistic statements that have truth value (from low to high probability) and can be tested; *ethnicity descriptors* have no truth value in what they claim, or zero truth value, as they are subjective/emotive expressions; and *ethnicity ascriptors* identify sociocultural characteristics that ascribe an ethnic identity to a group and thus have absolute truth value functioning as partial definitions of an ethnic identity. However, statements about certain aspects of their existence, that is, authenticity, validity, relative permanence of selected sociocultural characteristics, can be referenced to

objective evidence in a target culture with a probabilistic character of being true or false. Accordingly, such statements would also be labeled as *ethnicity indicators.* Beyond these aspects, the basic vocabulary of the 10-postulate general ethnicity model provides a conceptual framework with which any ethnicity and its dynamics can be described and documented. Furthermore, when the multisourced convergent evidence is brought together and evaluated in the theoretical framework of the general ethnicity model, inconsistencies, contradictions, and problems in development can be identified especially for an emergent ethnic identity as is the case with the Macedonian ethnic identity.

Epistemological Status and Limitations

The multiple meanings of ethnicity and how they function in the theoretical 10-postulate model of ethnicity (chapter 10) in terms of their status in truth value and as indicators for the existence of an ethnic group will now be described in more precise technical terms. *The distilled summary description below, though repetitive, includes the main methodological points that need to be retained for a better understanding in the presentation of each domain of evidence in subsequent chapters.* The summary below includes a statement of the type of evidence that is to be sourced from each domain, its probability/truth value status, its role as being necessary and/or sufficient toward formulation of an ethnic identity and finally its limitations and identification of problems in need of resolution generated by alternative explanations of conflicting items of evidence within each domain.

(1). Ethnicity in historical/political manifestations. According to the first logical function, an ethnicity must have distinctive historical/political fingerprint marks, that is, it must be a historical agent productive of events and reactive to historical events. An ethnic group must show evidence of an active historical/political role. Thus, any claim to ethnicity can be placed in the context of a historical framework. Statements linking a target ethnic group to past events would function logically as material statements, that is, as claims to empirically based evidence that could then be confirmed or falsified by reference to documented historical events; being true statements if the claims are consistent with a given text (an official history) or false, if they are not. For example, the claim that Tsar Samuil founded the first Macedonian state can be tested against alternative historical interpretations of this event. In this way "ethnicity" becomes a "rational" concept since statements based on it can be confirmed or falsified. However, given the existence of three/four conflicting historiographic traditions regarding Macedonia, any historical statement

about the Macedonians as an ethnic group becomes an intractable problem as there are no metahistoriographic methods to provide rules for a rational choice among competing historical accounts (see chapter 2). This aspect of the historiographic method provides its ultimate limitation in addressing questions regarding an ethnic identity, that is. by itself it is insufficient and cannot be used as an exclusive comprehensive source for claims or counterclaims to an ethnic identity. Thus, the historical/political domain of evidence provides a necessary, though not a sufficient, body of evidence for an ethnic identity inference; and, given the existence of divergent explanations for specific historical events within this domain, a need is generated for a reduction/resolution of conflicting explanations whenever they are encountered.

(2). Ethnicity in emotive/subjective expressions. Obviously, an evidential statement recorded by a political and/or a social scientist from a Macedonian inhabitant saying he is a "Macedonian" or used the cognitive self-label "Macedonian" can be regarded at face value as a piece of factual evidence. Speaking more precisely, such a self-descriptor label would be an un-analyzable empirical fact that, when found in a sufficiently large percentage of the total population of Macedonia, can confirm a claim to a separate Macedonian nationality/ethnicity according to current international practice. A Macedonian saying that he is a "Macedonian" would then function logically as an evidential fact; it exists but it is neither true nor false. It has null or zero value regarding its truth claim. When confined to this logical function, "ethnicity" becomes an "irrational" concept as it pertains to an emotive/subjective expression of self-identity; and, in cases of disputed ethnicity claims confined to this source of evidence, conflict resolution would be the only rational approach. This is the second logical function of "ethnicity" with obvious epistemological limitations vis-à-vis questions regarding a claim to an ethnic identity. Such evidence provides a minimal necessary basis for an ethnicity inference and/or formulation of an ethnic identity but, by itself, it is also insufficient, contrary to current anthropological views.

(3). Ethnicity expressed in sociocultural features. A claim to ethnicity as expressed in sociocultural features in the overall framework of a behavioral science approach is the third logical function of "ethnicity" and it can also lead to material statements, that is, to statements that can be tested as being true or false. In this case the empirical claim would be to a set of objectively observable sociocultural features that characterize a target ethnicity, that is, to features that can confirm the existence of an ethnicity characterization and statements

regarding it as being true or false. Importantly, such evidence provides a behavioral description of an ethnic identity that distinguishes it from other ethnic identities. Certain highly selected features can reach the epistemological level of being regarded as markers reaching a definitional status for that same identity and would, thus, have absolute truth value. For example, the highly selected "Evzone" guards standing alongside the monument of the unknown soldier in front of the Greek parliament dressed in their stylized version of the Greek national dress can be seen as being emblematic of what it is to be Greek and what Greek military valor means.

Nonetheless, the empirical question remains whether (1) such indicator sociocultural evidence exists for the selected target ethnicity and (2) by what method can such evidence become accessed. Even then, the epistemological question still remains of how such evidence links to an ethnic identity rather than to an accidental folklorist tradition that may or may not be native to a particular region in question as is required, that is, the issue of relative permanence. In the special case of the Scottish identity, some of the sociocultural features are so strongly linked to the Scottish identity that they can be said to define that ethnicity, that is, they have absolute truth value. Thus, an approach focusing on sociocultural features clearly avoids the problems and impasse associated with extant, conflicting historiographic traditions since it is fundamentally ahistorical and apolitical and the problems are associated with idiographic/emotive expressions of a self-identity. However, it comes with its own shortcomings as indicated; and, without the other two sources of evidence, such evidence, although necessary, is also not sufficient by itself. *Evidence from all three source domains is needed for a necessary and sufficient statement about an ethnic identity; in addition, however, with an eye toward reduction/elimination of alternative explanations of conflicting evidence by further analysis and research. Evidence for a claim to an ethnic identity collectively from the three domains becomes necessary and sufficient to the degree that within domain alternative testable interpretations have been examined and reduced or eliminated.*

(4). Ethnicity and genetic DNA evidence. While potentially genetic DNA evidence may become a fourth source domain helping to establish the existence of an ethnic identity, at the present level of application, it can be best characterized as providing a parallel universe of evidence to the three domains described above. Any evidence from this source has to be characterized as being consistent or inconsistent with inferences derived from the three other domains of evidence. Epistemologically, one cannot use this source of evidence to

either confirm or disconfirm inferences/conclusions about an ethnic identity based on historical, cognitive self-descriptor or sociocultural domains of evidence. What is lacking is a correspondence between ethnicity/race defined genetically as referring to a geographically circumscribed population group and a socioculturally defined ethnic group (in the broad sense) that has no necessary reference to a geographical location (e.g., a Gypsy). The linkage between geographical location and a socioculturally defined ethnic group is accidental and not a necessary linkage. Perhaps, rules can be specified to tighten the linkage. For example, in a geographically located population group, one can restrict the sample to self-identified individuals as being of a target ethnic group: "Macedonians," "Greeks," "Bulgarians," and others. before carrying out the genetic/DNA analyses. Nonetheless, in their present state of development such restrictions are unsystematic. There are other putative solutions offered by specialists in the field to circumvent the linkage problem (e.g., Yang et al., 2005), and they will be presented below as tentative solutions. In this way, historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists may begin to accept genetic DNA analysis results as relevant, and, perhaps, ultimately, as conclusive evidence.

Any bodily cell (termed autosomal cell) taken from blood, saliva, and/or tissue will include within itself the complete genetic/DNA history of the species and it remains constant. Uncontaminated blood, saliva, hair, body tissue samples all can be submitted for DNA analysis, that is, to DNA-genotyping to obtain a full genetic/DNA characterization of the individual from whom the sample source has been obtained (especially, now that the human genome has been decoded in its entirety). Fortunately, in forensic DNA analysis, as well as in studies of race and ethnicity, only restricted regions from the entire genome have been found to be sufficient as 99 percent of the genome in 46 autosomal chromosomes (23 pairs, one set from each parent) and millions of genes included, measured in mega base pairs of alleles), are similar and shared in common among individuals. These restricted regions in forensic DNA-typing are found in 13 loci in the chromosomes and are collectively identified as short tandem repeats (STRs). Here, the allele sequence at each location differs among individuals over the 13 loci (except for monozygotic twins); and, importantly, individual patterns emerge in terms of location, length, and intensity of expression. The obtained profiles can then be compared to a standard to ensure validity; but, diagnostically, to victim and suspect, in order to arrive at an exclusion/inclusion evidential decision regarding a given suspect. Specialized forensic laboratories independently

linked to county health organizations carry out such analyses upon request from police/prosecutorial attorney offices.

In studies of race and/or ethnicity, similar types of analyses are performed based on haplotype bloc profile differentiations of target ethnic or racial groups from other ethnic or racial groups. Sampled population groups are defined (i.e., circumscribed) by their geographical location. A haplotype as a basic technical term in this kind of an analysis is described as a "particular combination of alleles observed in a population" (Gaybriel et al., 2002: 2225). An important additional part of the definition is that these particular combinations of alleles are also closely linked alleles (genes or DNA polymorphisms) and are inherited as a unit.

In the Gabriel et al. (2002) study, which used multiple markers, it was observed that blocs of haplotypes, each bloc having only a few haplotypes in common plus other selection criteria, were found to occur over contiguous regions in the genome separated on each side by an inferred recombination due to mutant alleles inherited from a distant historical episode (i.e., informative SNPs). The borders on each side of the haplotype bloc where the flanking SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphisms) were located showed linkage disequilibrium in the allele sequence (LD) as confirmed/determined by the two standard measures, D and r^2. Within each bloc, haplotypes varied in size and diversity; and, importantly, these features were used to characterize and differentiate the population groups sampled.

The DNA-genotype analyses were carried out on four population groups: Yoruban African sample (90, 30 parent-offspring trios), African American (50), European (93), and an Asian sample (42). The genotyping for each subject involved identification of SNPs (pairs of dissimilar inherited alleles, one from each parent, technically labeled as, single nucleotide polymorphisms) in order to determine the composition of each haplotype and haplotype bloc in a wide range of contiguous regions in the human genome from 54 autosomal regions, evenly spaced throughout, each with an average size of 250,000 base pairs (bp) of alleles with one SNP at each 150 kb length.

The results showed differences within haplotype bloc across the four populations as well as across haplotype blocs. In addition, the proportions varied on SNP frequency across the four samples, ranging from 70 percent to 86 percent. A 59 percent of the candidate SNP selected for study, however, were common to all four populations. Also allele frequencies in the individual SNPs varied across the four groups and these results were consistent with prior findings of population differences and origin.

Another critically important difference among the four population groups was on proportion of "informative pairs of SNPs" showing linkage disequilibrium. What these informative SNPs flanking each haplotype bloc indicated was a historical recombination on the mutated allele that was to have occurred in the historical past at a particular locus. The flanking SNPs that identified common haplotypes within a bloc could be determined with "as few as six to eight randomly chosen common markers" (2227). Finally, the populations samples were mapped out on length of bloc span (kb) and proportion of informative pairs found to distinguish the four populations. Importantly, the linkage disequilibrium D and r^2 values did not vary across different sized blocs or on distance between the flanking SNPs, a critical indicator of validity of the reported findings.

The Yang et al. (2005) study was a much more fundamental study as it focused on the basic unit of inheritance, the allele (one set from each parent), and used a very high number of markers (199) that were found statistically to group themselves into k=4 to k=7 clusters of alleles depending on population group that would differentiate the population groups studied. Runs were made with each cluster level for each population group. The main finding that in effect would confirm and extend previous findings was that a nonhierarchical cluster analysis did distinguish separate population groups based on DNA polymorphisms and that the group differences based on the use of such diallelic AIMs were *discrete* rather than *continuous* as found in other studies. This finding of discrete cluster groupings is a hugely important one for DNA genotype research into issues of ethnic identity because qualitative (discrete cluster) differences are much easier to relate to ethnicity groupings compared to continuous quantitative pattern differences (as in the commercial DNA Tribes methodology). Thus, the Yang et al. (2005) diallelic methodology using very large number of markers (199) may be the methodology of choice in studying ethnicity with genetic/DNA protocols.

Like race, ethnicity in terms of sample/group selection is also geographically defined. An ethnic group would simply comprise a smaller, more limited geographical located area compared to race. Conceivably, reduced sensitivity might occur in the selected AIMs needed to characterize an ethnic group because, compared to a population group, a geographical region for ethnicity is greatly reduced. Given large enough samples, however, (>50), there is no *apriori* reason to expect reduced sensitivity. Consequently, no differentiation is or should be made in such genetic studies between race and ethnicity. Hence, it would seem that genetic/DNA methodology can be used

to study ethnicity as well with available independent genetic markers totally unaffected by competing historical accounts or by vagaries of subjective/idiographic expression of an ethnic self-identity. Nonetheless, the reservations noted at the outset will need to be considered in detail before accepting commercially based studies of ethnicity. Chapter 7 will present a detailed analyses of these reservations as well as the findings on ethnic component compositions of the Macedonians as an ethnic group compared and contrasted to neighboring Greek and Bulgarian population groups as reported by at least two commercial organizations.

In the chapters that follow this chapter, evidence from each domain is presented separately with a selective focus on the important evidential aspects highlighted above for each domain; in chapter 4, the historical/political manifestations of the Macedonian ethnic identity are given a detailed presentation; in chapter 5, the cognitive self-descriptor evidence plus original research findings; in chapter 6, the sociocultural characterization or the characteristic features of the Macedonian society; and, in chapter 7, the genetic DNA evidence. Chapter 8 presents an integrated, comprehensive and compressed narrative of the evidence from chapters 4–7 collapsed across domain and across historically important but discontinuous stages in the manifestation of the Macedonian ethnic identity. In the end, a general conclusion as to "Who the Macedonians Are" is presented along with caveats of unresolved issues. Chapter 9 takes up the unresolved problems of alternative interpretation of some pivotal issues in how the salient supportive/nonsupportive evidence is to be understood vis-à-vis the Macedonian identity. These specifically identified unresolved issues are reconceptualized in chapter 9 as problems in the development of the Macedonian ethnic identity. Finally, chapter 10 presents the 10 postulates of the general ethnicity model.

Glossary of Terms[1]

Allele: The fundamental unit of inheritance. A single allele is inherited separately from each parent. It is also an alternative form of a genetic locus.

Base Pair (Bp): Two nitrogenous bases (Adenine and Thymine or Guanine and Cytosine) form a pair and these are held together by weak bonds. Two strands of DNA are held together in the shape of a double helix by the bonds between the base pairs. A set of two bonded nucleotides are on opposite strands of DNA. The only two

possible base pairs are A-T and C-G, and these base pairs make up the sequences of fragments of DNA, for example, CCAGTAC. These sequences are a code for genetic information. Strung together in chains, each base reaches across and forms a pair with its complementary base on the opposite strand like the rungs of a ladder. Base pairing ensures that the genetic information, the sequence of bases in the DNA, is passed securely from generation to generation by DNA replication.

Chromosome: The self-replicating structure of cells containing the cellular DNA that bears in its nucleotide sequence a linear array of genes, a rod-like structure of tightly coiled DNA found in cell nucleus of plants and animals. Chromosomes are normally found in pairs; human beings have typically 23 pairs of chromosomes. In lay language, chromosomes are the package for DNA and genes.

DNA (DeoxyriboNucleic Acid): DNA is a double stranded molecule held together by weak bonds between base pairs of nucleotides. It is the molecule that encodes genetic information. The four nucleotides are Adenine, Thymine, Guanine, and Cytosine. Base pairs form only between A and T or between G and C nucleotides; thus, the base sequence of each single strand can be deduced from that of its partner.

DNA-Genotyping (or DNA-Typing): Chemical structure of everyone's DNA is the same. The only difference among individuals (or animals) is in the order of the base pairs. There are millions of base pairs in each person's DNA so that each person has a unique sequence. However, given that there are repeat sequences in the base pairs, therefore, the whole genome does not need to be identified in base pair sequence. Standardized methods exist such as those in forensic DNA-genotyping that examine short tandem repeats (STRs) in only 13 loci in the entire genome that uniquely discriminate among individuals (except for monozygotic twins). In forensic genotyping, genotype profiles across 13 loci are standardized by differences in STR sequence patterns, length, and intensity of expression, and these indicators are used for genetic DNA identification in exclusion/inclusion outcomes relative to samples from victim and criminal suspect.

DNA Marker: A gene or other fragment of DNA whose location in the genome is known.

DNA Sequence: Relative order of base pairs whether in fragments of DNA, a gene, chromosome, or entire genome.

DYS (D=DNA; Y=chromosome; S=unique DNA segment): A system of identification or a nomenclature system that identifies a DNA, chromosome, and unique DNA segment with a number location to identify a locus in the human genome.

Gene: Fundamental physical and functional unit of heredity encompassing an ordered sequence of nucleotides (AGCT) in a particular position on a chromosome that encodes a specific functional product (protein or RNA molecule).

Gene Expression: Process by which gene encoded information is converted into structures and processes within a body cell.

Genetic Markers: Alleles of genes or DNA polymorphisms used to locate and identify a position in the genome. Broken down into types, they are (1) indels, or insertions/deletions of the DNA at particular locations on the chromosome; (2) SNPs or single nucleotide polymorphisms in which a particular nucleotide is changed (e.g., A to G; and, since SNPs and indels are rare, they are also called "unique event polymorphisms"); (3) microsattelites, or short sequences of nucleotides (2–5 core base pairs; e.g., repeated ATCG sequences in tandem); and (4) minisattelites or longer sequences of nucleotides (9–80 core base pairs), repeated in tandem.

Genome: All of the genetic material in the chromosomes, that is, the entire gene array expressed in the total number of base pairs.

Haplotype: A set of closely linked alleles (genes or DNA polymorphisms) inherited as a unit, that is, a particular combination of alleles observed in population

Haplotye Bloc: Haplotype sequences with relatively few common haplotypes flanked on each side by SNPs.

Linkage Disequilibrium: A site in the allele sequence in a gene region where a recombination has occurred due to a mutant allele insertion.

Locus (or Loci): Position of a gene in the chromosome or in another chromosome marker; or, a stretch of DNA at a particular place on a particular chromosome.

Marker: An identifiable physical location on a chromosome, for example, restriction enzyme cutting site or a gene whose inheritance can be monitored.

Polymorphism: A naturally occurring or induced variation in the sequence of genetic information on a segment of DNA.

Short Tandem Repeat (STR): Multiple copies of an identical DNA sequence arranged in succession in a particular region of a chromosome.

Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP): A variation in the genetic code at a specific point on the DNA. These single nucleotide polymorphisms occur as variations within a biallele or as diallelic markers and have been estimated to be as many as 30 million. SNPs are better markers than STRs and are of particular importance due to empirically observed linkages to specific disease syndromes (phenotypes).

4

Historical/Political Manifestations of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

Given the comprehensive analysis of the concept of ethnicity and its logical functions in chapter 3, as well as the applicable methodology to be used, the first domain of evidence presented in detail on the question of "Who the Macedonians Are" is the *domain of historical/political manifestations*. This source provides the richest and most readily accessible basic raw material on the question of the Macedonian identity. However, ethnic identity in the context of historical sources and documentation has to be distinguished from the related concept of national identity as the two concepts are similar and are often used interchangeably. Subtle differences between them will make it clear that historical/political manifestations have probably more to do with a sense of a unitary political identity needed in a claim to nationhood rather than to a claim for an ethnic identity.

In attempting to create a new nation in the Balkans, along the lines of the earlier Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian examples, the Macedonians did have a sense of national unity (i.e., the Slav-speaker majority) in the revolutionary period from 1896 to 1908. Certainly the newly minted intellectual elite (mostly graduates of Bulgarian and Russian institutions of higher learning) had it, as the material below will show. Nonetheless, the issue of ethnic identity had not yet crystallized and was not even felt by them (except for Misirkov, 1903). Moreover, as the contemporary eyewitness account by the American journalist Albert Sonnichsen (1909/2004) shows, the Macedonians were commonly perceived as "Bulgars" (i.e., the Slavophone speakers) locally and internationally (but see Brown, 2003: 12–15). Both the Macedonian elite and the international community used the word "Bulgar" as an ethnic identity designation for the majority Slav-speaking population

of Macedonia. Apparently, the Macedonians at this time were not particularly disturbed by this internationally ascribed label. Perhaps, cognitively, they had little else to fall back upon. Having just emerged from the 500-year Dark Age period of Ottoman Turkish hegemony, they relied entirely and exclusively on outside scholarship to tell them who they were. In little over a decade, however, this self-identity label would mysteriously change to "Macedonian" in the mass population with considerable resentment for the alternative labels imposed on them as "Greeks," "Serbs," or "Bulgars" (Rossos, 1994). To limit the extent of the puzzle as to how this could have come about, one should be reminded that during their awakening (i.e., during the last quarter of the nineteenth century), the Macedonian self-identity had not yet emerged except for a vague feeling of *nashe, nasheism* (us, them), an apt term to describe their self-awareness (Rossos, 1995). They had nothing better available. Thus, the changeover dynamics in the two decades that led to "Macedonian" as a self-chosen designation are still mysterious and not particularly clear and cannot be understood except vaguely as a process of self-discovery.

As one might expect and as the example of Switzerland shows, a national group can be comprised of more than one ethnic identity. This is what appeared to be the case at the turn of the century for the Macedonians and Macedonia. At this early period in the twentieth century when they still saw themselves as "Bulgars," Switzerland was, for the Macedonian elite, the vision and model to emulate in their revolutionary struggle for autonomy and nationhood, and an attraction to ethnic minorities in their midst. This vision, in print, appeared quite frequently and it was the generally accepted model (see Anastasoff, 1945; Perry, 1988; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). Under more pressing concerns, however, that is, the recruitment, arming, and training of clandestine guerrilla bands in the different parts of Macedonia from 1896 to 1903 (Perry, 1988; Polianski, 1972), the Macedonians paid little attention to the question of "who they were" and generally accepted the "Bulgar" label in their drive to nationhood (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). This initial adoption of the "Bulgar" self-identity designation by the educated elite may have unwittingly cost them the indispensable international support they needed in the manner of the other Balkan countries earlier as they were seen to have no claim to an independent national identity.

Not surprisingly, during the Macedonian drive to nationhood, the Greek and Vlach-speaking minorities in their midst saw things differently. They sought alignment with their perceived "mother" countries of Greece or even Romania in the case of the Vlach (Latin

speaker) minority, and not with the ongoing revolutionary struggle seen by them as "Bulgarian" in nature (Poulton, 2000: 60–63). They never saw, and amazingly enough—even their own majority—Slav-speaker Macedonian population, the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) as an entirely self-contained native movement and struggle for autonomy and nationhood (see Poulton, 2000: 56). Worse still, the Albanian Moslem and Turkish villages dispersed in small numbers throughout Macedonia would cooperate with the Turkish military forces in constant pursuit of the revolutionary bands in the active periods of spring, summer, and fall, all chillingly described in great detail in the memoir of Sonnichsen (1909/2004). This was another major factor why the choice of "Bulgar" as a self-designation label proved to be so fatal and contributed to the overall failure of the struggle for nationhood. Almost by all, it was seen as foreign, as a Bulgarian-inspired attempt to add Macedonia to Bulgaria and thus it was resisted by all.

The political/historical manifestations of the Macedonian identity expressed in historical writing, documentation, and public memory are likely to be biased by the perspective of the source, the country of origin, as well the political/historical circumstances of its writing (see Karakasidou, 1994: 1–28; Kitromilides, 1989: 149–194; Rossos, 1994: 370). Importantly, it should be noted at the outset, this domain of evidence does not directly bear upon the issue of ethnic self-identity; it only points to its manifestation in a global all-or-none manner. Nonetheless, in what follows, the historical-political manifestations of the Macedonian identity, as reflected in the Macedonian movement toward autonomy and nationhood, within which the Macedonian identity evolved—imperfect, ambiguous, and, at a times, self-contradictory—is briefly presented.

The relevant sources, mostly non-Balkan, are the major focus here. Specifically, the concentration is on documented references to self-identity as expressed in political/military organizations as well as on names used for such organizations and their political aims at a time when Macedonia was just emerging from the 500-year Ottoman rule. This was a period when the Macedonians were oblivious to their past, had a mass amnesia (except for the public memory of recent historical events), and suffered from a total loss of continuity as people. Accordingly, the historical/political manifestations of the Macedonian identity and associated historical developments are heuristically divided into five periods: (1) Revival of the Macedonian identity in the second half of the nineteenth century; (2) The revolutionary struggle from 1896 to 1908 and the postrevolutionary

partition of Macedonia by Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria in 1913; (3) Interwar years; (4) World War II and the Greek civil war; and (5) Current and postindependence developments.

Revival of the Macedonian Identity—Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

After five centuries of oppressive Turkish rule under the Ottoman Empire, it should hardly have been surprising to find no manifestation of the Macedonian national/ethnic identity by the Christian population of Macedonia (see Brailsford, 1906/1971). The Western world may have initially regarded Macedonia and the Macedonians as a historically well-established ethnic identity, for example, Gladstone's slogan, "why not Macedonia for the Macedonians" (Anastasoff, 1949); or earlier, Lord Byron's reference to them in his poem *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (see appendix 1), as the crimson-scarfed men of Macedon, nonetheless, as the nineteenth century wore on, toward the beginning of the twentieth century, travelers, journalists, historians, and humanitarians (see Anastasoff, 1945: 35–37), generally all outsiders, refer to them as "Albanians," "Bulgarians" (the majority), "Serbs," "Greeks," and "Romanians" on the basis of their spoken dialects. Such revelations and reports suggested that there was no surviving Macedonian ethnicity at all unlike the historically well-established Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian examples and that Macedonia was simply a region. Adding to the confusion between fact and expectation was the Ottoman practice of indiscriminate labeling of all members of the Partriarchate Orthodox Church, regardless of ethnicity, as "Rumlei," meaning Roman subjects that they once were in the Byzantine Empire.

Not having a native intelligentsia until the late nineteenth century, the Macedonian population could not counter such nominalistic external or internal labeling practices as they were impoverished peasants living on small land holdings in mountainous countryside villages or on large Turkish estates in the rich plains below as land-tilling tenants (Vacalopoulos, 1973; Vakalopoulos, 1991). Virtual serfs to the Turkish overlords after centuries of occupation, the Macedonian masses were powerless to react. Worse still, such nominalistic labeling practices by Ottoman Turkish authorities as well as by outside observers brought about multiple confusions within the native Macedonian population allowing room for assimilationist/partitionist neighbor state propaganda and designs on Macedonia after the expected demise of the Ottoman Empire (Shashko, 1995).

These nominalistic identifications under various categories also provided leverage for Great Power shifts in policy as well (Rossos, 1991b). Moreover, in the absence of any unifying institutions such as a public education system and a mature intelligentsia, and, with shifting ethnicity characterizations combined with uncertain, unreliable population estimates of the various ethnic groups, Macedonia's future in the late nineteenth century, and unfortunately, in the early part of the twentieth century, was, as a consequence, almost totally determined by outsiders, outside events, and outside powers. In response, Macedonianism and the Macedonian identity first emerged in the intelligentsia as a self-preserving nationalistic drive to counter these outside manipulative forces waiting to carve up Macedonia upon the demise of Balkan Ottoman rule rather than as a conscious self-awareness of who they were.

As an officially recognized religious institution other than the dominant Islam of the Empire, the Greek Patriarchate Orthodox Church from its seat in Istanbul (Constantinople) was the only link to the past. It provided a very limited check to absolute Turkish domination over their daily lives. However, as Greek was the language of the church, but not for the majority native Macedonian population, it was seen as another form of foreign institutional control. Moreover, the Patriarchate Church was, for the most part, a willing tool of the Turkish Sultanate and/or the neighboring independent Greek state (Perry, 1988: 120–121). Its association to the Byzantine Empire had long been gone but the tradition of subservience to secular power was very much alive as the Patriarchate Church sought to survive and perpetuate its control over the Christian subjects of the Balkans within the theocratic/autocratic Ottoman Empire.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a rival Orthodox Church institution came to challenge Patriarchate control in Ottoman Macedonia based on the then widely accepted criterion of language as a marker for ethnic identity (Bracewell, 1991). The Sultan's decision to recognize the Bulgarian Exarchate Orthodox Church as another legitimate Christian church institution within the empire opened the door to competition for the allegiance of the Macedonian town and country populace based on local decisions and, again, on linguistic criteria. The emergence of the Bulgarian nation state following the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 and the consequent San Stefano Treaty (1878) intensified the impetus of the autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate Church to win the hearts and minds of the Macedonians through Bulgarian schools and churches that were to be established in towns and villages of Central and

Northern Macedonia (Perry, 1988; 1993). The claim was that the Macedonians were Bulgarians, Slav descendants, once part of the great medieval Bulgarian Empire. The similarity of the Macedonian unwritten dialect to the Bulgarian language allowed immediate access to the Macedonians and gave substance to the Bulgarian claims. The Sultan had designed this new component member of his Christian realm in his empire as a counter to the Patriarchate Church that was increasingly being linked to revolutionary activities in the southern regions of Macedonia and earlier with its local support of the Greek revolution (Perry, 1988; Brewer, 2001).

Not to be outdone in what evidently became a political/religious free-for-all struggle for Ottoman Macedonia, the Greek Patriarchate in response, along with the Greek government (Vakalopoulos, 1991), as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church and government, and even the Romanian government, established Greek, Serbian, and Romanian schools of their own at primary and secondary levels in large population centers—close by, rarely next to, but in the same areas as the rival Bulgarian schools. All were aimed at winning the loyalty of the Macedonians as "Bulgars," "Bulgarophone Greeks," "South Serbs," or as "Proto-Romanians." Upon graduation students would continue their education in neighboring country universities where, among other aspects, their education, as might be expected, would also include an acculturation into the host country ethnic identity and its historical heritage. Students coming from newly successful and well-to-do merchant or land-holding families subsequently went abroad for a higher level professional education (only recent reforms had allowed the native population to join town merchant classes). For the Slav-speaking students generally, this meant Imperial Russia either in St. Petersburg or Odessa (e.g., K. P. Misirkov). In a very small number of cases, students went to Switzerland, France, or Germany for a professional education in medicine (Perry, 1988).

Of this developing intelligentsia within the Ottoman Empire, only the Slav-speaking students attending Bulgarian and Russian institutions of higher learning reacted to the constant assimilationist policies to reinstate or restate their Macedonian identity apart from that of the host nation (Perry, 1988; Rossos, 1995). In contrast, the Macedonian émigré student population in Athens identified their ethnic identity with that of the host nation (impressed, no doubt, by Greece's glorious past, as were the ancient Macedonians). These émigrés in Athens sought to bring Macedonia into the newly expanded Greek nation through state-supported political activism and clandestine guerrilla incursions. Similar movements were to be found also in Sofia and

Belgrade but in these countries, the majority of the educated elite saw themselves for the first time as "Macedonians" and, importantly, this was also the first direct native intelligentsia reaction to the outside *nominalistic* ethnicity labeling practices (Rossos, 1995: 219–244; Poulton, 1995).

A schism in the development of the Macedonian identity can be seen to occur here at this early historical juncture as a large part of the intelligentsia were intent on attaining professional status and willingly accepted assimilationist ideology of the host nation (i.e., they saw themselves as Greeks or Bulgarians). Worse still for the Macedonians and their political manifestations was the strangle-hold of Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian political/military pressures emanating from ambitious army officer groups to conform to the host country's aspirations for future incorporation of Macedonia. The lack of internal institutional support in the form of a received historical heritage, an independent educational school system, an organized autonomous religious institution, and the lack of international recognition of the Macedonian identity as a political force as well as the separation of students and professionals from their homeland, all conspired to retard and ultimately defeat the normal development of national aspirations and/or intellectualized understanding of the Macedonian identity during this critical early period (see Rossos, 1991: 282–329; 1994: 369–394; 1995: 219–254). Moreover, scholars of the time, within and outside Europe, generally agreed that the ancient Macedonians spoke Greek as determined by material archaeological remains and were, therefore, ethnically Greek (Hammond, 1991; Borza, 1990: 79). For the rising student and professional population of Macedonia this was an insurmountable obstacle in understanding who they were. They needed a link-up to the ancient Macedonians that could not be attained given their Slav-Macedonian dialect. Thus, there was no way available to them at this historical period to bridge the gulf separating them from their ancient ancestors. This failure of a link-up by linguistic and/or other cultural remains to the ancient Macedonians cost them the international recognition they needed as a historically well-established ethnic identity-seeking autonomy/independence within the Ottoman Empire along the lines of the earlier Serb, Greek, and Bulgarian examples.

The Macedonians, at this stage, could only say what they were not (Perry, 1988). They were not Serb, Greek, or Bulgarian. Mistakenly relying on language as a clue as to who they were, they initially concluded they were Bulgarians or Bulgarian Slavs. Eventually, some of the intelligentsia settled for a more sophisticated label, that is, for the

hyphenated Slav-Macedonian ethnicity label (i.e., Misirkov, 1903). Questions as to why, if they were Slavs, they did not have a distinct Slav name for themselves as the Serbs, Croats, and Bulgars have; or, why was there a distinct lack of Slavic first names in their culture and society during this period, or why they wore, as their native dress, a single-pleat white tunic and pale white (or black) tight leggings running up to the hip rather than baggy trousers, as their Slav neighbors, or a kilt like the southern Albanians and Greeks, or why their dances and folk music were non-Slav did not occur to them (see Pribichevich, 1982: 222–223). These were all questions that apparently eluded the Macedonians at this crucial historical stage or were unaddressed issues at this early period. Such inconsistencies between sociocultural features and linguistic dialect were not felt at this early stage by the intelligentsia, the population masses, or at the international diplomatic level. Thus, the normal development of the Macedonian self-identity was severely retarded and went hand-in-hand with the critical lack of international acceptance and support, which they needed if they were to emerge as a nation (Rossos, 1995).

In diplomatic circles, the world still saw them as Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks, Vlachs, Albanians, Gypsies, and Turks; and, in the perceived absence of a distinct Macedonian identity, they sought and dealt with their representative client states in the region, that is, with Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey (Rossos, 1991b; 1994). Long gone was Gladstone's well-meaning slogan, "why not Macedonia for the Macedonians," and their own struggle for autonomy and nationhood was largely ignored. Oddly, enough Sonnichsen's (1909/2004) memoir indicates the development by this time of an underground government with civilian and military committees organized according to current sophisticated Socialist/Democratic ideals; but operating in secret, in a clandestine setting of an ongoing revolution apart from the mainstream population. Soon enough, these shadowy clandestine developments and the sad state of affairs that existed then (betrayal and extermination of rebel bands) were superseded and cast aside by the so-called Balkan wars of liberation and by the unwanted post-Balkan war partition of Macedonia with the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913 (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

An added insult to the partition was the population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria that was carried out officially in 1926. This exchange was nothing less than a small-scale ethnic-cleansing action by the occupying power, Greece, applied to those who had refused loyalty oaths, last name changes, place name changes, and an obliteration of their own immediate historical past and their costly

bloody insurrection struggles. In short, all was lost. That is, the dream for an autonomous self-governing Macedonia was lost.

Earlier, as the nineteenth century ended, "Macedonian" had become a frequently used official self-identity label and the numerous secret émigré organizations and members of these organizations, now back in Macedonia acting as professionals, that is, as lawyers, teachers, and doctors, coalesced in their ideas and future aspirations to a degree that was sufficiently crystallized to form a political/military organization aimed toward eventual liberation of the Macedonian population from the Ottoman Turkish yoke through a vaguely defined autonomy. Having experienced the numerous Bulgarian officer corps attempts as well as political/governmental attempts to gain control of the liberation/autonomy movement and to align it to Bulgarian state aims, the organization was named IMRO. The use of the word "Internal" was a deliberate and conscious attempt by this organization to dissociate itself from the numerous mixed liberation organizations that were outside of Macedonia in Sofia; and, indeed, throughout Bulgaria (Perry, 1988), all aimed in a concerted effort to annex Macedonia to the Bulgarian state.

The IMRO was founded in Salonica in 1893 as a secret revolutionary organization involving a large number of faculty members and former graduates of the Bulgarian Gymnasium at Salonica, some of whom were now professionals, teachers, and doctors in the larger cities and towns of Macedonia representing the newly minted Macedonian intelligentsia. From the very beginning, this activist political group was constrained not to offend Bulgaria from whom material support was expected; and, therefore, the organization included some native Bulgarian nationals (e.g., Ivan Garvanov). Unmistakably, this was a period when the Macedonian intelligentsia still saw themselves ethnically as "Bulgars." By 1896, a constitution was adopted that was largely written by the charismatic and influential leader Georgi "Gotse" Delchev (1872–1903), whose own ideas had by now become firmly set on the need for a native uprising independent of Bulgarian or any other Balkan state ties and obligations. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Macedonian ethnicity saw its first flowering crystallized as a political activist group rather than as an ethnic self-identity with the development of a native political/military organization, the IMRO. This development, however, was largely confined to a small component of the Macedonian intelligentsia and had not yet been transmitted to the native population masses.

The task that remained from 1896 to 1903 was to mobilize the villages and a rising urban merchant class toward the coming

revolutionary struggle, and externally to force Great Power intervention, all the while keeping in check Balkan state assimilationist aims (Perry, 1988; Polianski, 1972). Enlistment in the towns and villages was secretive, rather than en masse, based on few chosen loyal members in each village and town who would act, when called upon, to carry out the organization's plan of action for that area.[1] Only in this way could secrecy be maintained from Turkish military security organs, from the Turkish villages in their midst, and from rival insurgent organizations, and, importantly, from their own village and towns' people. Inevitably, this unavoidable method of organization was to raise suspicions concerning the organization's activities in the local population, certainly a lack of trust as it was in all appearances conspiratorial. Tragically and mistakenly, much of the population in the Florina/Castoria districts opposed them. They were perceived as "Bulgarians" in nature and aim rather than as Macedonians. The adoption of what appeared to be a standard Comitadji guerrilla uniform involving a black vest and undershirt, large baggy black trousers with laced white leggings and sandals as shown in photographs taken by Sonnichsen (1909/2004) unfortunately resembled Bulgarian but not Macedonian village/peasant wear.[2] What they chose to wear may have been uniform and functional for their clandestine, mountain guerrilla type of warfare but decidedly gave the illusion that the insurgents were "Bulgars." Thus, the insurgents acquired an unwanted stigma as "Bulgarians" at a high and unacceptable cost in loyalty among the native population.

The immediate impact was that the local populations were now open to rival Greek-sponsored insurgent influence (Poulton, 2000: 59–60; Vakalopoulos, 1991). Thus, when the revolt did occur in 1903, it came in the midst of divided loyalties with generally no mass participation by the Macedonian populations in the towns and villages (Poulton, 2000: 56). The high frequency of betrayals to Turkish and/or rival insurgent organizations is not what one would expect within a normal range in a clandestine revolutionary struggle, but, decidedly a consequence of the social/political confusion and chaos that existed then. It contributed greatly to the ultimate failure of the initial struggle for autonomy and nationhood.

Revolutionary Period 1896–1908. In the IMRO constitution, all ethnic elements regardless of religious affiliation were welcome to participate in a general mass population struggle for liberation from the Turkish yoke. However, in actuality, participation remained confined to the majority Slav-speaking Macedonian population (Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin regions). It did include some Vlach-speaking

Macedonians, notably and effectively, Mitre Vlasheto, and Pitu Gule (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008) that to a greater degree had energetically espoused the opposing Greek cause (e.g., Jon and Stephanos Dragoumis) (Vakalopoulos, 1991) or, in a small number of cases, the Romanian cause.

Parallel organizations had in the meantime also developed among the Macedonian émigré population with their supporters, ambitious military officers and high government officials who sensed the opportunity for personal success as well as fulfillment of patriotic aims of a Greater Bulgaria, Greater Greece, and/or Greater Serbia. All such organizations were, not surprisingly, opposed to the IMRO and its aim for autonomy or as an independent state and actively sought to frustrate or to defeat its aims through rival band activities or through covert takeover attempts. These rival organizations represented, in fact, a devolutionary development for the Macedonian identity that was, ultimately, to lead to the partition of Macedonia and to the present great schism in the Macedonian ethnic identity as Slav and Greek (see Danforth, 1991).

In Sofia in this same period, Macedonian émigré elements had established a rival organization called the Supreme Macedonian Committee (i.e., an executive committee above village, county, and province central committees) with branch organizations all over Bulgaria. It included members of the Bulgarian officer corps (Colonel Tsonchev) some of whom may have been of native Macedonian origin (Captain Boris Sarafov) as well as other Macedono-Bulgarian professionals who had made the Bulgarian identity their own. The branch organizations included large-scale countrywide membership from the general Bulgarian population. The Supreme Macedonian Committee sought to provide coordination and integration of all revolutionary activities in Macedonia and invited leading members of the IMRO to participate in their meetings and to act jointly. However, its covert aim, as discerned by Delchev, was an eventual takeover by Bulgarian army professionals who would align the Macedonian autonomy/independence movement to the Bulgarian state aim of annexing Macedonia (Perry, 1988). During a brief spell of cooperation and agreement, the Supreme Macedonian Committee did provide considerable material support. In the end, however, elements in the IMRO headed by Delchev saw this organization as a mortal threat and turned away from its existing ties (Perry, 1988).

The split in top leadership, once done, immediately created an unsolvable problem, namely, the financing of revolutionary activities within Macedonia due to disruption of monetary sources and

supplies from the outside Macedonian émigré population in Bulgaria. In this sector of revolutionary activity, the Supremists quickly seized the upper hand and were able to retain exclusive control of the monetary collection machinery (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). Worse still, the top IMRO leaders (except for Delchev) in the meantime had been betrayed and were now in Turkish prisons far away in Asia Minor. There was now in addition a disruption of communication by the top leadership with the local field commanders on the scene. Combined, these two developments briefly threatened to put an end to the revolution and to the Macedonian insurgency. However, and fortunately for the revolution, the top echelon leadership were released from prison quickly due to increased international pressure by the Great Powers. The problem of the disrupted finances, nonetheless, remained (Sonnichesen, 1909/2004).

The problem, which essentially was a problem of maintaining outside external support, was ingeniously sidestepped when in September 3, 1901, a small cadre secretly planned and famously executed the kidnapping of an American Baptist missionary named Ellen S. Stone along with her companion, Caterina Tsilka, in a small village (Bansko), north of Salonica (the head of the mission, Dr. House, the bigger prize and original target of the kidnapping for ransom, had eluded these inexperienced conspirators). After six months on the run in the Macedonian mountains with a baby girl along in the midst of winter (Caterina Tsilka had been pregnant at the time of kidnapping), and in spite of constant pursuit by the Turkish military and rival guerrilla bands, a ransom of US$66,000 in gold was finally agreed upon (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). Monetary sufficiency now largely achieved, the revolution went on as planned and continued to evolve uneventfully toward the eventual outbreak in the year that followed.

On the eve of the revolt during the summer of 1903, the IMRO was secretly exterminating agents of the Supreme Macedonian Committee within its ranks and vice versa (Dimovski-Tsolev, 1968). The IMRO was already facing a four-front guerrilla war against Ottoman Military and Security Forces, rival Supremist guerrilla bands from Bulgaria, Greek-sponsored Andartes bands, and, to a lesser degree, Serbian-sponsored guerrilla bands as well (Polianski, 1972).

Within occupied Ottoman Macedonia, the IMRO organized and materially supported the formation and training of the numerous secretive guerrilla bands around large city areas and provinces. As chief military inspector, Gotse Delchev tirelessly supervised these activities throughout the length and breadth of Ottoman Macedonia

(Polianski, 1972). Select activist townsmen and villagers were formed into small bands and trained secretly in the traditional Balkan guerrilla war and tactics in the summertime (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). Having attended the Bulgarian Military Academy, Gotse Delchev had some professional background for this task. His chief influence, however, was largely political/motivational aimed at achieving an autonomous Macedonia through an internally inspired mass uprising; of no less importance was his hope for outside intervention by the Great Powers (Perry, 1988).

In spite of steady development from 1896 to 1903 in number, organization, and armed state of readiness of the local guerrilla bands that roamed the Macedonian mountains in the summertime, the need for a double level of secrecy, that is, secrecy from Turkish state security organs and secrecy from rival insurgency organizations prevented the masses from ever acquiring full knowledge and appraisal of the IMRO and its aims. Worse still and at a crucial moment in the preparatory activities leading to the eventual outbreak, the charismatic Gotse Delchev and a small band were betrayed or fell into ambush and killed by a local Turkish military unit outside the village of Banitsa, east of Salonica. Thus, the formidable intellect behind the organization and preparation of the guerrilla bands was lost at the moment of greatest need, and Gotse Delchev was not to lead the IMRO Ilinden revolt especially at the critical early phase of the campaign.

Gotse Delchev had opposed the early date set for the uprising (August, 1903) by Garvanov and his IMRO group in Salonica (whose motives have since been in question, seen as an operative of the Bulgarian state; see Perry, 1986) arguing that it was premature. He had not been present when the decision was made but went along with it, nonetheless, so as not to alienate potential Bulgarian help nor allow discovery of IMRO plans for the planned revolt due to recent critical intelligence that had fallen into Turkish hands. At the moment, none of the neighboring states wished the IMRO to succeed, especially Bulgaria, that had assumed the revolt would fail and the movement would subsequently come under control of the Bulgarian army. When the famous/infamous Ilinden uprising did occur on August 2, 1903, it was well organized and very successful in the beginning (Perry, 1988). No doubt, due to Gotse Delchev's meticulous preparation. However, within three months, it was largely put down by the immense Ottoman Empire military and paramilitary forces. This was partly due to the absence of an overall strategic objective other than that of attracting the attention of the Great Powers (Poulton, 2000: 56–59) and, at the tactical level, no attempts were made to capitalize

and to build upon initial developments following the successful first strikes at small garrisons located in towns and/or near villages, rail, and telegraph communication lines, which, for a while at least, had blinded the Turkish military and caused a widespread disarray among its ranks. Without international support, or, more importantly, intervention, the uprising was doomed to fail. In the end, untold suffering and damage to the local population in the villages occurred, leaving behind an embittered taste in those who suffered the depredations and destruction not only by the Turkish Army and Security Forces but by the local "Turkish" (i.e., Moslem) population of the Turkish villages now organized into paramilitary groups; and shortly after, from the rival Andartes bands as well (Perry, 1988; Pribichevich, 1982; Poulton, 1995). The latter were apparently in an unholy alliance with the Turkish military (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004).[3]

The revolt failed not only because the neighboring Balkan states opposed it but also because the Great Powers (England, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany) wanted to maintain a balance of interests in the region, which at the time favored a status quo (Perry, 1988). None of the Continental Powers wanted to see one more client state in the region go over to the Russian sphere of influence as had Bulgaria. This was not unexpected as the Macedonian revolutionaries were indeed seen as "Bulgarians" at the international level (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). However, it remained, among others, for scholars such as Duncan M. Perry (1988) to fully uncover and describe in detail, especially for a non-Balkan as well for Macedonian readers outside the Balkans, these events and the tragic flaws that led to the doomed first flowering of the Macedonian political/national identity.

For the masses, the secretive and conspiratorial nature of the IMRO drive to autonomy and independence remained in their minds a clumsy plot for a Bulgarian takeover, especially in the Florina/Castoria region as well as other Southwest regions of Aegean Macedonia (this is the public memory that was passed down to me from my own grandfather and father). It was seen in a more favorable light in the Vardar and Pirin regions, as, apparently, no bitter feelings remained following the catastrophic defeat (Perry, 1988).

In 1904, well after the Ilinden uprising, an officer of the Greek army, Pavlos Melas (son-in-law of the Macedonian activist Stephanos Dragoumis), attempted a similar coordinating/integrating role in organizing Greek-oriented guerrilla Andartes bands except for his short life (Vakalopoulos, 1991). In the unfamiliar revolutionary environment of the then Macedonia and its deadly mix of rival patriots,

villains, and traitors, survival was brief as it was for Gotse Delchev. Pavlos Melas eventually also became an emblematic symbol in his case for the "Makedonomahi" (see Vakalopoulos, 1991) and the Greek participation in this complex Macedonian insurgency against the Ottoman Empire forces from 1903 to 1908. Hallowed by time, Pavlos Melas attained the mythological father figure status in Aegean Macedonia as has Gotse Delchev in the Vardar region of Macedonia (e.g., see Polianski, 1972; Vakalopoulos, 1991). Each vision, of course, was radically opposed to the other and it was to lead eventually to a Hellenic and a Slav-Macedonia with carved-in-stone hatreds perpetuated over the next 100 years as one might expect in the best of Balkan state traditions.[4]

One unnoticed but noteworthy event in 1903, especially in relation to the development of the Macedonian identity, was the publication of K. P. Misirkov's book *On Macedonian Affairs* (as cited in Rossos, 1995: 23–24). While it was the second, not the first, book to be published in the Slav-Macedonian language (Lunt, 1986), nonetheless, it was the first comprehensive statement of "Who the Macedonians Are" and of their legitimacy as a separate ethnic group with aspirations toward political autonomy. In it were the ideological elements of the modern "Slav-Macedonian identity," that is, the assertion of an independent identity apart from that of the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian national identities based on distinct native language according to the then current custom and practice (see Bracewell, 1991). Surprisingly, Misirkov advocated an unpopular peaceful achievement of an autonomous Macedonia through cooperative rather than revolutionary methods together with other ethnic groups including the Turkish population. Although banned, the book managed to attain one very critical *negative* review in Sofia and, thus, had little influence in the immediate years after its publication, occurring, as it did, during the catastrophic defeat of the IMRO drive toward liberation. In time, however, it was recognized as the ideological, if not the historical/political, foundation of the Macedonian identity, and its influence among the intelligentsia has only increased with the passage of time. It is also the first public expression of cognitive self-descriptor evidence regarding a core set of beliefs concerning the Macedonian identity and represents an obvious manifestation of that identity. At the same time, its dated thinking and conceptual limitations, even after more than a century, are hardly understood or noticed by the Macedonian intelligentsia.

Following the eventual defeat of the Macedonian insurgency (1903–1908) and the failure of the Young Turk military junta

(1908–1912) to carry out expected and promised reforms (as well some reforms imposed by the Great Powers), the Balkan states, in defiance of the Great Powers, decided to act on their own. Military alliances were formed first by Serbia and Montenegro that, subsequently, were joined by Bulgaria and Greece (Rossos, 1991b). Thus, in the first and second Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, the armies of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria swept through Macedonia and Thrace to defeat and to forever expel the Turks from Europe (except for a small portion of Eastern Thrace). Not surprisingly, the same Balkan Allies that had so swiftly triumphed over the Ottoman Turkish army fell into discord, quarreled, and fought over Macedonia, especially over the chief port city of Salonica when within their grasp lay the larger prize of Constantinople.[5]

Greece and Serbia won this second round in the Balkan wars (1913) Bulgaria had started and proceeded to create the present-day Slav and Hellenic Macedonia by splitting northern from southern Macedonia along the borders separating what subsequently became Yugoslavia and Greece. A small portion in the Pirin region was ceded to Bulgaria, the defeated party. In this way, the great schism in the Macedonian identity began and has remained since as a permanent fixture. Importantly for the future of Macedonia, the Macedonian émigré intelligentsia in Sofia in the face of all these reversals continued to lobby internationally without success for recognition of an independent Macedonian state. Such efforts along with the interwar turn to terrorism conserved the Macedonian identity immediately after the Balkan wars and World War I that followed, saving it from virtual destruction by the partitionist states and by the widespread denial of the Macedonian identity at high-level international diplomatic circles (Rossos, 1994: 369–394). Current heated rivalries between the Macedonian and Bulgarian states, unfortunately, have not allowed an adequate appreciation of these émigré activist efforts and, more importantly, the tolerant atmosphere of the Bulgarian state and its people that permitted their existence. Toward an adequate appreciation of this generally tolerant atmosphere, a reminder is needed of Greece and Serbia and the degree of tolerance these states had for the Macedonian identity in that same period (Rossos, 1994).

Interwar Years

Well-developed public school systems of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria followed the partition almost immediately (i.e., in the early years of 1920, after World War I). The Macedonian students were now

provided an entry into modern educational systems and subsequently into professional ranks on a massive scale compared to that of the Ottoman Turkish era. This was the first generation of Macedonians to ever attain any public school education at all (including the present author who is of that generation).[6] Through higher education as well as immigration, each family sought betterment and entry into the modern post-Turkish era by joining the ranks of the modern professional world in their native lands and/or as entrepreneurs in the new world to which they had come as immigrants (e.g., the Bitove family in Toronto, CA). No more enthusiasm remained for an autonomous or free Macedonia or for any form of ethnic/political activism. The dream of one united Macedonia was by now lost.

For the masses that had never known the true nature and aims of the IMRO but saw the insurgency as a conflict between Greece and Bulgaria, autonomy and freedom were virtually a dead issue. Except for the sporadic and infrequent raids from IMRO units now in exile in Bulgaria, not a murmur of resistance was shown anywhere in the partitionist state populations; rather, a relief at being liberated from the 500-year-long Turkish yoke. One post–World War I election, which allowed a wide spectrum of political parties to be represented on the ballot, did show, however, that the Macedonians disproportionately favored the Communist parties in Greece and in the newly formed Yugoslavia. As interpreted by Rossos (1995: 219–254), this was really a protest vote against the repressive Greek and Serbian assimilationist policies; perhaps, also, a disguised manifestation of a Macedonian ethnic identity gone underground.

The dark side to the partition showed itself soon enough in the increasing pressures to assimilate to the dominant ethnic identity with changes in place names and last names, and, at times, with legal proscriptions against the native Macedonian dialect (e.g., during the Metaxas dictatorship in Greece from 1936 to 1941). Moreover, the Macedonians as "Slavophone Greeks" in Greece were now to become a minority in their own land following the population exchanges of refugees from Asia Minor for the Muslim population of Macedonia (largely from the chief city of Salonica) (Kontogiorgi, 2006: 26; Iatrides, 1980; Rossos, 1994: 369–394). This was followed a few years later by a population exchange with Bulgaria (Kofos, 1995: 277). The Macedonians now would become "Old-Serbs" in Yugoslavia, "Pirin-Bulgarians" in Bulgaria, and, of course, "Slavophone Greeks" in Greece. As noted by Rossos (1994) and others (e.g., Perry, 1988; Poulton, 1995; Pribichevich, 1982), Bulgaria, while officially denying the existence of a separate Macedonian ethnic identity, nonetheless,

tolerated Macedonian émigré activism, at times at a great cost to the Bulgarian state in internal political turmoil and internationally directed terrorist activity linked to Bulgaria (Poulton, 1995: 79–84; 2000: 79–85, 92–94; see also Nedeva and Kaytchef, 2001). Thus, the expression of Macedonianism in Sofia in journal publications and other forms of ethnicity activism including sporadic extremist terrorist acts by IMRO bands in Greek and Yugoslav regions of Macedonia continued to occur (Poulton, 2000: 92–94; see also chapter 8). At times, Bulgaria under international pressure and pressure from her immediate Balkan neighbors would severely suppress these activities as necessary measures of self-preservation at a grave cost to its political system, for example, the assassination of a prime minister, Stambolinski, when he attempted a rapprochement with Serbia/Yugoslavia as well as the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia later, in May of 1934 (Graham, 1939; Hoptner, 1963; Newman, 1945). Such political activist/terrorist activities, nonetheless, would maintain some small continuance of the Macedonian dream at an intolerable price; and the price was an unwanted terrorist role among Balkan and Western European Powers, making it even more difficult for achieving international recognition. Terrorism then, still, had some degree of respectability as it focused on specific political targets compared to its indiscriminate use in current models.

Consequent to the partition, the divided portions of Macedonia developed along different and distinct lines, Hellenic Macedonia, on the one hand, with emphasis on the alleged linkage of the ancient Macedonians to the ancient Greeks and their Greek ethnic identity, and, across the border, a Slav (Yugoslav) Macedonia with a historic emphasis on ties to a largely imagined South Slav heritage (Drezov, 2001; see also Curta, 2001). Large-scale immigration to Australia, Canada, and the United States, and successful attempts to enter the various professions dampened subsequent enthusiasm for political involvement and muted ethnic aspirations between the two great wars. The intelligentsia, however, as noted by Rossos (1995), including elements in the student populations, increasingly turned to Communist or leftist underground organizations in Greece, Yugoslavia, as well as Bulgaria in response to the pervasive neglect by the European Powers of the Macedonian question in the interwar years that was assumed by them to have been solved successfully by their ratification of the 1913 partition (Rossos, 1994).

The IMRO, operating from within Bulgaria during this same interwar period, split into rightist Fascist and leftist Socialist factions (Nedeva and Kaytchef, 2001; Poulton, 2000). It ultimately deteriorated

into a self-serving terrorist organization, selling its services to left and right-oriented political groups within and outside of Bulgaria while continuing to pay lip service to nominal platitudes about unification and autonomy for Macedonia (Rossos, 1995: 237–238). Minimally, however, and this point needs to be strongly emphasized, that these activities conserved continuity of the Macedonian ethnic identity increasingly expressed now in transnational native Macedonian political organizations with ties to sympathetic outside organizations, for example, the MPO (Macedonian Political Organization) in Australia, Canada, and America, at a very crucial point when the Macedonian identity faced total destruction all around. In contrast to these trends in the IMRO, both with respect to its effectiveness but, more importantly, with respect to international recognition, the rising student intelligentsia in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the same interwar years turned toward a new direction, that is, to a peaceful evolution, advocating a creation of an autonomous Macedonian state within a larger Federated Balkan state. This new style of thinking laid the foundation for the eventual formation of the post–World War II Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the Federated Yugoslav Republics (Poulton, 1995: 94–95). As these developments left out a large portion of the Aegean Macedonian population in Greece that had little or no sympathy for an autonomous Slav-Macedonian state, this other half of Macedonia looked to Greece for gradual improvement in daily life with little or no regard for ethnic activism in spite of widespread repressive measures (Karakasidou, 1993b).

World War II and the Greek Civil War

In the summer of 1944 with the decline of Axis Power in the Balkans, which had been occupied since April 1941, Marshall Josip Broz Tito asked the Macedonian partisans of wartime Yugoslavia to form a Macedonian Republic within the newly formed Federated Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia so as to check future Serbian and Bulgarian influence over Macedonia (Dedijer, 1953; Vukmanovic-Tempo, 1990). This offer was accepted by the Macedonians after a considerable period of rivalry and conflict of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CP) with the Bulgarian CP over control of the Macedonian CP (Bulgaria had always considered the Macedonians to be ethnic Bulgarians and, under this rubric, Fascist Bulgaria had occupied and then annexed Vardar Macedonia in 1941 while the Germans were in Yugoslavia). Following the formation of the Socialist/Communist

Yugoslav state in 1944, the Yugoslav Macedonians in response turned their back on Bulgaria and formed their own republic Democratic Federal Macedonia (August 2, 1944) which later became the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (from 1963 to 1991) still, nonetheless, within the Federal Yugoslav Republic (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

The Macedonians for the first time in their modern history were finally free to address the immensely complex problems of nation building. Besides rapid industrialization, a comprehensive official Slav-Macedonian language was developed, and its grammar codified by 1951 with the help of Horace G. Lunt, an established Harvard Slavic-language specialist (Lunt, 1952), a national anthem was composed, an official history was begun, and an obligatory roster of heroes was selected from the many Macedonians who had participated in the numerous but unsuccessful armed struggles during the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Importantly, a call was made for a united Macedonia, thus setting the stage once again for a new round of conflict with the neighboring states of Greece and Bulgaria (Rossos, 1997).

Across the border to the south, in the aftermath of the retreating German occupation forces from Greece in October of 1944, the EAM/ELAS Communist-led partisan resistance forces, having failed to reach a power-sharing formula in the long negotiations with the Greek government in exile in Egypt and London, decided to resist the British Near East and Greek Army Expeditionary units (Gerolymatos, 2004; Iatrides and Wrigley, 1995). These Allied military units had already landed in Athens a month earlier (October 12, 1944) to quickly seize the reins of government in a race against the EAM/ELAS Socialist/Communist resistance groups that were now also infiltrating into Athens in large numbers for the same purpose. The armed conflict that came to be known as the Battle for Athens in the West and as the *Ta Dekevriana* within Greece was a small-scale prelude to the coming civil war. Worst of all, it was a bloody nightmare for the civilians caught within, caught in a deadly web of divided loyalties involving close family members and relatives in a closed crowded urban setting.[7]

Through a house-to-house urban civil war, the Communist-led EAM/ELAS pockets of resistance were gradually subdued. The end result in the midst of intense international pressure was an agreed-upon temporary government. Future decisions at the polls would decide the fate of the former Royalist Government in-Exile in London as well as the type of participation by the Communist-led resistance forces in an envisioned postwar democratic government encompassing all political interests. The hastily formed provisional government

under Archbishop Damaskinos, acting as regent in the meantime, maintained the truce. A minor peaceful interlude followed after the Varkiza agreements of February 12, 1945, in which the EAM/ELAS army voluntarily disbanded and surrendered its weapons (Gerolymatos, 2004). This was to prove a fatal mistake for the left-of-center Socialist/Democratic forces in terms of their subsequent participation in a postwar democratic Greek elections. It became apparent that fair elections could not be held, and the EAM/ELAS forces boycotted the elections. With the outcome of the elections in no doubt, the rightist forces by now with the backing of the Greek expeditionary and British forces, to no one's surprise, returned the Royalist Government in Exile.

As a direct consequence of the intense rivalry between rightist and leftist armed resistance partisan forces during the German occupation, and with the rightist forces now in power, a period of "white" terror and repression of the leftists became unleashed (Gerolymatos, 2004) with a special severity on the Macedonians (Rossos, 2008). In response, the Communist leadership, having boycotted the democratic elections and thus, out of power, decided that only an armed struggle would gain them a share of power in postwar Greece and reorganized the former resistance forces into the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE in its native acronym). Thus, the long-smoldering Greek civil war, the first round of which had already been played out in 1943–1944, erupted in 1947 into a full-scale civil war involving a disproportionate participation by the Slav-speaking Aegean Macedonian population ranging at various times from 25 to 40 percent (Rossos, 1997; 2008).

For the Macedonians the minimal goal was to achieve a more liberal treatment as an ethnic minority within Greece but the maximum goal was unification with the Vardar (Yugoslav) Macedonia state. The armed conflict that followed, a guerrilla partisan type of a war, was fought largely on home ground, on Macedonian territory bordering the Socialist states of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria that would provide training, safe haven, and military/technical support (Rossos, 1997). At the same time, the Macedonians of the newly formed Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as many Aegean Macedonians of the World War II leftist EAM/ELAS movement of Greece, especially the Macedonian NOF—People's Liberation Front (formerly SNOF/SNOV) partisan units within DSE could see this as an opportunity for creating a unified, single Slav-Macedonian state, in accord with the then East European Socialist (Communist) doctrine concerning ethnic self-determination as well as the World War II

Atlantic Charter provisions. Formerly, these aims had been vigorously opposed by the EAM/ELAS forces as the Macedonian SNOF and NOF/NOV partisan units within EAM/ELAS were expelled into Yugoslavian territory in 1943; however, now, the Macedonian partisans were tentatively accepted as a source of seasoned veteran manpower, which according to Rossos (1997), allowed the armed campaign to be restarted (see also Karakasidou, 1993a).

The Communist leaders, Zahariades and Vafiades, as had the Greek Communist Party in the past, while paying lip service to these Macedonian aspirations, resisted Macedonian efforts at unification at the cost of Greek territorial integrity (Karakasidou, 1993a: 455–477; Rossos, 1997). Their position increasingly became compromised in the eyes of the nationalist Greek government as "bloodthirsty Slav-Communist traitors." Any compromise, especially on the territorial integrity of Greece, would be entirely self-defeating and was, therefore, opposed.

Not surprisingly, the Greek DSE Communist-led forces sided with Stalin and the Soviet Union during the fallout between Tito and Stalin in 1948 when Tito was expelled from the Comintern/Cominform (the international arm of the Soviet Union Communist Party). Stalin and the Soviet Union that now opposed Tito, consequently, also opposed the formation of a unified Macedonian state within Federated Yugoslavia or as a part of a proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Balkan Union (Kofos, 1995; Poulton, 2000: 107–108). The Greek Communist leaders caught in the middle had now no choice but to choose Stalin and the Soviet Union over Tito and Yugoslavia. Disastrously, on their own, they sealed the border with Yugoslavia, ostensively to resist desertion and defection and waited in vain for Tito's demise and new leadership to emerge following Tito's expulsion from the Comintern. In response, Tito himself sealed the Greek-Yugoslav border on his side and this denial of safe haven and material support assured the defeat of the DSE army by the fall of 1949. Stalinist Albania was too poor to offer material support or to sustain the DSE forces. In any case, Stalin never intended for the Greek insurgency to succeed (given, of course, the agreed-upon World War II political division of Europe at the Yalta agreements that left Greece outside his sphere of influence).

As the civil war came to an end, thousands of exiles—civilians, including women and children, as well as surviving partisan military personnel—sought safety in the Eastern European Communist countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Many who managed to go across into Yugoslavia, in

spite of the sealed border, were never to return back to their homes as the Greek government in the interim years revoked their citizenship and seized their property. In the meantime, after years of exile, the military commander of the insurgent DSE forces, Markos Vafiades, could walk free the streets of Athens completely secure and Harilaos Florakis, a top echelon political leader of DSE, eventually became a revered elder statesman of the Greek Parliament and buried with honors at the end. Many of the Macedonians in East European Socialist countries, other than Yugoslavia, were allowed to return and did indeed return, but, just as quickly, left Greece for America and Canada.[8]

In the late 1980s after the death of President Tito (1980), intermittent attempts to further a united Macedonia movement in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia had no impression on the increasingly Hellenized Macedonians in Greece who by now were tired of war and conflict, many of whom came to the United States of America under special immigrant quota provisions and more to Australia and Canada. Claims and counterclaims about Macedonian territoreality and the "true" Macedonian ethnic identity developed into a deep mistrust over the years and perpetuated the already intense, politically inspired, fratricidal hatred among the Macedonians in the two neighboring states that eventually brought about the two Macedonian ethnic identities, which, subsequently, Danforth (1991; 1995) and Karakasidou (1994; 1997) were to astutely observe and document.

Current and Postindependence Developments

On the eve of the break-up of the Yugoslav state in 1990–1991, Gligorov, the then president of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia together with Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, actively mediated existing disputes in order to save the Yugoslav union on the basis that both the Bosnian and Macedonian political identities were too fragile and the Macedonian economy too weak to survive drastic political and economic changes in Yugoslavia (Poulton, 1995). However, as Croatia and Slovenia seceded followed by Yugoslav army attempts to suppress the secession (Cowan, 2000; Udovicky, 1997), increasingly, the Macedonian public opinion turned in favor of independence, in spite of its government (Daskalovski, 2006).

The Macedonians were fearful of another Serb embrace as had occurred in 1913 and, more recently, of Kosovo in 1989. Preoccupied with conflicts and war with Croatia and subsequently with

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia formally agreed to a peaceful pull-out of the Yugoslav army from Macedonia. Thus, Macedonia declared its independence for the first time in modern history on September 8, 1991 (as a multiethnic rather than as a nationalist state), and the dream of achieving an internationally recognized national identity and an independent state status, though delayed for almost a century, was finally realized. This second flowering of the Macedonian ethnicity reached full bloom and took hold, although immediately nonrecognition by most major Powers as "The Republic of Macedonia," the virulent campaign against use of the name "Macedonia," by Greece as well as the subsequent UN-imposed economic blockade, the Greek embargo, and the internal conflicts with the Albanian minority from within threatened its very survival (Poulton, 1995; Shea, 1997).

From the start, the nature of the Macedonian identity remained the Achilles heel in the success or failure of the newly created independent Macedonian state. The initial problem addressed by Sir Arthur Evans remained still an unsolved riddle in spite of concerted efforts to address this question by native and outside historians as recently as 1997 (e.g., Danforth, 1991; Glenny, 1996; Ivanovski, 1992; Pettifer, 1992; Poulton, 1995; Shea, 1997). It remained an obstacle to international recognition of Macedonia with its chosen name due to objections by Greece within the European Community. Moreover, the campaign by Greece over "the name issue," with all the arguments and counterarguments (see Shea, 1997: 278–284) suggests exhaustion and intractability of the problem when confined exclusively to the domain of historical evidence. The failure of historiographic methods in this instance is quite apparent as from this source there are multiple but opposed interpretations, even at this late date, as to "Who the Macedonians Are." This is a failure to which the Macedonians themselves contributed by their misplaced reliance on language as a broad criterion of ethnic identity in the early revolutionary phase and unfortunately also after Macedonia emerged as a Socialist Republic in postwar Yugoslavia from 1944 to 1991.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The historical/political domain of evidence shows an emergence of a Slav-Macedonian identity from 1900 to 1944 that, generally, was not recognized internationally. In the critical historical events, that is, the Ilinden 1903 uprising and the partisan war against the Axis Powers in World War II when a Macedonian IMRO-Ilinden inspired local detachment mounted the first full-scale attack on the occupying

Axis forces on October 11, 1941, one finds manifestations of distinctive national feelings and aspirations for nationhood but without an intellectualized understanding of the Macedonian ethnic identity. Even the charismatic "Gotse" Delchev in the early phase of his career referred to himself as "Bulgarian" (Danforth, 1995), no doubt, reflecting Bulgarian assimilationist effects of his Bulgarian Gymnasium education in Salonica and that of the Bulgarian Military Academy in Sofia. Only Misirkov (1903; as cited in Rossos, 1995: 223–224) addressed the ethnic identity question directly and formulated the modern concept of a "Slav-Macedonian" ethnicity, a concept still adhered to in the newly emergent Macedonian Republic in complete ignorance/denial of sociocultural features that point to a different conclusion.

With the formation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federal Republic (1944), the problem of recognition was solved at least in the East European Socialist countries. Recognition of a Macedonian state or of a Macedonian identity was not an issue for the Western European Community during this period of quiescence and it was largely ignored while the Yugoslav state existed. The issue of international recognition erupted only in 1991with the declaration of independence by the Republic of Macedonia with the severest challenge coming, not from neighboring Serbia as one might have expected, but from the neighboring Hellenic Republic (Shea, 1997). The challenge focused on an alleged illegal use of the name "Macedonia" (which had already been in international use since 1944) based on the Greek claim that there is no "Slav-Macedonian" identity and that the true Macedonian identity is "Greek." Surprisingly, a maximum claim emerged from this line of thinking culminating in the unprecedented statement of ownership by Greece over the name Macedonia as being Greek property. None of these efforts succeeded.

5

Cognitive Self-Descriptor Evidence for Macedonian Ethnicity

The historical/political manifestations of the Macedonian identity as expressed in conflicting historiographic traditions, the inconsistencies and contradictions from within, among the Macedonians themselves, and conflicts with neighboring Balkan states, all rest on a failure to look for alternative methods in addressing the issue of "who the Macedonians are." The failure of language as a valid ethnicity indicator and as an inapplicable criterion of ethnicity did not occur to the Macedonians. In contrast, the nearby Albanians who were now also striving for independence in the period from 1890 to 1912 had already realized that their adopted Muslim religion did not make them "Turks" although widely accepted as such in the Ottoman Empire by most Christian ethnic groups and even by the Albanian Moslems themselves who in the great majority, relative to their population, were at key government posts within the empire and had completely accepted the "Turkish" identity.[1] Within the ranks of the rebelling Albanians, however, religion was perceived as a false indicator of who they were in their drive to autonomy and nationhood.

In contrast, the Macedonians did not or could not (for political reasons) reject language as an ethnic identity indicator (especially, from 1944 to 1991). This was a critically necessary step to avoid the endless series of inconsistencies and confrontations with neighboring state interpretations of "Who the Macedonians Are" that easily opened the door to the partition in the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. They falsely tied their ethnicity to their Slav-Macedonian dialect that they sought to prove as an independent language and, thus, a marker for their ethnic identity (Lunt, 1952). What was never understood at this stage was that, once language was allowed as an ethnicity marker, one could easily link their ethnicity to neighboring

Serbia or to Bulgaria, depending on which linguistic similarities and/or differences are to be emphasized, or, even, to Greece based on the other criterion (i.e., Patriarchate Church affiliation). In this way and at this crucial early period, the claim to nationhood was lost and Macedonia partitioned (for a detailed critique of language as an ethnicity marker, see Badian, 1967).

Foreign Observer Assessment of the Macedonian Identity

A glimpse into the confusions and ambiguities about the Macedonian identity in post–World War I years is provided by the most inaccessible source of all: the domain of cognitive self-descriptor evidence or evidence based on self-reports regarding the Macedonians ethnic identity. To this day, this source remains largely inaccessible for the Macedonians in Greece and Bulgaria. In the partitionist states of Serbia and Greece, where consistent and constant denial of a separate Macedonian identity was paramount, free expression was impossible. In rare instances when such evidence was obtained, it was anecdotal, indirect, and unrepresentative of the Macedonian population as a whole due to small and unsystematic sampling. Nonetheless, some brief publicly documented glimpses into what the Macedonians thought about their own ethnic identity have recently come to light.

During the Ottoman Empire, besides language and dialect, religious affiliation was tantamount to an ethnic affiliation as religion was the main criterion used to assign sociopolitical status to component sociocultural groups in the Ottoman theocratic/autocratic political system. In this system, ethnicity did not matter; but for the minority groups and for outsiders looking in, trying to make some sense of the facts on the ground, it did. Thus, the alternate use of these two ethnicity markers, quite often interchangeably, led to confusions both for the Macedonians themselves as well as for outsiders trying to make ethnicity assessments. During the late Ottoman period (i.e., late nineteenth and early twentieth century), the newly independent neighboring Balkan states of Greece and Bulgaria sought religious affiliation to Patriarchate versus Exarchate Orthodox Churches in towns and villages of Macedonia as evidence of legitimacy/legality in asserting control over the religious as well as the sociopolitical life of the local population within the empire—all with a view to subsequent annexation (Rossos, 1995: 219–254). The first observations cited below on the Macedonian ethnological landscape by Brailsford (1906/1971) took place against this confusing background and perspective.

Brailsford made his observations while on a tour of Macedonia to bring aid to atrocity victims well after the failed Ilinden revolt (1903) but still within the period of the 1903–1908 insurgency (chronicled in great detail by Sonnichsen (1909/2004). Unlike Sir Arthur J. Evans (1903), he did not prejudge the issue by using language as the marker of ethnic identity. He relied on his own experiences that led him to the conclusion that the issue of Macedonian ethnicity was unfathomable since all assigned labels to the "races of Macedonia" (as determined by linguistic and/or Patriarchate versus Exarchate Orthodox Church affiliations—note the confusion here) were all fluid characterizations that would change according to local exigencies and requirements of a particular situation at a particular point in time. For example, the "Greek" and/or "Bulgar" labels assigned to villages would change as the villages were coerced into an Exarchate (Bulgarian) or Patriarchate (Greek) religious affiliation by rival IMRO Comitadji and Andartes revolutionary bands in what was to become a mini-civil-war with villages bearing the brunt of the consequent atrocities in this post-Ilinden Macedonia from 1903 to 1908. As an embedded American journalist traveling with various Macedonian rebel bands, Sonnichsen (1909/2004) presents in great detail the futile and deadly struggles with the Turkish Military Security Forces bent on extermination raids on suspected villages and on suspected rebel locations entrapped and often betrayed by their own people or by Turkish villagers nearby. Dogging their trails (and vice versa) were also the Greek-sponsored Andartes bands (in Southern Macedonia) who, according to Sonnichsen, were apparently in a cooperative alliance with the Turkish military against their common enemy.[2] The Macedonians masses, caught in the cross-hairs of these contending forces at war, were forced into flip-flop transitions from Bulgar to Greek and back to Bulgar, ethnic identities in fluid nominal affiliations pressured by internal and external forces competing for Macedonia's political future. This was the Macedonia that Brailsford encountered and described while engaged in his well-meaning humanitarian endeavors at a time when "Bulgar" was the standard designation for the Slav speakers of Macedonia.

Devolutionary Trend in the Development of the Macedonian Identity

With the catastrophic failure of the Ilinden (1903) revolt and the futile insurgency struggle that continued even after the allied Balkan nation defeat and end of Ottoman rule in the Balkan wars

of 1912–1913, the Macedonian identity, at this point, entered into a downward devolutionary trend of development, subjected, as it was, to the intense assimilationist policies of the partitionist states of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. World War I, occurring as it did in 1914, almost immediately after the Balkan wars, confirmed and, in the postwar peace conferences that followed, gave legal status to the partition of Macedonia, creating, as a result, the unwanted/unnecessary "war refugee" problem. In truth, the Macedonians could not be considered war refugees in their own homeland as were the Christian populations of Asia Minor that were expelled by Turkey after the Greco-Turkish war of 1921–1922. This was their land from which they were being expelled. They were treated as war refugees only because they were conveniently labeled as "Bulgarians" by Greece, the occupying power that now selectively and opportunistically used language as a criterion and as a marker of ethnicity upon those that resisted, whereas in contrast, Christian religion was the only marker used in the exchange of populations with Turkey in 1923. Earlier, prior to 1912, the same Macedonians who were now being exchanged were "Bulgarophone Greeks" for Greece seeking legitimacy to its claim on Macedonia and Macedonians.[3]

To address this so-called war refugee problem as applied to Macedonia, the League of Nations appointed a Mixed Commission to oversee the *fairness* of the population exchanges between Greece and Bulgaria in 1923 following the partition at the end of World War I. In the process, the League of Nations Commission would also attempt to assess the native population mass sentiment regarding the Macedonian ethnic identity. The commission report by Col. A. C. Corfe who chaired the commission reported that, surprisingly, the native population of Aegean Macedonia showed a reluctance to discuss such issues or to declare themselves openly and complained of the forced assimilation policies of Greece to make them "Greek." Only when questioned privately would they identify themselves as "Macedonians; not Greeks or Bulgars." They would indicate an indifference as to who governed them as long as there was fairness and justice (Rossos, 1995: 230).

All such evidence, however, fell on deaf years, as these isolated reports challenged and called into question the official post–World War I diplomatic view of the Macedonians as Bulgars, Serbs, or Greeks. Such self-reports of the Macedonian ethnic identity by the Macedonians themselves had little impact on World or Balkan Power diplomacy that, in one respect, all shared in the firm belief that there was no Macedonian ethnicity at all (Rossos, 1994). An admission of a

Macedonian ethnic identity, apart from that of the Serb, Bulgar, and Greek ethnicities, would have contradicted the whole rationale of the population exchange being overseen immediately after the great war; importantly also the legitimacy of the partition itself of Macedonia in 1913 in the context of the wartime World War I principle and promise of postwar "freedom" and "self-determination" for nationalities and/or ethnic minorities in occupied countries.

What was obviously overlooked was that the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, which legitimized the partition, was after all a victorious Balkan nation treaty, not an international agreement; nor, importantly, were the Macedonians consulted, minimally at least, through a plebiscite. When they were consulted, as the Corfe report indicates, a claim to a Macedonian self-identity had mysteriously emerged in the masses only to be ignored internationally. Beyond this aspect, the Macedonian insurgency from 1903 to 1908 was completely set aside. Why was this never considered a minimal marker of the Macedonian identity, for a national, if not for an ethnic Macedonian identity?

British Foreign Service reports in 1926 by a staff member of the British Legation at Belgrade as well as that by Home Office staff member conducting independent onsite visits to Vardar (Serb-held Macedonia) and to Aegean (Greek-held Macedonia), wrote back, to the surprise of the home office, that the Slav-speaker population in the two partitioned parts still saw themselves as "Macedonians" when asked and not as South Serbs or Slavophone Greeks (Rossos, 1994). However, these reports offer only an anecdotal and impressionistic glimpse as they are not based on any systematic sampling studies.

Another glimpse after about 20 years following the Col. Corfe and British Foreign Service reports of what the Macedonians thought about their ethnic identity was provided by a British officer stationed in Cairo, Egypt, during World War II, namely, Capt. P. H. Evans of Force 133 (Rossos, 1991a: 282–329). This broadly educated former British civilian was parachuted into Northwest Macedonia in the fall of 1943 as the head of the British Military Mission to advise, support, and importantly, to assess the local Greek resistance forces during the German occupation in the provinces of Florina and Castoria.

In his report Capt. Evans states that, unexpectedly, and much to his surprise, he found himself in a non-Hellenic, Slav-speaking Macedonian region of Greece with little liking for the former fascist Greek government and/or prospects of postwar Greek rule. He found wide resistance to Greek assimilationist policies that were never expressed openly but only in the privacy of a native home and away from Greek members of the local resistance forces. He observed that

the Macedonians were of a separate ethnic identity, which was neither Greek, Serb, Croat, nor Bulgarian, but a distinctive Macedonian identity based on "love of homeland and local region" as well as on such sociocultural features as local songs and customs. He characterized such sentiments as being authentic expressions of an ethnic self-identity, that is, sentiments uninfluenced by educational experiences or nationalist assimilationist propaganda.

He remarked on a "historical oversight" as the World Powers in the past had not allowed an independent Macedonian state to be formed but now the time was ripe for such a development. Given the considerable British obligations to Greece as a valiant and loyal wartime ally against the Axis Powers, this report remained secret and was never shown to Greek Middle East military authorities. It was discovered in the late 1980s in the British Foreign Office archives by Andrew Rossos (see 1991a), a Canadian historian who was born and raised in the exact same region of Capt. Evan's wartime assignment and who, five years later, was himself to become a child refugee in Czechoslovakia fleeing the horrors of the brutal civil war of 1946–1949.

This previously undetected development of a mass sentiment of a distinct and unique Macedonian identity out of an amorphous, unfathomable identity during the Ottoman Empire has to be seen as a deeply surprising finding. The Macedonian activist elite had reached a high level of national/political consciousness earlier. However, many of them still saw themselves as "Bulgars" ethnically (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004; Danforth, 1995). It is a great mystery how this cognitive self-awareness of Macedonianism trickled down to the masses during a very difficult wartime (Balkan wars and World War I) and postwar conditions to become transformed into a highly crystallized Macedonian ethnic identity (one respondent in the survey/questionnaire below offered a clue by his suggestion that it may have had a suppressed underground existence—see note 4 of chapter 8).

A noteworthy feature in these two anecdotal and unsystematic assessments of the Macedonian identity is that, in both, the native Macedonians never used a hyphenated self-label. They simply referred to themselves as "Macedonians." No rational basis or reference to any historical and/or sociological features were offered by the respondents to buttress their claim. The manifestation of Macedonianism was more in the nature of a self-discovery apparently out of nowhere, or, perhaps a decision, a personal construction of a self-identity, as an anthropologist might say. As it covered a span of 20 years and it was documented by independent observers, it does indicate by implication

a considerable nationalistic fervor and a strong desire to be recognized by the world as a unique ethnic identity. Unfortunately, this high point in the development of a unitary nonhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity was not sustained. It was quickly lost; to be replaced by a "Slav-Macedonian identity" and "Greek-Macedonian Identity" (Danforth, 1991; 1995).

Officially, the Macedonians in Greece became Greek-Macedonians, Bulgarian-Macedonians in Bulgaria, and Old-Serbs in Serbia/Yugoslavia; and, thus, a devolutionary trend begins here with a transition to a "Greek" and to a lesser extent to a "Bulgarian" ethnic identity. Similar Serbian efforts toward a "Serb" identity failed completely. Subsequent post–World War II Yugoslav efforts, however, did succeed in developing a "Slav-Macedonian" ethnic identity. Thus, a schism, by a force of circumstance (i.e., the partition of Macedonia), was imposed upon the Macedonians, and the consciousness of a unitary Macedonians ethnic identity was lost. As these developments are adequately covered by native and outside historical treatments, especially by Rossos (1995: 219–254), they would not be reconsidered in this section (see also Kofos, 1989: 229–267; Perry, 1988; Poulton, 1995; Shea, 1997).

Recent Anthropological Studies of the Macedonian Identity

Danforth's (1995) more recent anthropological study of the Macedonian identity in a transnational setting (using interview and case history methods) documented for the first time the effects of the systematic assimilationist policies of Greece to generate a Greek consciousness and of the Macedonian Republic efforts to generate a Slav-Macedonian consciousness. This devolutionary schism in the Macedonian identity based on educational/assimilationist influences of each country as well as on the widely used language-based ethnicity ascriptions has attained a durable and long-lasting character. Heated disagreements as to "Who the Macedonians Are" were to be expected in any comprehensive sampling, and this is what Danforth successfully documented.

Danforth studied the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia originating from Greece and from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), including many Macedonians from Greece from the same Florina/Lerin region who had to leave Greece and were never allowed to return following the defeat of the Communist DSE forces at the conclusion of the civil war in 1949. Specifically, Danforth

interviewed Australian Macedonians during the initial "name" issue controversy surrounding the newly emergent Macedonian Republic in 1991–1992. This was a time when the Greek government mounted international efforts to declare the Slav-speaking Macedonians as being of a "Slav" but not of a "Macedonian" ethnic identity and to comply with Greek demands for a denial of the name "Macedonia" to the newly emergent republic. Local efforts of the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia were to pressure the Australian government to deny the Slav-speaking Macedonians their "Macedonian" ethnicity label as immigrants. The controversy became heated as rival Slav-speaking Macedonians both from Greece and from the former Yugoslavia spearheaded counterdemonstrations in Melbourne in an effort to deny the Greek and Greek-Macedonian demands. These efforts were successful as Australian courts did not accept the Greek position.

At the height of these transnational conflicts and controversies, individual Macedonians at various levels of academic sophistication and economic circumstance were interviewed regarding their personal beliefs about their Macedonian identity. Interestingly, the responders representing each group were mainly from the same border province of Florina. Case histories were compiled and presented to highlight and demonstrate how out of the same historical/political raw materials two different ethnic identities were being constructed, one "Greek-Macedonian" and one "Slav-Macedonian" (simplistically, one "Greek" and the other "Macedonian" at individual as well as at group level). Rationales for either ethnicity affiliation were presented as objective grounds in support of the chosen self-identity label. A wide range of factors were cited as crucial to their selection of a cognitive self-descriptor label that, surprisingly, did not always reflect assimilationist agendas of their home countries.

The most dramatic revelation was that, in one case, one brother considered himself of a Greek ethnicity and the other of a Macedonian ethnicity (Danforth, 1995: 185–196). Pribichevich (1982: 212) had earlier observed the same phenomenon in a parallel case of a Macedonian émigré family in Sofia: in this case, one brother was Bulgarian, the other Macedonian; there is also Newman's (1945: 66) observation of two brothers, one was Bulgarian, the other, Serbian. The demonstration of such personal constructions of ethnic identity was seen as highly supportive of the *nonessentialist* modern anthropological analysis of ethnicity and the subjective nature of ethnicity affiliation expressed in core beliefs. Equally, such observations are a poignant reminder of how fluid ethnicity labels have been historically

in Macedonia and apparently still continue to function in the same manner.

The absurdity that two brothers can be of a different ethnic identity argues against ethnicity as a scientific term in this nonessentialist anthropological interpretation. Moreover, if in fact, such labeling and self-identification reflect political indoctrination and assimilationist agendas that try to develop a national identity consciousness that is consistent and suitable to a particular state's political goals, argues against such an anthropological approach to ethnicity as it leaves open the question of authenticity, or more bluntly stated, that of validity. A more serious difficulty with this anthropological conception of ethnic identity is that if ethnicity is an individual/group cognitive construction, then there can be as many ethnic identities potentially equal in number to the population comprising an ethnic group.

Danforth also seems to have never confronted the issue of fluidity and impermanence of such specific ethnic identifications as "Greek-Macedonian" and "Slav-Macedonian" compared to the initial mass self-identification by the Macedonians as being "Macedonian" over more than a 20-year period (Rossos, 1991a; 1994). The former reflects the reality of the partition, the latter, the past, and, hopefully, the future.

In two more recent studies, Karakasidou (1993b; 1997) specifically focused on the process and dynamics of how the Slav speakers of Macedonia in the Florina and, in a separate study, in the Langhadas basin (Northeast from Salonica) acquired or are acquiring "Greek" ethnic identity (euphemistically, this process was labeled as "passage into nationhood" and/or as "national homogenization"). While her book (a published dissertation entitled *Fields of Wheat; Hills of Blood* [1997], detailed the specifics of changes over a half century from 1913 to 1950 due to the assimilationist policies ("national homogenization" policies) by Greece in the ethnic self-identification of former Slav-speaking Macedonians in the Langhadas basin area, she studiously avoided the critical issue "Who Are the Macedonians?" Her revelation that Macedonians existed in Greece who might be characterized as being of non-Hellenic ethnicity, nonetheless, created a sensation and even threats to her life (S. Lyall, the *New York Times,* February 17, 1999). What was not understood, however, in all the media attention her book has generated, is that she documented to a remarkable degree how successful Greek efforts at acculturation have been. Thus, instead of praise she met censure and threats to her life. Surprisingly, she won wide support in the academic world and even respect from Macedonians outside of Greece who, perhaps, should

have resented the implications from her conclusions highlighting the fluidity, volatility, and relative impermanence of the Macedonian ethnic identity; giving credence to the earlier idea that there is no Macedonian identity at all. This, after all, is the original Greek agenda regarding Macedonia and Macedonians.

Two generally unrecognized shortcomings downsize the impact of her studies. The first is that in her selected sample of respondents, she did not include those Macedonians who had not adopted a Greek ethnic identity, that is, those Macedonians who had resisted and fought against such an acculturation, who subsequently remained banned forever and prevented from ever returning to their homes in Greece (as Danforth, 1995 and Shea, 1997 have amply documented). Worse still, in the Florina and Northwest Macedonian region of Greece, there have been and are well-known Macedonian dissidents who have resisted assimilation and acculturation, who have been persecuted, jailed, and professionally isolated for believing in a separate Macedonian ethnic identity distinct from that of the Greek identity (e.g., Voskopoulos, Sideropoulos, Anastasiades, and Pasois). Importantly, they were probably available for her Florina studies had she chosen to interview them. Their self-reports might have provided some balance and sensitivity to the complexity of the issues addressed and a different input had they also been included in her studies.

The other or second major short-coming is that, besides the sampling inadequacy, there is the failure to include something like a "lie-scale" that is routinely used in psychological studies of personality to determine to what degree the self-reports elicited are authentic or are based on "social desirability" of the elicited response. Moreover, the phenomenon of shifting ethnicity affiliations so characteristic of revolutionary Macedonia (1896–1908) first noticed by Brailsford (1906/1971) eluded her as an operative mechanism as well as the probability of a different outcome had the civil war been lost by the Greek government forces in 1947–1949. In addition, the interview process itself of members of a despised minority, as the Macedonians are in Greece (Shea, 1997), by an interviewer ostensibly representing an aspired-to Greek ethnic identity undoubtedly influenced the outcome and response to questions regarding their ethnic identity.

Given the limitations outlined above, her studies might be better understood as docu-fiction writing rather than meeting elementary standards of a scientific study. Cambridge University Press rejected her dissertation study when it was submitted to them for publication on grounds, perhaps, other than commercial conflicts of interest as reported in the *New York Times* article. In any case, her studies of

cognitive self-reports regarding the Macedonian identity have little to say on the critical issue of "Who the Macedonians Are," a subject of some interest to the Macedonians she interviewed but, apparently, not to the author.

Who the Macedonians Are: A Survey/ Questionnaire Study

Introduction. The study, *Who the Macedonians Are: A Survey/ Questionnaire*, was conducted to assess what the Macedonians themselves think about their ethnic identity. The study was motivated by Danforth's (1995) anthropological research that, as already indicated above, revealed two Macedonian ethnic identities: one calling itself "Greek" and the other "Macedonian." To a lesser extent, it was also motivated by Karakasidou's (1997) findings as well, which documented a transition from an unspecified "Macedonian" to a "Greek" ethnic identity in the Greek-held Langhadas basin. In addition, the rationale for the study was also based on the consideration that Macedonian respondents need to be provided with *current* well-researched alternatives to pivotal questions about the Macedonian ethnic identity. This requirement, as specified in chapter 9, if met, would enable the participant to step outside of what is culturally/ socially acceptable (i.e., "socially desirable" answers) on issues regarding the Macedonian ethnic identity.

Danforth's (1995) study was based on unstructured/nonrandom oral interview self-reports from samples drawn from the Macedonian Diaspora in Melbourne, Australia. The interviewed responders were from various walks of life and at different levels of education. Importantly, they were divided into those who came from the Greek-held region of Macedonia (Florina/Lerin Province); and, those who came from the formerly Yugoslav-held region of Macedonia. Given the alternative interpretation above of Danforth's observed findings as showing an outcome possibly reflecting "social desirability"; and, thus, of questioned validity, the present study was conducted to control for this uncontrolled variable. This was done by explicit instructions to the participant to avoid responding based on "social desirability" and by presenting alternative answers based on the research in connection with *The Macedonians: Their Past and Present*. In this way, the responder was sensitized to the issue of "social desirability"; and, and at the same time, made aware of current research on salient questions about the Macedonian ethnic identity. Nonetheless, "none of the above" as an alternative was retained to allow for dissatisfaction

with the given alternatives. Beyond these considerations, the participant was admonished to look at the alternatives answers, to each question not as right or wrong answers, although, potentially some could be viewed as true or false, but as plausible answers. Since the survey/questionnaire was administered in a structured written form, variability normally found in orally presented questions, as in the Danforth (1995) and Karakasidou (1997) studies, was held to a minimum.

The survey/questionnaire was for a planned structured/stratified random samples study of the Macedonian populations in Northern Greece, FYROM, and Western Bulgaria. Stratification of the samples would include country of origin, age, and level of education. This structured/stratified random samples design would then allow appropriate statistical analyses of the results and generalizations/conclusions about the Macedonian ethnic identity in the three populations. Nonetheless, before embarking on the full-scale study, a preliminary study was needed to test the survey/questionnaire as a valid and reliable instrument. Thus, the preliminary study reported below was conducted on two *available* Macedonian samples: one from a FYROM (i.e., Republic of Macedonia) population and the other from a Canadian/American (CAN/AM) population of Macedonians from Greece and the former Yugoslavia.

The preliminary study was conducted entirely online. The survey/questionnaire was emailed to volunteer samples, one from each source or country of origin (N=10). In FYROM, the survey questionnaire was distributed to a professional university educated sample by Prof. Zhidas Daskalovski, a well-published political scientist at St. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. For the (CAN/AM) sample, the survey/questionnaire was distributed to a comparable sample by Chris Stefou, a retired engineer, a Macedonian activist in Toronto who edits and publishes *MakNews,* an Internet journal. With one exception, participants were young middle-age professionals with only one female participant.

The survey/questionnaire (see appendix 3) consisted of 25 questions in 5 categories: (1) ancestry or origin of the Macedonians as well as linkage to the ancient Macedonians; (2) impact of Middle Age events on the ethnic mix of the modern Macedonian ethnic identity; (3) impact of critical nineteenth/twentieth century events on the Macedonian identity; (4) outside observer assessments of the modern Macedonian identity (i.e., Evans, 1903; Brailsford, 1906/1971; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004); and (5) conceptual analysis and cognitive construction of the national versus the ethnic identity of the Macedonians. Each question was provided with five alternative

answers (*a, b, c, d, e*) including when appropriate, "all of the above" or "none of the above." Question 25, however, was an open-ended question: a short essay on "Who the Macedonians Are." The results were analyzed by a small sample nonparametric test, the x^2-one-sample test (Siegel, 1956: 42). To determine statistical significance of frequency of choice for each of the alternative answer categories of *a, b, c, d, e.* on each question, the x^2 -test was performed separately for the CAN/AM (N=10) and FYROM samples (N=10). What this means is that for each question, which has 5 alternative answers, *a, b, c, d, e*, the probability by chance, or a random distribution, is a frequency distribution of 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 in choice of answers *a–e* in a sample of 10 responders. A random choice probability is 1/5 for choosing each alternative answer and in 10 subjects 2 subjects for each choice would be the expected frequency. Thus, for example, in a distribution of frequencies, 8, 0, 0, 0, 2 where eight responders chose answer *a* and only 2 chose answer *e* and none chose *b, c,* and *d*, the result of a x^2-one-sample test analysis would be $x^2 df\ 4 = 18.00$, $p < .01$, which is significant at the $\alpha = .01$ level, that is, this kind of a distribution could occur by chance less than 1/100.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results were grouped into choices of answers showing (1) *high agreement* (8–10/10); (2) *majority agreement* (6–7/10); and (3) *no agreement* (i.e., a variety of numerical distributions, 1–5/10, with a maximum of 5/10). The analysis was carried out separately for each sample with comparisons across samples.

1. Questions showing high agreement in choice of answer. CAN/AM sample. In the CAN/AM sample, there was high agreement on questions 2, 6, 16, 17, 19, and 21. That is, 8 or more of the 10 respondents chose the same answer for these questions. There was also high agreement in the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) sample, but on a different set of questions: 1, 2, 10, 11, 14, and 23.

Questions 1 and 2. Questions 1 and 2 were highly salient questions for both samples. Question 1 was about the ethnic mix of the modern Macedonian identity as regards recent and distant ancestry. Question 2 posed the same question but it was now augmented by the addition of new highly relevant historical/archaeological evidence. That is, Curta's (2001) well-researched finding showing that the sixth/seventh century AD Slav settlement of the Balkans, including Macedonia, was a creation of nineteenth-century European historians, that is, it never happened. Cambridge University Press was cited as the *prestigious*

publisher to further impress its importance. The overall intent was to see how well-based information about a pivotal historical event would impact upon choice of answer; and, whether there would be a shift as a result. The CAN/AM sample showed an initial majority 6/4 split in choosing *a* and *b* answers, respectively, where, *a,* as a response to the question of ethnic mix was, "Macedonian/Illyrian/Paeonian/Agrianian mix," and, *b*, "Slav-Macedonian mix." By contrast, all 10 respondents in the FYROM sample chose *b* to Question 1, that is, "Slav-Macedonian ethnic mix." A x^2 analysis of these results was carried out separately for each sample. The simple majority 6/4 split in choosing answers *a* and *b* in the CAN/AM sample was statistically significant (x^2df 4=10.00, $p<.05$) while the 10/0 split in the FYROM sample was highly significant (x^2df 4=32.00, $p<.01$).

A shift from an initial 6/4 split on Question 1 to an 8/2 distribution on Question 2 did occur in the CAN/AM sample (x^2df 4=18.00, $p<.01$), significantly favoring choice *a* and a similarly sized shift also occurred in the FYROM sample again favoring choice *a*. Nonetheless, the distribution in the FYROM group remained a 2/8 split statistically in favor of *b* (x^2df 4=18.00, $p<.01$). While the shift in the two groups was equal, it was small; and, surprisingly, the difference across groups remained unchanged. That is, the FYROM Macedonians stayed with their culturally inherited belief of a sixth/seventh century AD settling of Slavs into Macedonia in spite of the new critical information whereas the CAN/AM respondents almost completely rejected a Slav-Macedonian ethnic identity (8/10). Apparently, cultural and educational differences played a decisive role, and "social desirability" remained a factor influencing the choice of answer, notwithstanding instructions to the contrary.

Question 6. Question 6 was another question with high agreement. It asked whether religion, a widely used alternative marker for the Macedonian ethnic identity during the Ottoman Empire, is, in fact, a useful indicator. The CAN/AM sample in a 9/1 distribution chose "religion was used as marker for the Macedonian ethnic identity but it is not a valid indicator." This result was statistically significant (x^2df 4=24.75, $p<.01$). In the FYROM sample, by a 6/4 split, which was also statistically significant (x^2df 4=10.00, $p<.05$), this group chose "all Macedonians are of the same Orthodox religion" (a nice safe answer). Thus, the CAN/AM sample appeared to be better informed on the limitations of religion as a marker for ethnic identity.

Questions 16 and 17. Question 16 dealt with outside observer assessments of the Macedonian identity and the conflicting estimates that have bedeviled outside experts since and have confused

the Macedonians in turn. The high agreement in choice was found in the CAN/AM sample but not in the FYROM sample. The alternative answers for this question cited documented evaluations of the Macedonian ethnic identity: (a) as being "Bulgarians," that is, Sonnichsen's (1909/2004) assessment (b) as being "Slav-Macedonian," that is, Misirkov's (1903) assessment; (c) the elicited "Macedonian" self-identity assessment as documented in the Corfe report to the League of Nations (Rossos, 1994); and (d) Danforth's (1995) study showing two Macedonian ethnic identities. In an 8/2 distribution, the CAN/AM sample chose *e* "all of the above" that is statistically significant (x^2df 4=18.00, $p<.01$) In contrast, the FYROM sample had a well-distributed split in choice of answers from *a to c*. What the CAN/AM respondents saw, namely that multiple factors were contributors to the confused/conflicted estimate of the Macedonian ethnic identity (accepted selectively by the Balkan Powers), was not seen by the FYROM sample. Instead, the FYROM sample focused on what was considered to be the one paramount alternative in these outside assessments and this differed nonsignificantly among the responders (x^2df 4=1.50, $p>.05$). Question 17 continued the interrogation and asked for background reasons behind these widely different estimates of "Who the Macedonians Are." In a 9/1 split the CAN/AM sample chose answer *b* (x^2df 4=24.75, $p<.01$) which was that the neighboring Balkan states saw the Macedonians as Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians and, thus, each in turn could, thereby, establish legitimacy on claims to Macedonia and Macedonians. In contrast, the FYROM sample, in a majority (7/3) decision (x^2df 4=13.0, $p<.01$), selected *e*. "none of the above." Both decisions were significant beyond chance but the decision of the FYROM sample expressed dissatisfaction with the given alternatives; or, perhaps, it was an independent decision based on expectations of other alternatives not listed as answers.

Questions 19 and 21. Question 19 focused on the overall implications of Danforth's (1995) and Karakasidou's (1997) reports of a transition to a "Greek" identity in the Macedonian population of Northern Greece and similar developments in the Pirin region of Bulgaria. Implicitly, the Danforth and Karakasidou studies of the Aegean Macedonians suggest that there is no Macedonian ethnicity as such; or else, it is transient and ephemeral; such a finding, unless questioned on its validity, is a very damaging assessment for the Macedonians who wish to be recognized as a nation among nations. The CAN/AM sample in an 8/2 split chose response *c*, (x^2df 4=18.00, $p<.01$) that, "nonetheless, there are Macedonians who have asserted their Macedonian ethnic identity even now." For the

FYROM sample, 4/10 saw these lands in Greece and Bulgaria as "lost lands" (x^2df 4=5.00, $p>.05$). Curiously, not one respondent in the CAN/AM sample was willing to accept this assessment as an alternative answer.

Question 21 asked about a connection to the ancient Macedonians and how it might be established if the modern Macedonians were ever to reclaim their ancient heritage. Historiographic methods, sociocultural studies, archaeological/historical and DNA genetic studies were all listed as alternatives *a–c*, and, choice *e*, "all of the above." For the CAN/AM sample, the split was 9/1 for choice *e* (x^2df 4=24.75, $p<.01$), or, for a combined methods approach. Only 5 of the 10 respondents chose this same alternative in the FYROM sample (x^2df 4=6.00, $p>.05$), a result that does not differ from chance statistically.

2. Questions showing high agreement in choice of answer. FYROM sample. As already indicated, there were questions showing high agreement in the Republic of Macedonia sample as well, but on a different set of questions: 1, 2, 10, 11, 14, and 23. Responses to Questions 1 and 2 have already been presented and discussed to show that a marked difference separated the two groups on the issue of ethnic mix of the modern Macedonian identity.

Question 10. Question 10 focused upon factors behind Arthur H. Evans' (1903) report that there is no Macedonian ethnic identity at all and Brailsford's (1906/1971) assessment that the Macedonian identity is unfathomable. Here the alternative answers ranged from an apparent absence of a Macedonian consciousness during this early period to the other alternative answer, namely, that the Macedonians could say what they were not, that is, they were not Serbs, Greeks, or Bulgars, but, nonetheless, could not say what they were. In a 9/1 split the FYROM sample chose *e.* "none of the above" (x^2df 4=24.75, $p<.01$); whereas, only 5 out of 10 chose this same alternative in the CAN/AM sample (x^2df 4=4.75, $p>.05$). For the two samples, taken together, this was not a statistically significant choice (x^2df 4=8.75, $p>.05$). One can speculate that those in the FYROM and CAN/AM samples who chose "none of the above" assumed that there always was a consciousness of a Macedonian identity that the Macedonians were hesitant to express as they relied on outside experts to tell them who they were in the Ottoman Empire period when they had no written language and no schools.

Question 11. Question 11 interrogated the respondent on his/her understanding of the concept of national identity versus that of ethnic identity. The significance and rationale for this question lies in the

fact that, since 2001 following the Ohrid Agreements (Daskalovski, 2006), Macedonia was declared a multiethnic state (comprising Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Gypsies, etc.). As a consequence, the question that now confronts the Macedonian state and the Macedonian people is the forging of a national identity in the face of minorities tending toward partition, nonintegration, and nonassimilation. The alternative answers to this question of national versus ethnic identity were (a) same; (b) different; (c) same, since they are used interchangeably; (d) different, because, as the examples of Switzerland and the former Yugoslavia show, a national identity can subsume multiple ethnic identities; (e) none of the above. The FYROM sample in 8/2 split between (*b*) and (*e*) indicated that they saw national identity as being different from ethnic identity (x^2df 4=18.00, $p<.01$). The CAN/AM sample in a 6/4 split opted for answers (*d*) and (*e*) pointing to the Swiss and former Yugoslav models as exemplars for the future (x^2df 4=10.00, $p<.05$). Both the FYROM and CAN/AM choices were statistically significant. *While one example given above is a success, the other is a failure. Pondering the consequences of a multiethnic Macedonia with these two examples in mind, with a potential to succeed like the Swiss model and a potential to fail and fall apart like the Yugoslav state, should sensitize the Macedonians to both the advantages of a multiethnic state as well as the possibility of a catastrophic implosion from which the Macedonian identity could never hope to recover.*

Question 14. Question 14 initiated a query that was continued in Question 21 (already presented above). It asked a participant to identify the relation to the ancient Macedonians whose name the modern Macedonians carry on. The FYROM sample chose "none of the above" in 10/0 distribution; whereas the CAN/AM sample in a 5/4 distribution pointed to current sociocultural futures of the modern Macedonians as links to the ancient ones. The other 4, as in the FYROM sample, also chose "none of the above." This outcome reaffirms the earlier assessment that even though the Macedonian respondent is presented with new current research material for an independent choice on such a momentous issue as the linkage to the ancient Macedonians; still the respondents do not accept new alternatives, again, in spite of the instructions.

Question 23. Question 23 was a continuation of Question 11. The respondent was now asked to choose what he considered to be a proper course of action given the 2001 constitutional change to a multiethnic state. Here, again, all the alternatives were rejected that did include the following possibilities: (a) foster a national identity as in the Swiss and Yugoslav models; (b) reject national identity as a

useful construct in the case of Macedonia; (c) change the constitution back to that of a national state and follow the earlier well-established model of France; (d) search for a new construct to bring the diverse groups together under new name; (e) none of the above. To all these alternatives, the FYROM sample chose "none of the above" in a unanimous choice (10/0) (x^2df 4=32.00, $p<.01$) while in the CAN/AM sample 5/10 chose the same negative evaluation (x^2df 4=6.00, $p>.05$). However, this was a not a statistically significant choice overall for the two samples (x^2df 4=9.25, $p>.05$). Once more and here again as in Questions 2, 10, and 14, new and relevant information in the form of novel but reasonable alternatives did not influence what was culturally and socially acceptable. This type of evidence, though sparse, tends to support ethnic identity as a "personal cognitive construction," as anthropologists have argued, but with the proviso that past cultural and educational experiences play a decisive role even against well-documented contrary evidence.

3. Questions showing a majority agreement: CAN/AM Sample. In the CAN/AM sample there was majority agreement in response to Questions 4 and 9. Similarly, there was majority agreement in the FYROM sample but on a different set of questions, 4, 9, 17, 22, and 24.

Question 4. Question 4 asked the respondent to consider the impact of Middle Age Eastern Roman, Byzantine, and, intermittently, Slav Empire (Bulgarian and Serbian) rule of Macedonia followed by the 500-year Ottoman Empire Occupation on the Macedonian identity and its linkage to the ancient Macedonians. Surprisingly, out of all the alternatives presented, not one respondent either in the CAN/AM or in the FYROM sample selected the option of "loss and break in the linkage to the ancient Macedonians," or the option that "there are no methods to address this question," nor the option that the "question of linkage to the ancient Macedonians is unfathomable," all of which express conventional wisdom on this issue. Instead, the chosen alternative for both groups (7/10) was for the more hopeful option that the question could be addressed by "sociocultural studies of language, religion, traditions in the home, music, dances, etc" (x^2df 4=12.75, $p<.05$, CAN/AM; x^2df 4=13.00, $p<.05$, FYROM). Thus, with all kinds of alternatives expressing a common negative answer, the sample respondents chose an alternative considered elsewhere (see chapters 3 and 8), that is, an epistemologically acceptable method to address the issue. It must be noted, however, that even Eugene Borza (e.g., 1990), a noted historian, in a telephone conversation indicated

quite bluntly that there is no way to establish the sought-after linkage to the ancient Macedonians.

Question 9. Question 9 was a component part of a line of inquiry that was continued in Question 10. Specifically, Question 9 was limited to Brailsford's (1906/1971) conclusion of an "unfathomable" Macedonian ethnic identity based on his firsthand account of shifting loyalties in coerced Macedonian villages first to a "Bulgarian," then to a "Greek" identity, and again back to a "Bulgarian" identity, and so on due to pressures by roving guerrilla bands sponsored by Greek and Bulgarian governments in post-Ilinden (1904) Macedonia. The respondent was asked to evaluate the validity and reliability of Brailsford's assessment. Here, the format was parallel to that of Question 11 and asked the responded whether he "agreed" or "disagreed"; and, in the other choices, "agree" or "disagree" were combined either by "religious affiliation as a false criterion," or with the blunt assessment that "Bulgarian" and "Greek" were, in the historical perspective, simply false assessments of the Macedonian identity. The CAN/AM sample majority chose "disagree" (7/3) (x^2df 4=13.00, $p<.05$) with the added comment that the Brailsford report was falsely based. The majority (7/3) of the FYROM sample, however, selected "disagree" with no qualification or addition (x^2df 4=13/00, $p<.05$).

4. Questions showing a majority agreement: FYROM Sample. Majority agreement was shown by the FYROM sample on questions 4, 9, 17, 22, and 24. Questions 4, 9, and 17 have already been considered above.

Question 22. Question 22 presented the claim of Evangelos Kofos (1989), a noted Greek historian, that the Macedonian identity developed out of the parent Bulgarian identity by process of "morphogenesis and mutation." The alternative choices were (a) agree; (b) disagree; (c) agree because the Macedonian language is really a Bulgarian dialect; (d) disagree because the Macedonian national identity emerged roughly at the same time as the Bulgarian identity; (e) b and d above. In a majority decision (7/10) the FYROM sample chose a simple disagreement with no qualification (b) (x^2df 4=13.00, $p<.05$) whereas the CAN/AM sample in 5/5 split chose b and e, respectively (x^2df 4=9.00, $p>.05$). In any case, both samples rejected Kofos's hypothesis that implicitly or in reality, the Macedonians of FYROM are, Bulgarians. Thus, the turn of the twentieth-century idea that the Macedonians were ethnically speaking "Bulgarians" is now rejected, a century later.

Question 24. Question 24 asked the very important question of ownership of Macedonia's recent and distant past. Surprisingly, the FYROM sample chose "none of the above" (7/3) (x^2df 4=13.00, $p<.05$) from an array of answers that included an ownership claim of the recent past but not of the distant past; both the recent and distant past; and mediation to settle the issue with neighbor country scholars, as well as the other option of "not an important issue." In the CAN/AM sample, 4/10 (x^2df 4=5.00, $p>.05$) opted for a claim to both recent and distant past and 4/10 opted for a negotiated settlement. While the CAN/AM nonsignificant split distribution in choice of answer is quite understandable, the choice of "none of the above" in the FYROM sample is an unfathomable/inexplicable response, given the considerable implications of a claim to Macedonia's distant past by the Macedonians to counter the much ballyhooed Greek claim to Macedonia's heritage and distant past. Apparently, this issue is not a very salient issue since FYROM faces severe internal problems with the Albanian minority and external problems with Greece relative to the "name" issue.

5. Questions showing no agreement: CAN/AM and FYROM samples. Taken together, the two samples showed no agreement on answers to questions 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 18, and 20. Specifically, this assessment should be taken to mean that there was neither a high agreement nor a majority agreement; instead, there was a variety of distributions in the answers chosen to each question from among the alternatives. Some were important questions and some were continuations of questions already responded to. For example, Question 5 was about language and its use as a criterion of ethnic identity. Here, there was an expectation that language like religion (Question 6) would be rejected as a criterion of ethnic identity now a century later (although it had been widely used and accepted as such in the Ottoman Empire era). This expectation was not met in this survey. In the remaining questions of this category, there were other examples of such unmet expectations; but, mostly, the questions that showed a lack of agreement, as reflected in the distributions, were related to those questions for which there was high or majority agreement. The implicit inconsistency has no readymade accessible interpretation.

6. Question 25. Essay on "Who the Macedonians Are" CAN/AM and FYROM samples. The most productive outcome in response to this question came from the CAN/AM sample. Competence with the English language, no doubt, was a factor that gave rise to the short and concise answers on the part of the FYROM sample. While in the CAN/AM sample much of the material presented reflected a great

deal of what was already presented as alternative answers to choose from (an easy way to address this essay question), there was, however, new material that is both significant and in need of being incorporated into the final version of this survey/questionnaire. One was the "sshsh" factor by which the Macedonians for a variety of reasons and in a variety of circumstances would show reluctance in expressing their Macedonian identity. The significance of this observation is that it can perhaps provide a rational explanation why the Macedonians allowed themselves to be labeled as "Bulgarians" at the turn of the twentieth century also an explanation for the *nie, nashe,* or *nashism* alternative of Rossos (1995) as stated in chapter 2, as well as an explanation for the mysterious later emergence of "Macedonian" as the preferred self-identity label by ordinary Macedonians—documented in the Corfe (1923) report to the League of Nations (Rossos, 1995: 230). Another important input was that some "always knew or felt, like their fathers before them, that they were Macedonians." For others, it was a gradual evolutionary process of self-discovery in arriving at a Macedonian self-identity after considerable scrutiny of the various received alternatives on the issue. Significantly, no one in the two samples opted for a "Greek-Macedonian," "Bulgarian-Macedonian," "Serb-Macedonian"; or, for "Greek," "Bulgarian," or "Serb" identity.

General Discussion

The results obtained with the survey/questionnaire on "Who the Macedonians Are," highlight five themes each of which has implications for the future development of the Macedonian ethnic identity. Inasmuch as the samples drawn from university/college-educated middle-age professional population in Canada/United States and in the Republic of Macedonia were nonrandom samples, what was found, although statistically significant even with the small samples used, cannot be generalized beyond the samples to the populations from which they were drawn. The present results can be interpreted only as suggestions for what may be found in the same target populations of Canada/United States and Republic of Macedonia.

The first basic theme concerned the ethnic mix of the modern Macedonians. The major issue here, as clarified in Question 2, is whether or not a Slav component in the ethnic mix should be excluded based on Curta's (2001) finding that the alleged sixth/seventh century AD inundation of Macedonia by Slavs did not occur, that, essentially, it was a creation by nineteenth-century European historians. In a surprising result, the CAN/AM sample opted for the

choice, "Macedonian, Illyrian, Paeonian, Agrianian mix" (a speculative answer based on the ancient ethnic groups that were identified for the regions comprising the present Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin Macedonia). Unsurprisingly, the FYROM sample selected the option of "Slav/Macedonian" mix, in spite of the clearly stated strong contrary evidence of Curta (2001). Apparently, the FYROM sample did not fully accept the implications of the new evidence and went for the *culturally/socially acceptable answer*, ignoring the instructions. The psychological mechanism of cognitive dissonance of the new material with the old information relevant to answering the question can provide an explanation for this outcome. Following 50 years of being in a South Slav culture (i.e., The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the new evidence was cognitively dissonant with what is historically accepted as common place. For the CAN/AM sample, however, the new information appeared to be cognitively resonant and this group was ready to accept a non-Slav ethnic identity. The new evidence merely provided the occasion to express this conviction.

The second theme addressed by the respondents was the issue of the multiple answers to the question "Who the Macedonians Are" that, historically, has plagued the Macedonians as being Bulgarians, Slavs, Greeks, Slav-Macedonians, Greek-Macedonians, and others. The CAN/AM sample was quite aware of all these possibilities and chose all of the above as representing the historical reality while the FYROM sample distributed their answers among all the possible answers. Importantly, on the question that followed, which asked for the factors behind these historical answers as to "who the Macedonians are," the CAN/AM sample pointed to the imposed "Serb," "Greek," and "Bulgar" identities by the neighboring Balkan states as reasons behind the confused/contradicted multiple Macedonian identity. In contrast, the FYROM group chose "none of the above" in response. Significantly, both groups totally ignored the *fact-based* alternative of *language* and *religion* that were used as markers of ethnicity during this period. On the specific question regarding the role of religion on this issue, only the CAN/AM sample saw this as a false criterion; but then, this group could not generalize this assessment to language as well. Language remains a major theme for the Macedonians as to what to do with it (i.e., Cyrillic versus Latin alphabets) and how to explain its origin when all other sociocultural features of their society point to a non-Slav ethnic identity.

The third theme on which there was significant agreement was the issue of the connection to the ancient Macedonian identity. The responders were asked what they thought could be claimed as their

own regarding Macedonia's recent and distant past in face of the claimed ownership of the ancient Macedonian heritage by Greece; and, the recent past, by Bulgaria. In a follow-up to this issue, the possibility of a linkage to the ancient past as well choice of methods was raised by the alternative answers. To the first question, the FYROM sample responded with "none of the above" indicating perhaps this is not a very important issue in the face of serious problems confronting the Vardar Macedonian state. However, on the second question as to finding a linkage, 9 from the CAN/AM sample and 5 from the FYROM sample rejected all negative alternatives (i.e., as an unsolvable issue) and opted for a combined methods approach suggesting an interest for an investigative pursuit of this issue. The take home implication here is that it is in this way that the Macedonians can begin to lay a claim to their ancient heritage and deny legitimacy to present claims of ownership by Greece.

The fourth basic theme reflected on Danforth's finding of two Macedonian ethnic identities, one Greek-Macedonian and the other Slav-Macedonian, and on Karakasidou's documented transition from a Macedonian to a Greek ethnic identity in the Langhadas basin. Here the selections, on the one hand, focused on the small minority in Greece that persists in holding on to their Macedonian ethnic identity even now; and, on the other hand, on the realization that these are "lost lands" (especially, given the agreements about non-changing borders with Greece and Bulgaria). However, the major implication that the Macedonians may have failed to confront is that their ethnic identity is impermanent and could devolve and disappear, given what has happened in the Aegean and Pirin regions, especially, under a severe challenge by the Albanian Moslem and other ethnic minorities. Moreover, the EU Community pressures on Macedonia for a more liberal interpretation of a modern democratic state could only worsen the existing precarious balance.

The fifth basic theme is Macedonia's future following the Ohrid (2001) agreements turning Macedonia into a multiethnic state. Question 11 was a diagnostic question on this issue as it posed a set of alternatives that would reflect the responder's current understanding of the concepts of national versus ethnic identity and the allied issue of "same or different." While almost all responders judged that the two concepts are different, a significant number (6) saw the relation as exemplified by the Swiss and Yugoslav models. While a precedent does exist for this type of conceptualization as the early 1896 IMRO constitution had provisions for acceptance and inclusion of all ethnic and religious groups as equals in an autonomous Macedonia (like the

Swiss model), the hard reality of the recent past is that the Yugoslav state failed in the face of internal pressures among the different antagonistic ethnic groups. Thus, the question remains as to what will happen to Macedonia, given the documented impermanence of the Macedonian ethnic identity and the potential partitionist pressures by the Albanian Moslem minority in their midst with their goal of splitting the Tetovo region and uniting it with either Albania or Kosovo. This was one of the aims, among others, unravelled by Daskalovski's (2006) analysis of the reasons and rationales given by the Albanian rebels for their 2001 KLA dominated revolt. The more hopeful but rejected alternatives were: (1) "rewrite the Macedonian constitution along the model of France as a nation state"; (2) "reject a common Macedonian identity"; or (3) opt for "new name for Macedonia." All these suggestions of new paths toward the future found no acceptance among the responders. Another disheartening parameter to this issue that needs to be stated is that as long as the Macedonian ethnic identity is seen as "Slav-Macedonian," the claim to legitimacy on Macedonian lands by the Macedonians is no more than that of the other interlopers, the Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Greeks, and others. Moreover, this assessment of the Macedonian identity continues to give life to what should have been a dead issue long ago; that is, of the historical "Macedonian Question" ("who are the Macedonians"; "to whom Macedonia belongs"; "what is the extent of her lands"; and "how many of each Slavs, Albanians, Turks, Greeks, Serbs"). The continued existence of the Macedonian Question imposes additional political burdens and it may even open the way for her Balkan neighbors to attempt another dismemberment of what is left of Macedonia. However, as already indicated, establishing a basis for a unitary, non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity linked to the ancient Macedonians by sparse but highly critical sociocultural remains from the past will put an end to the Macedonian Question, especially, to the specific component question of who owns Macedonia. In this way, grounds for another partition can be denied.

Summary and Concluding Comments

Brailford's (1906/1971) early observations of a shifting, amorphous Macedonian identity (which should not have been surprising, given the immediately preceding Dark Age period during the Ottoman Empire) is followed by the emergence of the nationalist drive self-label "Macedonian" in the activist elite and emerging intelligentsia of students and professionals in Bulgaria and Russia from about 1900 to

1907. A downside to this, however, was that many among this activist elite identified their ethnic identity as "Bulgarian." Seemingly, to neutral outside observers, this would represent a self-contradiction; but, minimally, at least, a confusion and, maximally, a lack of legitimacy to their aspirations. The population masses in rural areas remained, in the meantime, as they were and as described by Brailsford except for the highly crucial display of a mass sentiment for a unitary Macedonian ethnic identity as documented in Col. Corfe's and Capt. Evans' reports. Earlier, Misirkov in 1903 (as cited in Rossos, 1995) conceptually characterized the nature of the Macedonian ethnicity as a Slav-Macedonian identity distinct from the neighboring Serbian and Bulgarian ethnic identifies. Simultaneously, the Greek participation in the struggle for Macedonia in the Aegean region (1900–1907) had, at this point, already begun making inroads in the direction of developing a "Greek consciousness" based on the idea that the ancient Macedonians were Greek and that their antagonists, the IMRO Comitadji bands were in reality "Bulgarians" and agents of the Bulgarian state. This had an impact on the Macedonians in the Florina/Castoria region as they were now becoming dimly aware of Macedonia's distant past. While the great schism in the Macedonian ethnic identity begins at this phase, there is, nonetheless, as the reports of Colonel Corfe and Captain Evans indicate, an unhyphenated Macedonian identity that had emerged in the meantime in the masses, only to be subverted almost immediately by the great divide into Greek and Slav-Macedonian identities. The few dissidents in the NW region of Greece's Macedonia, persevering against immense odds, are presently struggling to maintain a unitary Macedonian identity across the great divide with their official journal *Nova Zora* (New Dawn). This bilingual journal (Greek and Macedonian) is devoted to socio/political and historical themes and subjects of modern Macedonia keeping alive Macedonia's "Edwardian [IMRO Comitadji] past," to borrow a phrase from the late mystery writer Eric Ambler (1951). Ambler, himself, wrote the following tribute to the Macedonian insurgents of revolutionary Macedonia (1896–1907) when he had nothing favorable to say of the Greek-sponsored Andartes insurgents (nor does Sonnichsen, 1909/2004): "The Macedonian *comitadji* with his cartridge belts and his rifle was becoming a legendary figure, a heroic defender of women and children against the savagery of the Turks, a knight of the mountains who preferred death to dishonour and treated his captives with courtesy and forbearance" (370). This tragic and noble struggle of the IMRO toward liberation that has been so muted and ground down by Greek historians

is by these dissident efforts not lost to the Macedonians in Greece who, invariably, are not literate in the Slav Cyrillic script and thus have no access to literature emanating from the across the border, from the *Republic of Macedonia*. Curiously, Sonnichsen (1909/2004) writing 50 years earlier had a similar high regard for the Macedonian Comitadji insurgents with whom he lived for almost a year daily facing common danger from pursuing Turkish Military Security Forces and opposing rebel/guerrilla "Andartes" bands.[4]

6

Sociocultural Characterization of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

As can be determined from the previous two chapters, the evidence for a "Macedonian" ethnicity shows that it is ephemeral, given the dynamic changes over a century from *nasheist* to "Bulgarian," through "Slav-Macedonian" to "Macedonian," and then back to a dual dichotomized, "Greek-Macedonian" and "Slav-Macedonian" ethnic identities; or the current reality. Moreover, the in/out nature of the early twentieth-century national/political drives to autonomy and nationhood support such an impression. A new and important source of evidence with a strong bearing on the issue, however, is Florin Curta's (2001) archaeological searches both into original Byzantine documents as well as of material cultural remains. The conclusion that there was no massive Slav population input into Macedonia as settlers or as invaders in the critical sixth and seventh centuries AD when such incursions were alleged to have occurred nullifies arguments as to a Bulgarian or a hyphenated Slav-Macedonian ethnicity for the Macedonians. Of equal importance are Borza's (1990) and Badian's (1967) arguments for a separate ancient Macedonian ethnic identity apart from that of the Greek identity. This latter source downgrades any claim for the modern Macedonians as being of a Greek ethnic identity. However, these are all arguments based on elimination of evidence and are negative in nature. What is needed is a positive characterization of the Macedonian ethnic identity through available sociocultural features that can be observed directly and, maximally, are capable of being linked to sociocultural remains of Macedonia's distant past; a critical missing link. Thus, the third domain of evidence identified in chapter 3 as being appropriate to establishing a basis for an ethnic identity inference is the subject of the present chapter.

In the third domain of evidence, "ethnicity" or an "ethnic identity" is a sociocultural group phenomenon concretized by a search for empirical indicators; and, possibly, in a well-developed ethnic identity (e.g., the Scottish identity), by an open-ended set of semantic ascriptors that define the distinctive sociocultural features of a targeted ethnic identity. This would be closer to an "essentialist" understanding of ethnicity as the assumption is made that there are objective sociocultural features that function as independent probabilistic indicators or as defining markers of an existing ethnic identity, which, however, may change with time. Maximally, such sociocultural indicators could serve as objective markers of an ethnic identity; but, minimally, on the downside, they could all be dismissed as being ephemeral folklorist material (as indicated in chapter 3).

As a starting point, one looks into ordinary-language discourse about ethnicity to provide clues in selecting a set of sociocultural ethnicity indicators that have by tradition and widespread usage gained acceptance and credibility. Certainly this sociocultural approach to ethnic identity is the oldest. It was first used by Herodotus to identify the ancient Hellenic ethnic identity in terms of the four criteria of common language, common cultural traditions, common history, and common religion (Bowra, 1957). Barth (1969: 9–38), in a more recent example, also cites sociocultural features as being relevant. A current dictionary definition and description of "ethnicity" emphasizes sociocultural features as well. In Webster's *New World Dictionary* (third college edition, 1988), ethnicity is described as a "designator of a population subgroup having a common cultural heritage as distinguished by customs, social characteristics, language, common history, etc." Capt A. H. Evans, cited earlier, used an informally selected set of sociocultural indicator evidence to infer a distinctive Macedonian identity apart from that of the Greek identity.

A set of sociocultural indicators is presented in table 6.1; although, understandably, many other sets are possible (e.g., Smith, 1992: 55–78). The selection is arbitrary and the only criterion that can be applied is based on how well a chosen set of ethnicity indicators describes a target ethnicity in terms of its objectively observable sociocultural features. Admittedly this is a fairly vague, if not an openly circular, criterion, but others will be provided in the next chapter and in the general ethnicity model as well (chapter 10).

As can be seen in the table, the following selected sociocultural features are presented as ethnicity indicators of the Macedonian ethnic identity: (1) language or linguistic dialect; (2) religion; (3) national dress; (4) national dances; and (5) ethnic self-identity designation.

Table 6.1 Criteria and evidence for Macedonian ethnicity

	Criterion	Ethnicity Inference	Conclusion/Inference
1. Language	Arvanitophone	Albanian	No Macedonian Ethnicity
	Hellenophone	Greek	" "
	Slavophone	Bulgarian or Serb	" "
	Vlachophone	Romanian	
2. Religion	Eastern Orthodox		Unitary Macedonian Ethnicity
3. National Dress	Single Piece Pleated Foustanella + Tight Leggings See Appendix 4: Plates 1–4 (Compare with ancient Cheiton)		Unitary Macedonian Ethnicity
4. National Dances	Heroic Dances for Men Pappadia (Naoussa) (Dora Stratou) Teshkoto Oro (Skopia) (Tanetz) Mashko Aegeitsko Oro (Tanetz) Rusalija (Tanetz) Komitska (Tanetz) Jounatchko Oro (NYC Giorgi Tomov Folk Dance Group)		Unitary Macedonian Ethnicity
5. Ethnic Self-Identity	"Macedonian"Unitary (No Known Separate Slav Label)		Macedonian Ethnicity[1]

Some of these sociocultural indicators have been used, singly or collectively, as markers to help make determinations about ethnicity (e.g., language/religion, Brailsford, 1906/1971; Poulton, 1995; Shea, 1997). It should be noted, however, that "ethnicity," defined in this manner, entails not only the set of indicators listed above but also a large, finite, as yet, unspecified number of sociocultural indicators and ascriptors. It is a domain of evidence that awaits search and discovery in almost every case of ethnicity identification and is best understood as being open-ended.

Table 6.1 shows the five categories of ethnicity indicators and related empirical evidence that can be used to point to a Macedonian ethnic identity and allow inferences about its nature. The results of this compilation are shown in the left, middle, and right columns of table 6.1. According to the selected ethnicity indicators, of (1) language spoken by the inhabitants in question; (2) religion; (3) national dress; (4) national dances; and (5) ethnic self-identity designation (i.e., the label used for self-identification by the inhabitants in question), altogether, highlight *an obvious contradiction* in terms of what can be inferred about the nature of the Macedonian identity using dialect/language as a criterion versus the remaining sociocultural features shown in table 6.1.

Above the two horizontal dividing lines in table 6.1, the results, based on language/linguistic criteria, support the current worldview of Macedonia as a multiethnic region as the linguistic evidence points to a medley of ethnicities, Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, and Serbian (or *la salade Macedoine*, according to a well-known World War I French expression). In contrast, all four sociocultural ethnicity indicators of ethnicity shown below the two horizontal dividing lines of table 6.1 uniformly point to a single unitary Macedonian ethnicity regardless of spoken dialect or region. This linkage and inference of a unitary Macedonian ethnicity is based on the fact that all Macedonians, regardless of linguistic dialect or region, share these four sociocultural features.

As an inference, the hypothesized unitary Macedonian ethnic identity is a profoundly different conception compared to received texts based on the current four historiographic traditions regarding Macedonia presented in chapter 2 (see also Poulton, 1995). Nonetheless, this novel inference of a single unitary Macedonian identity is still just one of two permissible but, unfortunately, contradictory interpretations of the Macedonian identity: unitary versus multiethnic identity. To make matters worse, for each source of supportive indicator sociocultural evidence for a unitary Macedonian

ethnic identity there are specific alternative interpretations that can be brought to bear, which may not be consistent with the simplified view and inference of a unitary Macedonian ethnicity. Thus, an inference of a unitary Macedonian ethnicity, *epistemologically speaking*, becomes, under these circumstances, a hypothesis or a theory whose validity can be increased only by elimination of alternative interpretations of the evidence.

The specific or special interpretations of each line of evidence above and other relevant categories of indicator evidence in this domain are presented below and analyzed in an attempt to resolve the basic contradiction regarding the Macedonian identity as being either unitary or multiethnic. In the past, this basic contradiction as to "Who the Macedonians Are" has brought about much confusion to the Macedonians themselves and to all those seeking to understand the Macedonian ethnic identity. The systematic reduction in inconsistencies and of contradictions in conclusions drawn from the different sources of evidence is a method to increase the plausibility of the unitary hypothesis/theory regarding the Macedonian identity and to transform it from a hypothesis/theory toward an objective factual reality. However, this is easier said than done. Nonetheless, this is what is attempted here in this chapter as well as in chapter 9.

Analysis of the Sociocultural Indicators of the Macedonian Ethnicity

(1) Language. If one examines closely the Slav-Macedonian dialect/language[1] that is also the language of the majority Macedonian population in the three regions of Macedonia (Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin), one can find evidence that this language is an assimilated language and that, surprisingly, Greek (i.e., *koine* derived from the Attic Greek) appears to be or may have been the immediate linguistic precursor capable of being documented prior to the development of the Slav-Macedonian dialect. To make this claim more plausible, consider the following sentence that is in correct grammatical Slavonic form and has household usage but complete lack of a Slavic vocabulary: *Ella mori tchoupo, kinesei odi doma. Ella* is obviously Greek. *Mori tchoupo* is a Greek-Albanian phrase or idiom. Importantly, however, the words *kinesei*, *odi*, and *doma* are all ancient Greek. *Kinesei* is from the word to move (e.g., *kinesiology*) and *odi* is the verb form of *odos*, which means path or way. *Odi*, however, as used in the sentence above, functions as a verb, not as a noun, as is generally the case in the modern Greek language. Curiously, this use of *odos* sheds light on the Homeric name

of Odysseus, as meaning "Traveler." *Doma* comes from the Greek word "dome," indicating a place, a plot of land, or home. An infinite number of such sentences involving household expressions can be formed, which are grammatically correct in the Slav-Macedonian dialect consisting purely of a Greek vocabulary from a large vocabulary list provided by Andriotis (1991: 38–41).

In that the vocabulary is of common household usage and, therefore, it had to be in the native language prior to the changeover into the Slav-Macedonian dialect, this Greek vocabulary suggests the idea that the Slav-Macedonian dialect is not native to the speaker but, rather, an adaptation by the speaker to assimilate and accommodate himself to a foreign language of an occupying power for sociopolitical communication purposes (i.e., during intermittent Middle Age Bulgarian and Serbian Slav Empire rule). *One would not borrow simple, nontechnical household words from another language to express something as simple and ordinary as, "Well now, go home girl," which is what the above sentence states. One can expect to find household words from another language but not to the extent of entire sentences expressing a basic common household nontechnical usage.* The comprehensive underpinning for this conclusion can be found in the large and extensive lists of nouns, verbs, and adjectives of ancient Greek (i.e., *koine* version) in household usage in the Slavophone Macedonian dialect as compiled by Andriotis (1991: 19–41).

There is a mystery here as to why such a large Greek language vocabulary from ancient times exists in a people who apparently had their own non-Greek dialect at least up to the Hellenistic era as evidenced by reference to events in Alexander's Expeditionary Army in Persia (i.e., Philotas' treason trial—Green, 1991: 225) and other indications compiled by Badian (1967). Nonetheless, the existence of a precursor Greek language vocabulary of household usage points to the Slavonic dialect of the Macedonians perhaps as being an *adaptive linguistic response* to Bulgarian and Serbian Empire Middle Age occupations that occurred intermittently (i.e., alternating with Eastern Roman and Byzantine Empire occupations in a changing border situation) from the ninth century to the Ottoman Empire occupation in 1430. As a revelation, Andriotis (1991) states that "Slavisation went through a stage of bilingualism during which they [i.e., the Macedonians] spoke both Greek and Slav. That stage enabled them to keep in their new language as a part of the treasure of vocabulary of their own national tongue" (25).

Understood in this way, the linguistic evidence does not support a claim for Slav-Macedonian ethnicity and the mystery of the Greek

language vocabulary is solved by assuming that the *koine* of the Hellenistic period was the adopted *lingua franca,* that persisted into the Eastern Roman times as well as during the intermittent successor Byzantine Empire rule over Macedonia prior to adoption/adaptation/development of the Slav-Macedonian dialect; or, as Andriotis suggests, it may have even coexisted for some small period of time alongside the Slav-Macedonian dialect.

Curta's (2001) meticulous documentation of relevant archaeological and historical evidence shows that there was no massive inundation of Slav invaders and settlers into Macedonia in the alleged mass population changes during the sixth and seventh centuries AD, which according to the received texts (see chapter 2) altered the ethnic mix of the Macedonians and tilted it toward a Slav-ethnic identity. According to Curta (2001), the commonly accepted idea of a mass Slav inundation of the southern Balkan peninsula (i.e., in Macedonia and Greece) is a nineteenth-century invention by European historians and that the Slav (*sklavenes*) label was an Eastern Roman Empire blanket term of convenience to designate the ethnically diverse groups coming down as disparate but organized raiding forces into Roman territory south of the Danube river reaching as far south as Peloponnesus in Greece and then going back to home bases north of the Danube at times when the empire's forces were engaged elsewhere. Importantly, the common Slav language among the raiding groups was interpreted as a *lingua franca* phenomenon by Curta because the language in its written form is quite uniform as far north as Russia. Moreover, documented reports of Slav settlers outside the walls of Salonica in Macedonia as evidence of a mass invasion are seen by Curta as exaggerations to impress central government officials in Constantinople for the need for more garrison troops and aid. What, in addition, the original Roman and Byzantine sources indicate is that to confront a potential mass invasion of empire territory south of the Danube, Emperor Justinian in the sixth century had embarked on a large-scale building program of defensive forts in a three-tiered defensive system designed to keep these diverse allegedly "Slav" raiding groups north of the Danube; or, in the worst case scenario, to slow down their southward progress once inside empire territory. Altogether Curta's independently sourced evidence confirms the conclusion reached above that the Macedonian identity, whatever it might have been, has not been massively impacted by Slavic migration into Macedonia. Importantly, the linguistic criterion as a marker of ethnicity is shown and argued by him as well as by many others (e.g., Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990) that it is not a valid and reliable indicator. Altogether,

the evidence, direct and indirect, points to the Slav-Macedonian dialect as a *linguistic adaptation* to Middle Age Slav Empire rule.

One can ask the question, however, why is it that no such linguistic adaptation occurred as a changeover to the Turkish language in the 500-year-long Ottoman Empire occupation of Macedonia? The most likely answer is that in its extension to the Balkans, Christianity was accepted as representing an independent "realm" in the theocratic/autocratic Ottoman Empire, unlike Asia Minor where Christianity was replaced by Islam and the official Greek of the Byzantine Empire was replaced by Turkish as the new *lingua franca*. It is a common notion in modern Greece that it was the Christian religion that saved their ethnicity from total assimilation into a Turkish ethnic identity during the Ottoman Empire rule. Thus, the Slav-Macedonian dialect survived the long period of the Ottoman Empire rule for the same reasons as for the other Balkan languages; namely, the acceptance of Christianity in their empire by the Turkish Sultans.

(2) Religion. Yugoslav/Macedonian Republic versions of Macedonian history have pointed to the Bishopric of Ohrid in the ninth century AD as an early foundation of the Macedonian ethnicity in that, as Bishops of Ohrid, St. Naum and St. Clement (disciples of Kyril/Constantine and Metody/Methodius, the apostles to the Slavs) ministered in the Slav language. However, as the names Naum (Hebrew) and Clement (Moravian) suggest, they may have been foreign-born functionaries of the Bulgarian emperor who dominated these lands at the time as these names do not appear in Macedonia prior to this period. Moreover, it is well-established that the Orthodox Church, unlike Western European Catholicism, has always been subservient to secular power especially during this Middle Age period. Thus, high church appointees may have been assigned to their posts at Ohrid with the consent of the ruling Bulgarian Emperor or perhaps they may have been direct appointees. Later on, during the Ottoman Empire, when the Bishopric of Ohrid was eliminated by the Patriarchate Church in Constantinople, and Greek was substituted in the church liturgy, it could not be concluded that the Christian subjects had changed in their language or in their ethnicity to become Greek.

The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Macedonia, using the common Slav-language Church ritual declared itself an independent Orthodox Church in 1967 from the parent Serbian Orthodox Church dating back to Serb/Yugoslav rule. It was promptly dismissed as an outlaw church by the Patriarchate Orthodox Church at Constantinople (the nominal head of all Orthodox Christendom) for obvious political reasons (i.e., Greek control of Aegean Macedonia). It is still claimed,

however, by the Serbian Orthodox Church with persistent and unsettled disputes. Given that the Orthodox Church of Greece ministers to the Macedonian Christians in the Greek language in the Aegean region, a schism presently exists regarding religious affiliation, which can be clearly downgraded in importance as this schism reflects the political exigencies consequent to the partition of Macedonia in 1913. All Macedonians, nonetheless, can be said to be of the same Eastern Orthodox faith ministered in either the Greek of the Bible or in the Church Slavonic language shared by all Slav-Orthodox nations. Thus, the Macedonians have a common religion.[2]

(3) Macedonian national dress and dances. The formal dress of Macedonian men is a single piece pale-white tunic, made up of heavy duty cotton cloth, which is called *foustan* or *foustanella* (in Greek). It has a distinctive single row of pleats terminating just above the knee. The pleats are drawn at the waist by a cord—easily, a derivative of the ancient Macedonian Cheiton (see appendix 2, plates 1, 2, 3, 4). Unlike the Greek and southern Albanian *foustanella*, it is a tunic, not a kilt. This Macedonian dress for men along with the tight, heavy, pale-white woolen leggings from the hip down, with a black tassel tied around the leg just below the kneecap is unique and distinctive, unlike the baggy trousers worn by Slav-speaking neighbors in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. It identifies Macedonian men across dialect and region as it does not correspond to any variation of the *foustanella* anywhere in Greece, Northern Epirus, or Southern Albania. However, the *foustan* unmistakably points to an ancient Macedonian origin of the modern Macedonian as can be seen from comparison with a Macedonian soldier's tunic found in the wall painting of an ancient Macedonian tomb at Vergina (appendix 2, plate 4). According to Green (1991: 11), Macedonian men who had not killed an enemy in battle would wear a cord on their Cheiton instead of a belt. Macedonian men still wear a cord around their *foustan* to draw the pleats in place, and to keep them there, a wide red sash and belt. A people of Slavic origin do not wear a tunic and tight woolen leggings but rather large baggy trousers as is the case with Serbian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian national wear for men.

The Macedonian warrior dances (see appendix 2, plates 1 and 2) (Rusalija, Komitska Igra, Mashko Egitsko Oro, Teshkoto Oro, Jounatchko, Oro, etc.) show an unmistakable cultural continuity with the ancient Macedonians contrary to what one might expect given the Slav-Macedonian dialect/language used at home. Moreover, Pribichevich (1982) has identified these dances and music as being archaic dating back to pre-Slav times. The dances themselves are

characterized by leaps into the air by the lead dancer (apparently, mimicking the role of the Homeric hero), by high knee lifts and by slow deliberate rhythm. These dances may resemble the Greek and southern Albanian dances in genre but certainly not the rapid, small-step close-to-the-ground Serbian and Bulgarian Slav dances. They all point to an ancient Macedonian heritage linking the present Macedonians to the ancient Macedonians who, according to Borza (1990) as well as Green (1991), also danced a warrior's dance called the *telesias* (on one occasion, as the assassins were about to murder one of Alexander's predecessors, a frequent occurrence in the Royal Family).

(4) "Macedonian" as a self-identity label. According to Shea (1997: 14), the Macedonians referred to themselves as Macedonians as late as the tenth century, at least 200 years following the alleged massive Slav incursion into Macedonia in the sixth/seventh centuries AD, which has now been challenged by Florin Curta (2001). The Byzantine emperors also referred to them as "Macedonians" during this period. Thus, the retention of the unhyphenated designation, "Macedonian" from these medieval times into modern times, suggests that, whatever the Slav input into the ethnic mix may have been, it was, apparently, not a dominant factor. These ethnic identity indicators above as well as the sparse but revealing cognitive self-descriptor evidence in the face of extreme assimilationist pressures in contemporary Macedonia suggest again a non-Slav ethnicity. Had they been Slavs, they would have had a distinctly Slav label: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and others. Bulgaria has recognized this latent self-contradiction of a Slav-Macedonian ethnicity and has eliminated the word "Macedonian" to identify the Macedonians in the Pirin region of Southwest Bulgaria. Curiously, Greece is now following a similar line of reasoning in demanding the Republic of Macedonia to use, instead, the name *Skopia* (standard usage within Greece). The Hellenic Republic has lobbied internationally for the Macedonians to refrain from using the word "Macedonia" or "Macedonian" as an ethnic self-identity label. This effort has failed completely as within the last year the *Republic of Macedonia* has been finally recognized with its chosen constitutional name by the United States as well as by Russia, China, Canada, and more than 100 other countries. However, the issue with Greece is still in dispute and under negotiation.

(5) Ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians. The questions and confusions regarding the modern Macedonian ethnicity apply equally to the ancient Macedonians as well (Borza, 1990; Hammond, 1991). While the Attic (Athenian) form of ancient Greek apparently was

used as an official literary language (which subsequently became the *koine* of the Hellenistic Empires) and was apparently spoken alongside the native Macedonian language in the aristocracy of the royal court, there were, undoubtedly, also other dialects besides a native Macedonian dialect/language (e.g., Illyrian and Thracian dialects). At the time of Alexander I, the *philhellene*, the Macedonians were not allowed to participate in the Olympic Games as they were regarded as being "barbarians." Primarily, this determination was made on linguistic grounds. Thus, Greek athletes refused to compete with Alexander I in one of the running events in the fifth century BC as they regarded him as being non-Greek. He was allowed to compete only after Alexander I persuaded the Olympic judges (Ellinodike) that his royal family were descendants of the Temenid royal family from Argos with a pedigree going back to Hercules and Zeus. However, this apparently manufactured lineage, as suggested by Green (1991: 7–9), could apply at best only to the Royal Family. On some such pedigree, nonetheless, the Macedonians, may have been accepted as Greeks. Certainly, the Macedonian Royal Court welcomed exiled and ostracized artists and intellectuals from Athens and other Greek city states (Green, 1991) and the young Macedonian nobility would send their sons to Greek city states, sometimes as hostages (e.g., Philip II), for an acculturation into the then dominant classical Greek culture. Nonetheless, Demosthenes, in his anti-Macedonian tirades (the Philipics) continued calling them "barbarians." Labeling them as barbarians at this late stage suggests that the Macedonians were never really accepted as Greeks. Thus, although the Macedonians elected to make the Greek language and culture their own and clearly identified themselves with the then advanced Greek civilization, they may have still been regarded as "barbarian"; or, at best, and, to coin a new word, "hemibarbaric."

No writings were left behind by the Macedonians themselves to answer such questions definitively; and, as all written evidence is based on non-Macedonian (i.e., on Greek and Roman) sources, there cannot be any degree of finality. Thus, who the ancient Macedonians are is also an unresolved problem; although, in the main, the evidence that is available largely points to a separate ethnic identity apart from that of the Greek (see Borza, 1990, and Badian, 1967, for a detailed analysis of this issue).

One written record of a treason trial in which Alexander the Great asks Philotas, son of Parmenion, who was the accused but at the same time a talented, highly respected general in the Companion Cavalry, whether his trial should be conducted in Macedonian or in Greek

suggests that both languages were adequate for purposes of the trial. This linguistic distinction suggests, in an unmistakable manner, that the Macedonian language was, apparently, well-developed but not comprehensible to Greek speakers. As Philotas elected to be tried in the Greek language, "so that the proceedings could be understood by everyone present," obviously, the Macedonian dialect did not have such a capacity. There was then a linguistic basis for labeling the Macedonians as "barbarians." However, the ancient Macedonians as carriers of the advanced Greek civilization preserved it for the Western World through their Hellenistic Empires. Thus, the ties to Greece, based on this shared historical past, are substantial and present an important consideration for their contemporary descendants across all dialects and regions of Macedonia.

(6) Macedonian dynasty in the Byzantine Empire. The historical fact of a "Macedonian" dynasty in the Byzantine Empire circa the tenth and eleventh century AD as well as the historical fact that one of the emperors, Basil II, in this line was proclaimed as *Voulgaroktonos* (Bulgar-slayer) following the defeat of Emperor Samuil's forces, the same Samuil that the Macedonians of the *Republic of Macedonia* claim as the founder of a Slav-Macedonian state, indicates that the Macedonians were still being distinguished as an ethnic identity apart from the Bulgarian/Slav ethnic identity (even after the so-called massive Slav-incursions into Macedonia some 300 years earlier). This suggests that changes in the Macedonian identity were largely due to political exigencies in the seesaw struggle between the Bulgarian (and, later, the Serbian) and Byzantine empires and not necessarily due to an overwhelming population influx of Slavs into Macedonia. However, in the absence of hard-core statistics, population estimates contributing to the ethnic mix remain as speculative inferences based on anecdotal observer reports.

(7) First names as clues to ethnicity of the modern Macedonians. First names were examined as a method by Andriotis (1991) to establish the ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians as being Greek. He examined similarity to common first names used in the Classical Greek city states as distinguished from names characteristic of neighboring Thraco-Illyrian tribes. Names such as Phlip, Alexander, Cassander, Ptolemy, Perdicas, Amyntas, Attalus, Parmenion, and Philotas were obviously Greek in form and not Thraco-Illyrian, although it is equally obvious, that they were not commonly employed outside of Macedonia. However, the names Amyntas, Attalus, and Parmenion do not have an obvious Greek root meaning. Applying the same first name analysis to modern Macedonians who according to their last

names are ostensively of a Slav-Macedonian background and who, as Macedonian revolutionaries, fought for the IMRO or independently during the Macedonian insurgency (1903–1908), the following names can serve as illustrative examples: Giorgi "Gotse" Delchev, Damian Gruev, Marko Lerinsky, Vasil Tchakalaroff, Pando Kliaschev, Georgi Petkov, Kuzo Stefov, Jordan Piperkata, Giorgi Sugarev, Nikola Karev, Petre Youroukov, Slaveiko Arsov, Jane Sandanski, Alexandro Touroungev, Todor Alexandrov, Anastas Lozanchev, and, of course, the greatest warrior of them all, Apostol Petkov (Polianski, 1972: 371–373). Boris Sarafov was born in Salonica but apparently to Bulgarian parent functionaries in Salonica. Thus, with the exception of Slaveiko Arsov, all first names above are Macedonian versions of Greek or Greek Orthodox Christian names. There is apparently a virtual absence of first names indicative of Slavic origin; names such as Branco, Svetozar, Slobodan, Boris, Vladimir, Bogdan, Milan, Zlatan, Zoran, Goran, Dragan, Jaroslav, Miroslav, Bogulub, Radtko, and so on. By this criterion, the so-called Slav-Macedonians obviously are not Slavs in spite of their Slavic last name endings. The virtual absence of Slavic first names cannot be easily explained except to suggest a non-Slav ethnicity, and, through a process of elimination, tentatively perhaps, as being survivors of an ancient Macedonian ancestry.

(8) Last name formulas. The native system of last names or last name formulas similarly point toward a non-Slav ethnicity in spite of apparent Slav endings. For example, given an ancestral grandfather named Nestor (which, surprisingly, is a common first name in Macedonia) a current descendent of Nestor would be called "Alexandro Na Nestoroi." This can be distinguished from "Alexandro Nestorov" and "Alexandro Nestorovich," the Bulgarian and Serbian versions, respectively; or from the current "literary" Macedonian version, "Alexandro Nestorovski." The latter is, unfortunately, the system adopted in the Macedonian Republic from 1944 to present no doubt based on the ruling conception of a Slav-Macedonian ethnicity within a South Slav culture, which was the then Yugoslavia. The native Macedonian system differs from these other systems in that it is in the *attributive*; not in the *possessive* case. "Alexandro Na Nestoroi" literary means Alexander of the Nestors, which differs from the other systems (including Greek last name formulas) that would mean Nestors' Alexander. This native vernacular formula for last names is similar to the Dutch, Irish, and Latin-speaking countries, which also use the attributive rather than the possessive case. For example, Van Dyke, Van Der Hoyt (Holland), Von

Bismarck (Germany), De Gaulle (France), Di Ciano (Italy), MackIntosh (Scotland), O'Toole (Ireland). Unfortunately, this native attributive formula never found its way into official usage because the Serbian and Bulgarian (as well as Russian) possessive case formulas were considered the only acceptable literary expressions for last names in modern and contemporary Macedonia.

One very revealing linguistic aspect in the native Macedonian system is the absence of the letter "v" as in "Nestorovoi," which would be required in any correct Slavonic version of the name Nestoroi (the absence of the "v" could also indicate precursor *koine* Greek influence). A people using an adoptive/adaptive version of another language would be prone to such basic errors but not if it had been the original native language. In any case, the native (but not the "literary") Macedonian system of last name formulas represents a complete departure from Slav or Greek last name formulas and points to a unique non-Slav and non-Hellenic Macedonian identity.

(9) Four sociocultural traditions as links to a distant past. Another revealing source of independent evidence for Macedonian ethnicity and especially its linkage to the ancient Macedonians lies in four sociocultural traditions. Up to World War II, it was standard practice upon burial for the wife to sing a funeral dirge to lament her loss of a husband, recounting his worldly deeds and accomplishments, with messages to loved ones in the hereafter. Although an unchristian pagan tradition, the Orthodox Church tolerated it and still tolerates it. This tradition most likely provides a living link to the world of Homer since in the *Odyssey* the point is clearly made by the suitors that, as long as Penelope had not sung the funeral dirge for her husband, Odysseus, he could not be declared dead; thus, the suitors could stay and continue to wait, seeking the hand of Penelope as a bride. Another traditional tale with Homeric links is that of Vrkovic Vir (from the Shtip region of Vardar Macedonia). A badly battered and bruised local on coming back from a nearby spring was asked by his follow villagers, "who did this to you?" and received back the laconic reply, *nikoi*, which in the Macedonian dialect can be translated as "no one." Since apparently no one could be found at or nearby the spring, it was subsequently called *Vrkovic Vir*, meaning ghostly spring (a default explanation).

A third tradition presents a much clearer example of a linkage to a prehistoric Homeric period. This is the custom of placing symbolic objects in the cradle of a newborn male child within the first three days after birth in an appeal to the Homeric feminine figures of the Three Fates to ensure a desired direction in the child's fate. For

example, placing a revolver, a book, and golden coin in the cradle of a newborn boy would suggest that the father wanted his son to be manly and courageous, learned in books, as well as a man of substance or never to be in need of money. This is what my grandfather, Christo, had wished for me at my birth. When asked about this tradition, my mother replied that my grandfather had appealed to the Three Fates that determined a man's fate (inviolable even by the Gods). Astonishingly, in her non-Greek Macedonian dialect the key phrase she used was *Tie Trite Sho Pishat* (those three who write).

A fourth tradition with possible links to a distant past is the present custom prevalent in the Florina/Lerin region (Lyncestis, in ancient Macedonia) of breaking up the wedding *bogatcha* (large round ceremonial bread) into two with bare hands by the two fathers (i.e., fathers of the bride and groom) at a point as when a wedding cake is cut. Invariably, the largest piece goes to the groom's side (obviously by prearrangement) as if to compliment the bride's merit and to show that the greater benefit is to the groom's father. Green (1991: 361) describes a somewhat similar ceremony, that is, the cutting of the wedding bread into two when Alexander the Great married Roxane, daughter of the Eastern Sogdian chieftain, Oxyartes. During the celebration, Alexander the Great, as one might expect (given the previous Gordian knot episode) cut the wedding bread in half with his sword. Green speculates that this might have been a Macedonian custom; it probably was.

The existence of the sociocultural features described above in both Vlach and Slav-speaking Macedonian households in the remote Aegean Macedonian villages of NW Macedonia in Greece (Vacalopoulos, 1973: 349–350) would be hard to explain except as clear-cut linkages to a Homeric world that existed even prior to the development of the 12 gods on Olympus and certainly prior to the onset of the classical period, at the end of which the ancient Macedonians burst forth upon the world's stage. These surviving customs dating back to a Homeric world, which, as some writers suggest characterized the ancient Macedonian Royal Court at the time of Philip and Alexander the Great, hints at a linkage to a distant past and implies that, perhaps, the Macedonians did not come from anywhere, are native to Macedonia, and are not significantly different from their ancient ancestors regardless of linguistic dialect or region. Shea (1997: 61) cites evidence pointing to the fact that not only sociocultural linkages exist but that the physical characteristics of the contemporary Macedonians evoke the ancient Macedonian features but not those of the Slav-ethnic groups around them.

Summary and Concluding Comments

The examination of sociocultural features, other than language, has been shown to provide evidence for inferring the existence of a nonexclusionary, unitary Macedonian ethnic identity regardless of linguistic dialect, region, political persuasion, and/or cognitive self-label. Some of the same evidence that leads to such an interpretation also shows a possible linkage to the ancient Macedonian identity and heritage. As there are alternative special interpretations that can be given to each one of the identified separate lines of sociocultural evidence presented above, epistemologically speaking, the inference of a single unitary Macedonian identity across region and language is, at best, an integrating theory and/or hypothesis. Unique predictions/postdictions of additional sociocultural features based on this general integrative theory of a single unitary Macedonian identity, surprisingly, are possible. For example, the present-day Lake Doiran "bird" fisherman cited by Pribichevich (1982: 228) can be regarded as critical *postdicitive* sociocultural supportive evidence. Herodotus, the first historian, reported similar observations from his travels into Macedonia and made specific references to these Macedonian "bird" fishermen of Lake Doiran (Pribichevich, 1982).

At a certain level of awareness the Macedonians themselves have espoused the view derived above of a unitary Macedonian identity. This is what the Col. Corfe report and Capt. Evans's observations, cited earlier in chapter 5, suggest. However, more recently in a quotation from an Australian (Macedonian) newspaper editorial (Kofos, 1989: 229–268) there is the following succinct statement of a unitary Macedonian identity: "For almost three hundred years we have been taught under cruel circumstances that we are Sloveni—Macedonians are dead and we are different people— 'Macedonian Slavians'... Slavianism for us Macedonians is a deadly destructive political, moral and national force which aims to eradicate Macedonianism completely... Politically, once we become Slavs we automatically lose any significance as descendants of the ancient Macedonians... By calling ourselves Slavs we legalize this robbery by the Greeks [of the ancient Macedonian heritage]... For us, Macedonian revolutionaries, Macedonianism gives wholeness to our being, past, present, and future. It is inner liberation from foreign imposed ideas, and confidence in our ability to be what we have been and will again be... If we remain silent, we will remain Slavs, and as Slavs, we have no legal right to anything Macedonian."

These statements above present a forceful and blunt contradiction to all who would assert a language-based Slav-Macedonian ethnicity. Nonetheless, as evidence, these statements are idiographic/emotive, cognitive self-descriptor statements not buttressed by independent objective evidence. One has to look into the rich Macedonian sociocultural heritage in folk dances (approximately 40 ethnic dances), musical variety, and various other sociocultural traditions as a source of evidence for a unitary Macedonian ethnicity in the explicitly stated manner shown above; and, possibly, as a definitive objective evidence to answer the perennial question, "Who Are the Macedonians?"

7

Components of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity: Genetic DNA Evidence

Introduction

As indicated in the preface and as explicitly described in chapter 3, there is now an available technology that potentially has the promise of being the gold standard for issues of ethnic identity. The well-established DNA genotyping technology used in linkage studies of single or multiple gene factor involvement in manifestations of various medical disease syndromes and/or developmental abnormalities and, more to the point, the highly focused forensic DNA analysis in restricted regions of the genome are now applied to questions of race and ethnicity. Unfortunately, in most direct investigations of ethnicity linked to disease syndromes, the distinctions between race and ethnicity are blurred; rather, the focus is on large population groups, geographically specified, and it has been suggested that race can be eliminated altogether as a useful term in genetics.

The end point of such investigations, as in forensic DNA genotyping, is an exclusion/inclusion decision regarding an individual person, but focused on the individual person as related to a geographically defined population or a population subgroup. A geographically defined population group or subgroup that is based on a specific physical location (as in the Gabriel et al., 2002, and Yang et al., 2005 studies) is a larger class or set than ethnicity or even race that is also geographically defined. Thus, the distinctions between race and ethnicity as related to such large geographically circumscribed areas are blurred. The question remains whether findings related to these large geographically circumscribed areas can be generalized to the smaller, ethnic identity level of geographical circumscribed population groups.

Besides this problem of blurred distinctions, there is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between an ethnic identity group defined on the basis of sociocultural evidence and DNA genetically defined, geographically specified group or subgroup. Thus, there is no logical contact between ethnicity defined socioculturally and a genetically defined population group presenting physiological evidence underpinning a genetic investigation. However, as indicated in chapter 3, there can be a common geographically defined location wherein a member of a target ethnic group resides, and this can serve as a focal point of contact to establish a one-to-one correspondence between ethnic identity and the underpinning genetic DNA evidence especially in a homogeneous, indigenous, and/or native population group. If such a one-to-one consistency is replicated across individuals sampled from a target ethnic group, then, clearly, an association is established much as an association to a disease syndrome. At this point, however, the analysis of ethnicity linkage to DNA underpinnings ends.

Unlike an associative linkage to a disease syndrome that can subsequently be investigated for upstream/downstream causal linkages via mediating mechanisms, this is not possible for ethnicity associated to DNA underpinnings because ethnicity is a socioculturally determined concept; and, as such, has no relation to the genetic DNA underpinnings. For this reason and many others, there is, unfortunately, little interest in academic circles for research into genetic DNA linkages to ethnic identity per se. Consequently, there are only a few peer-reviewed research studies into genetic DNA linkages to ethnicity (e.g., Gabriel et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2005 described in detail in chapter 3). Thus, by default, commercial organizations are now largely carrying out such research into ethnicity-DNA linkages motivated by lucrative individual interests for looking into personal ancestry and affiliation to ethnic/racial group and place of origin.

To date, there are 24 such commercial organizations as described in a recent review article in *Science* (Belnick et al., 2007). The critical datum that emerges from these commercial attempts to link an individual to an ethnic group or race is again an inclusion/exclusion comparison against a statistically prevalent or against a most frequently encountered genetic DNA profile to show belongingness to a particular population group, DNA defined. In one approach (DNA Tribes), the genetic DNA analysis is in terms of pattern location in 13 loci, including length and intensity of expression (gene penetrance) of selected short tandem repeats (STRs), that is, in the allele sequences in the 13 loci among the 23 pairs of chromosomes. In the

other approach (iGENEA), haplotype blocs or a combination of blocs are selected on the basis of a few (<10) AIMs (ancestry information markers—see Glossary at the end of chapter 3) that are then used for exclusion/inclusion decisions relative to a geographically located database. In this latter approach, the entire human genome can be examined rather than the 13 forensic analysis loci; but, most frequently, the analysis is confined to those diallelic base pair sequences of selected chromosomal regions that have been labeled as AIMs and that are evenly spaced throughout the genome. Regions are then selected using specific selection restriction criteria and the selected candidate haplotypes are then analyzed for length, frequency of SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphisms), and for proportion of informative SNPs flanking each haplotype bloc. Informative SNPs are mutated allele base pairs that introduce a linkage disequilibrium in base pair allele sequences and have occurred in the historical past of a target population being studied. Well-established statistical programs are then used to estimate how far back in years a mutated allele base pair can be dated and then this is linked to an established history for an ethnic or national group as a point of contact as to what this period was when the informative SNP mutation occurred.

Linkages to a historical period of a population group can be problematic due to the fact that there are no single standard universally accepted histories for any historical period, and histories and historians can diverge in their interpretations (e.g., the Macedonian ethnic identity). Thus, there is a problem of interfacing what essentially is genetic physiological evidence to what essentially is socioculturally based, but not well-anchored, evidence (i.e., conflicted historical accounts). At worst, the relation is nominal; or at best, a statistical association of one body of evidence to another body of evidence.

DNA Tribes approach. The two academic peer-reviewed linkage studies of race/ethnicity to genetic DNA evidence carried out by Gabriel et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2005) have already been presented in detail in chapter 3 and thus will not be reviewed in this section, except to point out that they are scant and too few in number. The focus now is on commercial attempts to study ancestry affiliation and ethnicity linkage to genetic DNA underpinnings. The DNA Tribes approach to the issue of genetic DNA genotyping of an individual into an ethnic identity is the first of two commercial organizations to be examined.

What can be noticed immediately is that it has an unexpected degree of uniqueness. However, the technology used is well established, and, it is that of forensic DNA inclusion/exclusion analysis of autosomal

samples (in this case, saliva swabs) on the 13 standard loci across the genome, that is, across the selected chromosomal regions with the same markers as those used in forensic police-related criminal investigations. These markers are the STRs (short tandem repeats) across the 13 loci as described in chapter 3. The allele base pair sequences of these short tandem repeats at each of the 13 locations differ among individuals (except for monozygotic twins) in length, location, and intensity of expression. Importantly, individual patterns emerge in this type of analysis characterized by differences in location, length, and intensity of expression across the 13 standardized loci. The individual pattern profiles are sufficiently distinct so that mere visual inspection of such a profile can identify an individual for an exclusion/inclusion decision in a criminal police case. An exclusion/inclusion decision in the DNA Tribes approach, however, is replaced by a statistical belongingness/affiliation decision arrived at by comparison with most frequently observed pattern mixes of what are described as Tribes or Subtribes representative of geographically circumscribed worldwide regions where such patterns are found.

Figure 7.1 shows the European continent as a geographical region with specific area locations of the DNA Tribes (a substitute term for

Figure 7.1 DNA Tribe regions for the European continent.

race/ethnicity) to whom individual affiliations are referred to. As can be seen in figure 7.1, these European DNA Tribes are: Celtic, Norse, Germanic, Polish, Ashkenazi, Finno-Ugrian, Russian, Portuguese, Basque, Spanish, Italian, Balkan, and Greek. The names used as labels/designations for each Tribe are historically derived and, thus, have only heuristic value as nominal labels designating each Tribe based on a characteristic genetic DNA profile. A map of the European continent with designated Tribe regions is presented in figure 7.1. As shown in figure 7.1, the Norse Tribe includes the population regions of SE England (probably SE Scotland; not SE England), Normandy and Norway; the Germanic Tribe includes Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. These European Tribes which are relatively close genetically, compared to other groups worldwide, belong to an overall umbrella Tribe labeled as *Caucasian* that includes under a single classification two subcategories, *European* and *Near Eastern* Tribes.

As strange as these groupings may appear (since historically it was the German Saxons who inundated SE England), these regional groupings, nonetheless, are objectively derived on the basis of statistical comparisons of genetic STR sequences of base pairs as patterns over the 13 loci across the 23 pairs of autosomal chromosomes using a distance metric defined, "as the sum of absolute differences" (Valaitis and Martin, 2008: 4). This "sum of absolute differences" is in the pattern sequence comparisons of geographically located Tribes in the European Continent. The distance measure is operationally referenced to a proprietary, patented, statistical program developed by Dr. Eduardas Valaitis for DNA Tribes (Valaitis and Martin, 2008).

As the sum of the differences across comparisons increases, so also does the magnitude of the umbrella class or category and/or the number of subgroups included in the DNA population Tribe. For closely related Tribes, distance is defined as the distance between a mean difference score within a Tribe from that of a within mean difference score of a comparison Tribe. Figure 7.2 presents a schematic diagram of relatedness and distance of the world population Tribes based on an extremely large data base involving samples from 800 living populations worldwide.

The strangeness in this novel descriptive classificatory system of genetic DNA categories where "Tribe" is a genetic/DNA-based category intended to replace race/ethnicity as a useful category lies in that "Tribe" itself is a primitive, equally vague classificatory term. However that may be, in this application, "Tribe" has an unimpeachable objective operational statistical anchoring. It is based on mathematically derived measures of clustering, relatedness, and differences



Figure 7.2 Diagram showing worldwide major and minor grouping according to degree of contribution based on the genetic DNA evidence.

solely based on genetic forensic style data from 800 living population groups throughout the world that have been genotyped and grouped into major and minor clusters in terms of relatedness/difference of base pair sequences in the STRs across the 13 loci.

The rationale behind the selection of "Tribe" as a descriptor label in place of race/ethnicity, which are widely salient classificatory core concepts in the social sciences and history, is that race and ethnicity are derived on the basis of both physical/physiological and/or socio-cultural indicators that may be inconsistent and incommensurate. By replacing conventional race/ethnicity classifications with mathematically derived objective indicators of genetic relatedness and difference among humans categorized as "Tribes" yields a reliable and consistent classificatory system for purposes of genetic DNA mapping of an individual into a group anchored to a specific geographical location and its history. Justified or not, the concept of Tribe results in a remapping of the world populations for purposes of genetic DNA genotyping.

Empirical evidence from European region databases and using what appears to be a principal component analysis, a major characteristic component is identified in the profile that is most prevalent in a geographically designated Tribe region as shown by the highest

percentage of a component contributor to individuals sampled from that region. Besides an identified dominant genetic contributor to a mix, percentage contributions are also included from profiles characteristic of other European Tribe regions as shown in figure 7.3 (Valaitis and Martin, 2008: 13). Thus, a Tribe in Europe, in addition, includes in varying percentages component contributors from other European Tribe designated regions.

Contributors to the ethnic mix of each Tribe category. Color coded percentages are shown in each column representing a European Tribe according to degree of contribution based on the genetic DNA evidence.

To illustrate how this genetic Tribe profiling in figure 7.3 can be interpreted, an inspection of figure 7.3 across all 13 European DNA Tribes, ranging from Celtic on the extreme left to Greek on the extreme right, shows that the characteristic major Celtic component contributor amounts to slightly more than 50 percent for the Celtic Tribe (shown on the extreme left column) while, at the same time, the Greek component in the Celtic Tribe mix is slightly less than 3 percent. Looked at across all other Tribes shown in figure 7.3, the Celtic component declines at the other end to about 7 percent for the Greek Tribe. However, for the Greek Tribe itself, the Greek component, the major contributor for this Tribe, reaches only to about 22 percent with the other components declining in contribution from about 10 percent to 3 percent for the Norse component.

Applied to individuals for whom a European Tribe analysis approach is appropriate, as for example, a Caucasian person from the United States, about one half of such individual samples would show an "ordinary" profile characterized by DNA Tribes analysis as being of a Northwestern European mix (Valaitis and Martin, 2008: 15). However, as applied to the Macedonian ethnic identity, clearly this approach to ethnicity is not fine enough to differentiate the target Macedonian ethnic identity from the Greek identity because as shown in figure 7.1, it is subsumed within a Greek Tribe region of Europe. It may be that the Macedonians are of a Greek ethnic identity as claimed by Greek historians (e.g., Kofos, 1989; 1995); but it could also be that the methodology based on STRs compared to that based on haplotype bloc analysis may be inadequate to reveal differences that require a higher level or, perhaps a different type of processing precision.

iGENEA approach. The iGENEA approach also employs a well-developed methodology of genetic DNA research protocols; but, in this alternative, the focus is on haplotype blocs flanked by informative



Figure 7.3 The Tribe categories shown in figure 7.1 are presented according to major and minor component contributors.

SNPs across select regions in the 23 pairs of human autosomal chromosomes as described in detail in chapter 3 (e.g., see also Gabriel et al., 2002. and Yang et al., 2005 for a more detailed presentation of such analyses). Genetic DNA databases were formed for geographically circumscribed European population samples corresponding to parallel ethnically defined population groups, including a Macedonian sample and for contrast/comparisons in the present case, to Greek, Serbian, Albanian, and Bulgarian samples as indigenous Balkan people. In this approach, an ethnic group, rather than a Tribe, is the primary unit of analysis to which genetic DNA profiles are related. However, in both cases, they are geographically defined.

The results according to a iGENEA website posting for the modern Macedonian, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian ethnic identities, like those shown in figure 7.3, are also expressed in terms of component contributors. Whereas in the DNA Tribes results, the constituent European ethnic group components are given the familiar nominal labels of Celtic, Norse, Greek (see figure 7.1), in the iGENEA results, the constituent ethnic component groups are labeled as Antic (ancient) Macedonian, Teutonic, Hellenic, Slav, Illyrian, Hunnian, and Phoenician for each of the geographically identified Balkan states. This breakdown of contributors and the differentiated level of component contribution for each Balkan country sample represents a characteristic profile of an inferred ethnic mix of ancestral ethnic components to the modern Macedonian, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian haplotype bloc sequences. The profiles for each country sample are distinguished by the hierarchical ordering of the component contributors.

This description of an ethnic identity as a profile of major, lesser, and minor contributors is parallel to that of the DNA Tribes approach presented above in figure 7.3, including the major and minor quantitative levels. However, the methods used in the two approaches are different. On the one hand, for the DNA Tribes approach, the focus is on STRs (short tandem repeats) in 13 standardized chromosomal cite locations. On the other hand, for the iGENEA approach, the analysis is genome-wide of well-established ancestry informative markers (AIMs) as found in haplotype blocs each flanked by an SNP (short nucleotide polymorphism) at the beginning and end of the diallelic sequence. An important, but quite peripheral, difference is that in place of race/ethnicity, “Tribe” is the preferred core concept for the DNA Tribes approach. Nonetheless, operationally, both “Tribe” and “ethnicity” are referenced to specific geographical regions.

The constituent breakdown in the iGENEA analysis presented in a quantitative hierarchical level of contribution for the Macedonian sample is as follows: Antic Macedonian, Teutonic, Slav, Hellenic, Illyrian, Hunnian, and Phoenician. For the Greek sample, the hierarchy and sequential order is different with the Hellenic component at the top and in a descending order, Slav, Phoenician, Teutonic, Illyrian, and Antic Macedonian. For the Bulgarian sample, a new contributor, Thracian, is the major contributor though others are also present, but again, at lower levels in a differentiated descending order of contribution. Not unexpectedly, for the Serbian sample, the Slav component is at the top with a differentiated descending order for the other components. Viking is a new component in this sample but is at the bottom of the hierarchy. For the Albanian sample, again, not unexpectedly, the Illyrian component is at the top as the major contributor with a differentiated descending order relative to the other groups.

Additional information provided, specific to the Macedonian identity, is the identification of five y-haplogroups that are said to circumscribe Macedonia as a geographical region. Whether these markers are exclusive to the ancient Macedonian component contributor is not clear from the posted results as the methods (protocols/procedures) are not indicated. This characteristic of partial statement only of protocol/procedure in commercial approaches to race/ethnicity analyses detracts from their acceptance as well-established results. The prevailing attitude in such organizations is that the exact protocol/procedures are proprietary trade secrets.

Discussion

The results above indicate indirectly a differentiated Macedonian ethnic identity from the neighboring ethnic groups, the Albanians, the Serbs/Montenegrins (the Montenegrins are ethnic Serbs), Bulgarians, and Greeks as there is allegedly a haplogroup identification profile specific to each ethnic group. This differentiation of the Macedonians is based primarily on the high loadings on an Antic (ancient) Macedonian haplotype bloc component for the Macedonian sample compared to the neighbors around them, the Albanians, Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks. Differential loadings on the Hellenic and Illyrian components are also important contributor differences in identifying the Macedonians from the other groups. Had these results been presented as a part of a peer-reviewed report in a science journal, there might have been appropriate statistical analyses to validate such ethnic sample differentiations based on individual sample profiles. On

the other hand, variability among individual scores could be minimal (i.e., error variance may be low enough so that there would be no need for a conventional statistical analysis [e.g., see Zwislocki et al., 1967]). Had the findings undergone a peer review and succeeded to a publication in a science journal, then, greater reliance might have been placed on the iGENEA report above of a unique Macedonian ethnic identity strongly tied to their ancient Macedonians ancestors. Such an end result might have independently confirmed the inference/hypothesis of the present work regarding the Macedonian ethnic identity as a unique, non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian identity linked to the ancient Macedonians by sparse, but critically important, sociocultural remains from the distant past.

An interesting question at this point is whether or not these two different methodological approaches to the study of ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages can result in similar, identical, or, at least, consistent outcomes for a target ethnic identity. For example, in an association analysis of a disease syndrome influenced by multiple genes across the genome, there are alternative quantitative statistical methods to address such a question and these are often used to show reliability and validity when they lead to a common outcome: that is, linkage to the same genes and to the same degree. Circumscribed to the Macedonian ethnic identity, the answer to a parallel question shows that in the DNA Tribes approach there is a 22 percent loading on the Greek Tribe as a principal genetic DNA component (Macedonia is within the Greek region Tribe). However, in the alternative iGENEA approach, the Hellenic (Greek) component loading is only 15 percent for the Macedonian sample. Whether this percentage difference is significant or negligible cannot be determined without an error variance estimate. If the error variance is small, this difference in percentage would lead to a conclusion of two different ethnic identities and the two methodologies do not validate one another.

There is one other way to assess this differentiation on the Hellenic component to the Macedonian mix in the DNA Tribes versus the iGENEA findings and that is by reference to a relevant historical record showing a massive resettlement of "Greek" refugees from Asia Minor into Aegean Macedonia as a result of the Greco-Turkish war of 1921–1922; and, concomitantly with it, the ethnic cleansing of the native Macedonian population. More than 500,000 refugees were forced out of Asia Minor and resettled in Macedonia. They were a Greek-speaking population from the Aegean coasts; and others, from the interior who were Orthodox Christians of undetermined ethnicity. This influx plus the lightly disguised ethnic cleansing from 1923

to 1949 of the Macedonian Slav-speaking population euphemistically labeled as "the exodus of the Slavs from Macedonia" by Kofos (1995) may have changed the ethnicity of the samples being considered so that the Hellenic component may have been increased to about 22 percent overall for Aegean Macedonia for the DNA Tribes sampled population. For the iGENEA Macedonian sample, which was confined to Slav-speaking Macedonians from the Republic of Macedonia or the Vardar region of Macedonia, it was 15 percent. These population changes in the turbulent historical past may explain the lower loading of the Hellenic component in the iGENEA Macedonian sample versus the higher loading on the Greek region sample. Not having precise information on how the samples were gathered—that is, geographical circumscription of population area sampled and self-designated ethnic identity of each sample—makes the above analysis highly speculative.

From another perspective, one can examine the iGENEA results above relative to the contribution of the Hellenic component for Greece and Macedonia as separate regions and then combine them to see if it corresponds to the geographical Greek Tribe region of the DNA Tribes analysis. Given that in the DNA Tribes analysis, Macedonia is within a Greek Tribe region, the average of the two percentages above, summed and divided by 2, would be 25 percent. This result is similar to the DNA Tribes result of 22 percent, which validates the findings on the Hellenic component. Whether this is a real or an artifactual result cannot be determined. What is clear, however, is that the Macedonian ethnic identity can be differentiated from the Greek identity in one approach but not in the other approach. Thus, there is a conflict in outcome and these two commercial methodologies are not comparable. This conflict and other problems lead to the question of choice as to which methodology is more appropriate for research into ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages. For family ancestry affiliations, clearly, the DNA Tribes approach would be preferred because individual differences can be very precisely described as in forensic analyses related to criminal investigations. For ethnicity affiliations, the iGENEA method would be the method of choice, especially if augmented by the use of a large number of markers as in the Yang et al. (2005) study and the capability of finding "discrete" clusters in the haplotype bloc profiles.

Scholarly peer-reviewed studies of ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages are scant; and,not surprisingly, there are no literature reviews. Yet there is one review in *Science*; but, this review is confined to an assessment of only the commercial approaches to the issue of linkages.

Belnick et al. (2007) in their *Science* review point out some salient statistics relevant to these commercial organization approaches to race/ethnicity issues: (1) there are two dozen commercial organizations that provide ancestry information and information regarding ethnicity/race affiliation based on genetic DNA analysis from saliva samples provided by interested individuals; and (2) there are more than 460,000 individuals who have purchased such services over the past six years. In terms of method used, critically, only sparse and limited information is presented in the review, but, this is due to proprietary practices on the part of the commercial organizations that do not provide full public disclosure of what are considered as trade secrets. What is indicated in the report, however, is that the genotyping is of y-chromosomes for males and mitochondria for the female x-chromosomes across the 23–46 chromosome genome-wide regions. In another approach, DNA ancestry is determined by the use of as many as 175 markers from both the y- and x-chromosomes.

In the absence of more specific protocol/procedural information, the review, not surprisingly, turns toward critical evaluation of genetic DNA genotyping as related to ethnic and/or ancestry identity affiliation. Problematic aspects of commercial assessments of ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages are identified, as indicated in the review, because an ethnic identity affiliation may have profound impact on an individual's psyche with serious implications for a person's self-identity and his sociocultural interactions as a result of such test result outcomes. More often than not, the assumptions and limitations behind the methodology lead to results that are less than what is expected. Consequently, commercialization has led to misleading practices; and, it goes without saying, that there are no regulatory agencies to overlook and examine such practices particularly as they might lead to an untoward mental health impact.

Belnick et al. (2007) identify eight limitations to the findings and interpretations of commercial organization methods to relate ethnicity to genetic DNA evidence. These are as follows:

1. Geographically circumscribed location for an ethnic identity is only partial as it does not include transnational relocations to other lands.
2. Even with data bases ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 samples, such numbers may not be large enough to capture the "full range of human diversity."
3. A most common haplotype may not represent the within-group diversity of a population target group.

4. There is no contact between DNA and ethnic or racial affiliation as race and ethnic affiliations are more inclusive and not replicable in terms of DNA underpinnings.
5. AIMs do not tell the full story as they comprise frequencies ranging only from 30 percent to 50 percent of the genome.
6. Paradoxical results, that is, findings of DNA genetic concentrations where there is no anthropological evidence for a corresponding population subtype.
7. Samples may not be sufficiently large in size.
8. Commercial preferences may lead to distortion in the interpretation of findings.

These criticisms expressed as limitations on commercial organization attempts to provide ethnic identity linkages to DNA evidence are, however, themselves conditioned by the background of the 14 authors/coauthors in this much-needed review published in the highly prestigious professional journal, *Science*. Understandably, there is no interest in the academic world on the part of geneticists to pursue this important issue other than as related to developmental abnormalities and/or disease syndromes. Thus, as one might expect, a review of this type by default would come from academic fields where ethnicity and race are significant core concepts such as anthropology, history, social psychology, sociology, and political science. Of the authors listed, three are anthropologists including the first and second authors along with five sociologists, plus two in unrelated medical specialties and a variety of other fields. This combination of nongeneticists—that is, of social scientists as authors plus some with unrelated backgrounds in medicine as well as the limited information available to them on the exact protocols and procedures used—does not leave much in terms of a critical evaluation other than pointing out limitations in the findings and interpretations reflecting, to a degree, a protective delimitation of already circumscribed areas of study such as ethnicity/race by standardized methods in extant academic disciplines. The conclusion was "Thus, these tests should not be seen as determining race or ethnicity of the test-taker" because, as they see it "exact certitude is lacking" (400). Seemingly, by implication, encroachments on conventional methods of study of ethnicity/race by genetic DNA methodologies are deemed inappropriate and irrelevant. Whether or not this criticism is justified, nonetheless, what is factual is that almost all of the alleged limitations above can be challenged.

Starting with the first limitation, it can be pointed out that in the human genome more than 99 percent of the genetic makeup is

identical in humans. The 1 percent that is informative of differences is further circumscribed in forensic DNA exclusion/inclusion analyses to 13 standardized loci in the genome-wide regions and this analysis can be applied to any individual in any part of the world. Individual differences identified through such forensic DNA methods are very precise, although not of a "finger print" specificity. Maximally, the first limitation would apply only if one were searching for individual differences, not for groups or subgroups distinguished by ethnic self-identity designation and localized as indigenous and/or native groups with a long history tying them to a specific geographical region. The first limitation applies even less to a haplotype bloc analyses that show high degree of uniformity across samples within a group. It follows also that the genetic/DNA uniformity in geographically circumscribed samples with a long history, unencumbered by invasions, does not require either large samples (greater than 50 but less than 100), nor even random samples from a target population group. Moreover, relatedness within a group is in terms of principal and lesser contributors, as in a mix, which allows for population mixing and is the principal interest—not diversity. So much for the first three limitations.

The fourth limitation expresses a truism that the evidence underpinning an ethnicity/race affiliation is sociocultural, and, thereby, has no logical contact with physiological genetic DNA evidence. As already pointed out earlier and in greater detail in chapter 3, this by no means is a fatal flaw because a one-to-one correspondence on an individual basis can be established with a resulting statistical group level association between the two different bodies of evidence. The additional point that ethnicity and race are more inclusive than genetic DNA underpinnings is contradicted by the DNA Tribes approach that rejects ethnicity and/or race as being too narrow and not inclusive enough for statistically determined genetic DNA commonalities and categories based on samples from large geographically located population areas worldwide.

Regarding the fifth limitation, the reply might be that the AIMs do not need to tell the full story; they only need to identify clusters of genetic DNA profiles that relate and differentiate genetically identified population groups. The sixth limitation, that is, the finding of "paradoxical results," is based on negative evidence and does not take into account future historical/anthropological studies that may find a lost subgroup population. The seventh limitation has already been addressed earlier; and, in any case, sampling size ranging from 50 to 100 individual samples has been deemed sufficient in the peer-reviewed Gabriel et al. (2003) and Yang et al. (2007) studies. The eighth and final limitation, that is, the possibility of distortion in the

interpretation of the results, is a general scholarly problem, not particular to commercial investigations, and "exact certitude" (Belnick et al., 2007: 400) is nowhere to be seen in science.

From the commentary above, what is immediately obvious is the lack of academic interest in the basic issue of ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages per se; and, on the commercial side, a lack of validation by peer-reviewed research among the numerous commercial organizations studies of such linkages. These deficits have a common end result, and that is a lack of trust in the findings and conclusions in both the academic peer-reviewed scholarly studies and in the commercial organization results and findings. This lack of trust, on the one hand, stems from the fact that the former are too sparse and too few in number and, on the other hand, the latter have no peer-reviewed validation studies of the applied technology used (although the argument is that they are already using well-established methodologies). This impasse is not bridgeable as things stand because of lack of interest on the one side and reluctance to reveal trade secrets on the other side.

Within the field of genetics, the methodologies used in research studies are all, without exception, fairly well established and there is no question of their reliability and validity. The within issues involve mostly questions of practicality/applicability when gene factor associations to disease syndromes appear unrelated or divorced from any known mediating mechanisms as well as unknown environmental interactions and/or unknown gene penetrance differences among individuals. All these factors affect the expression of a disease syndrome on the outcome side.

Outside the field of genetics, where the well-established methodologies are applied to ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages, there is much preliminary work that needs to be done in the areas of a standardized understanding of what ethnicity is and identification of indicator anchoring domains of evidence (the goal of the present book). Also, peer-reviewed research studies of ethnicity-genetic DNA linkages are needed that begin not with a large geographically localized areas as in the Gabriel et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2005) studies, but with smaller, highly limited ethnically defined geographical population areas much narrower in scope with a corresponding higher need for a large set of AIM markers (~ 175). These problems and deficiencies have already been discussed in chapter 3 in greater detail, and the undeniable conclusion might be that in future studies what is needed are cooperative studies by specialists in ethnicity-related academic fields such as political psychology, social psychology, and political science together with geneticists interested in a greater precision in

the ethnicity/race linkages. To a lesser degree, anthropologists and historians can also attempt to form such cooperative alliances with geneticists to study particularly controversial issues in history such as the alleged sixth/seventh century AD Slav inundation of the Balkans now challenged by Curta (2001) as it relates to the Macedonian ethnic identity.

Presently, there seems to be a reluctance for studies in this direction by anthropologists and historians, as evidence from genetic DNA sources is viewed as irrelevant, superfluous, not to say, threatening, next to the conventional well-established methods and well-recognized results in these academic areas of study. However, what the anthropologists and the sociologists alongside the other authors of the *Science* review emphasize quite rightly is that misinterpretation of commercial organization findings regarding an individual's identity and his family as well as his ethnicity affiliation may have a negative untoward effect on a person's mental health, and, by extension of the argument, do call for federal regulatory oversight into the exact protocols and procedures to independently validate the applied technology used. To come to an overall conclusion from the above analysis and presentation, it seems that until peer-reviewed scholarly studies are carried out into the issue of ethnicity/race linkages to genetic DNA factors sufficient in number to allow critical reviews of what has been accomplished and/or until federal regulatory agencies can validate commercial organization studies of this issue, there is no gold standard as yet and in sight, in the near future.

8

Who the Macedonians Are: An Across Domain, Evidence-Based Answer

Introduction

In this chapter, the evidence from the different domains, described earlier in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, is examined, summarized, and integrated to allow general conclusions on the basic issue of "Who the Macedonians Are."

The question of "Who the Macedonians Are" has preoccupied historians, anthropologists, and European foreign embassy observers for at least the past 100 years (Anastasoff, 1945; Brailsworth, 1906/1971; Danforth, 1991; 1995; Evans, 1903; Glenny, 1966; Karakasidou, 1997; Kofos, 1983; Lunt, 1986; Misirkov, 1903; Pettifer, 1992; Poulton, 1995; Rossos, 1991b; 1995; Roudometof, 2000). The significance of providing an answer, and depending on the answer, is that it can then be determined whether or not the Macedonians, specifically, the majority Slav-speaking Macedonians of the Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin regions of Macedonia (now in three different countries) are the legitimate owners of Macedonian lands and territories; if not, then, as allegedly late-coming Slav interlopers into Macedonia, like the Albanians, Turks, Gypsies, as well as Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars, have no more right to Macedonia than the other late comers; or, minimally, share equal legitimacy. If indeed this is the case, then, by implication, the Great Power and Balkan Power decision to parcel out Macedonia to Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria in the second decade of the twentieth century, from 1912 to 1922, is, retrospectively, justified; and, as a direct consequence, the historical "Macedonian Question" (Cowan, 2000; Glenny, 1996; Perry, 1988; Pettifer, 1992; Roudometof, 2000) continues

for yet another century with new scholarly arguments as to who gets what of Macedonia and whose grievances are to be addressed/redressed. In other words, the ongoing discussion proceeds along well-established lines of the received text. If, however, *there is, was,* and *has been* a distinctive non-Slav Macedonian identity, which is the main theme addressed in this book, then, the 1912/1913 partition of Macedonia has to be seen as one of the great political crimes of the twentieth century.

The more compelling reason for reexamining and bringing together the historical, the cognitive self-report, the sociocultural, and the genetic DNA domains of evidence is to relate the evidence scattered across the different domains into an integrated interpretation and then see how well the integrated evidence is supportive of the hypothesis introduced in chapter 2 for a unitary, non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity across dialect and region linked to the ancient Macedonians by sparse but critical sociocultural remains from the distant past. Moreover, if placed alongside the historical "Macedonian Question" ("who are the Macedonians"; "to whom Macedonia belongs"; "what is the extent of her lands"; and "how many of each, Slavs, Albanians, Turks, Greeks, Serbs," etc.) (Glenny, 1996; Perry, 1988), the integrated evidence and interpretation can put to rest the "Macedonian Question" and bring an end to the 100-year discussion as having no basis in reality. However, such a sweeping conclusion would be appropriate if, and only if, the evidence is strongly supportive. Clearly, this is what the reader must decide.

The method by which the evidence is presented and evaluated is by placing it in the framework of the General Ethnicity Model postulates of chapter 10, particularly as regards issues of evidence being necessary and sufficient and integration of across domain evidence. Furthermore, as the development of the Macedonian identity, understood either as a national/political and/or as an ethnic identity, has been a roller-coaster ride from the late decade of the nineteenth century to the present time; "now you see it, now you don't" phenomenon, sometimes seen as Bulgarian, sometimes as Greek, or Serbian with only occasional glimpses of it as a strongly expressed Macedonian identity, thus, the evidence, by necessity, will be looked at stage-wise.

Specifically, the summary, integration, and evaluation of the evidence from the four domains will be carried out separately for each of the historically important phases of development/devolution as described earlier in chapter 4.

In part 1, the evidence is collapsed across the source domains and integrated into one narrative. Given that the evolution and development of the Macedonian identity is a stepwise process that occurred in discontinuous phases, it will be presented in three stages: Stage I. Resurgent/ revolutionary Macedonia; Stage II. Interwar devolution and terrorist activism; and Stage III. World War II and postwar developments.

In part 2, the evidence will be further summarized and integrated; this time, it will be collapsed across the three stages with an explanation for the discontinuity separating the stages with a bridging narrative to present an overall picture of what the evidence shows and to identify the connecting strands from stage to stage in spite of external factor disruption by the Balkan Wars, by World War I, and World War II. At the end of part 2, general conclusions are formulated and stated regarding what has been shown relative to the three requirements for establishing necessary and sufficient evidence in order to infer a separate and unique Macedonian ethnic identity. Finally, observations and a commentary are presented of muted but lethal elements acting against the Macedonian ethnic identity that are generally ignored by historians and anthropologists in their assessments of the Macedonian ethnic identity.

As introduced in chapter 3 and as described in greater detail in the 10 postulates of the General Ethnicity Model, an ethnic identity, now examined critically, must display in the integrated evidence certain minimal necessary characteristics: (1) it must show that it has been an actor/agent acting upon and being productive of particular historical events as well as being acted upon; (2) there must be, as well, a historical display of a consistent name by which it wishes to be recognized as a player in the arena of international politics; and (3) there also has to be a linkage of the self-chosen name to unique and distinctive sociocultural characteristics such as language, music, dances, traditions, athletic games, which set it apart from other ethnic identities. These requirements will serve as guides as to what is selected and emphasized from the evidence in chapters 4–7 with an eye to determining how well the three requirements have been met. Needless to say, when found together, that is, when all three necessary component types of evidence are present and are consistent, then the evidence also becomes sufficient for an inference of an ethnic identity as argued in chapter 3. Applied genetic DNA findings, appended at the end, will either confirm or shown to be questionable regarding conclusions drawn from the integrated evidence about the Macedonian ethnic identity.

Part 1: Summary and Integration of Evidence from Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 across Historically Important Stages in the Development of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

Stage I. First Decade of Awakening, Resurgence, and Revolution

According to Rossos (2008) and Seraphinoff and Stefou (2008), there were many episodes of organized resistance to the Ottoman Empire particularly in the nineteenth century; but, a nationally organized resistance officially documented as a national Macedonian struggle occurred only with the development of the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) whose chief impact on world events was during the first decade of the twentieth century (Perry, 1986; 1988; Polianski, 1972; Shashko, 1995).

A. IMRO. Preparation of the Masses and Revolution

Introduction. Founded in 1893 in the chief city of Salonica, with a written constitution in 1896, the IMRO aimed toward an eventual autonomy/independence along the lines of the earlier Greek Serbian and Bulgarian examples. It was a meticulously organized political, paramilitary, and social organization. But, nonetheless, it needed to prepare the masses for the coming open struggle to autonomy and independence. Within a decade, it had, at ground level, political and paramilitary units called "committees" (hence the name Comitadjis) at village/town, and province levels, with governing committees headquartered at Salonica for the IMRO and Sofia for the Supremists.[1] It was, as it had to be under the circumstance of Macedonia being an occupied Ottoman Empire territory, a highly secretive clandestine organization with a shadow government ready to emerge and operate openly (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004: 92–95, 120–121).[2] Upon the pain of death all members were sworn to secrecy. In the end, the vaunted secrecy proved porous. Gotse Delchev, the chief organizer, was neither the first nor the last to die in a Turkish Security Patrol ambush. He was killed outside of Salonica just three months ahead of the Ilinden uprising.

Ilinden Uprising. The Ilinden uprising in the early decade of the twentieth century was carried out by the IMRO as a well-planned but premature open revolt in the summer of 1903 (Perry, 1988).

Following early diversionary bombings in Salonica and disruption of rail and telegraph lines of communication, the strategic and tactical plan called for coordinated local partisan operations all over Macedonia in which the district/province local military committees (rebel units) were authorized to strike and defeat concentrations of defensive Turkish forces at or nearby villages and towns without directly involving the villages and towns (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). Though unrealistic, hopefully, it would spare Turkish military and paramilitary reprisals. In the past, such clashes outside village and town boundaries would avoid punitive reprisals (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). Moreover, this was the traditional small-scale guerrilla war formula. Nonetheless, the revolt spread in scope. For some "hot spots," for Krushevo and the Kostur/Lerin region, the revolt took on the character of mass participation ultimately leading to liberation of territories. In the town of Krushevo and in the Kostur/Lerin region, the revolt was en masse with liberated areas briefly enjoying freedom and self-government with already organized local civil committees actively operating along advanced Socialist/Democratic ideals seeing to the immediate needs of the people (Brown, 2003: 12; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008: 92–100). However, the freedom achieved and the revolt itself were both short lived. Within three months the revolt faced total defeat by overwhelming Ottoman Empire forces that, by the end, were well-organized and well-led. The on-the-spot horrors that followed with the reoccupation by Turkish military and paramilitary forces are beyond imagination and are best left to historians.

Defeat and Aftermath. In spite of the catastrophic defeat, the revolt continued but now transformed into a sporadic insurgency. Units and leaders survived largely intact as casualties appear to have been light on both sides (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008: 94–108; Vakalopoulos, 1991). As the struggle continued from 1903 until 1908, it developed into a desperate, if sporadic, three-way free-for-all partisan/guerrilla war against Turkish military extermination units as well as against emboldened Greek-sponsored Andartes and Bulgarian-sponsored Vrhovist (Supremist) bands in the field. The worst that could happen was that by the end of this phase, almost all of the revolutionary leaders were lost (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). That is, all the well-educated cream of the Macedonian intelligentsia that held the struggle to high Socialist/Democratic standards in the treatment of enemy and hostile villages in their midst (Ambler, 1951).

Expectation of Outside Power Intervention. Before the Ilinden outbreak, there was an expectation on the part of the IMRO leadership that, as in the earlier Greek, Serb and Bulgarian liberation struggles, outside help, if not intervention, by the Great Powers, would come (Perry, 1988). It had been a cornerstone assumption in the strategy behind the uprising. However, it did not come. Instead, some ineffective palliatives did come in the form of foreign observer officers from Russia, Italy, and Austria attached to Turkish military units to help keep clashes and reprisals to a minimum ("Mürszteg reforms") (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). Worst of all, the neighboring countries, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria never wanted or intended for the revolt to succeed. Covertly and overtly each country struggled against the IMRO as a Macedonian national organization, before, during, and after the Ilinden uprising (Vakalopoulos, 1991). Each claimed legitimacy to Macedonia and the Macedonians; and, through intrigue and covert action sought to frustrate and defeat the Macedonian efforts toward autonomy and independence.

Garvanov, a Bulgarian national embedded in the IMRO, had, at the moment, chaired the IMRO hierarchy in Salonica and contrived to arrange an impromptu meeting on January of 1903 to set an early date for the uprising. This was against the wishes and assessment as to readiness by Gotse Delchev, the inspector general of the paramilitary units in the field (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008: 81–82). By accident or design, Delchev could not arrive in time to block this decision either in the January meeting or later in April (at another city) on the eve of the uprising. Citing Garvanov as the architect of the 1903 revolt, Perry (1986) suggests that his actions and decisions may have been part of a Bulgarian state conspiracy to defeat the IMRO so as to leave a vacuum and open ground for a Bulgarian military takeover of the Macedonian independence movement and turn it into one of annexation.

Young Turk Revolt. At this crucial juncture, a curious but parallel revolution occurred in 1908 to put an end to the insurgency as well as, momentarily, to immediate neighbor country machinations and intrigue to acquire Macedonian territory. The new revolt occurred within the Ottoman military (Lord Kinross, 1969). It also was centered in Macedonia.

The revolt was conceived and conducted by European educated, liberal-minded officers of the "Young Turk" movement that, starting back from 1889, was in process and development all along during the Macedonian insurgency with parallel levels of secrecy both within

the Officer Corps and from the ongoing Macedonian insurgency (Sonnichsen, 1909/2004: 120–121). In June 1908, the Young Turks, starting from their headquarters in Salonica, eventually reached Constantinople in July to overthrow the absolutist Ottoman Turkish government. Amazingly, the Young Turks were able to convince some insurgent Macedonian units they had encountered in the field to end their insurgency and, in a common effort, help them carry out a coup and takeover the government at Istanbul. Sonnichsen (1909/2004) himself in his memoirs, who by this time had returned to America, expressed high hopes toward a Socialist/Democratic liberalization of the empire; so did the Macedonians and the outside world. Moreover, it was Jane Sandanski and his Cheta, from the earlier Ilinden outbreak in the Pirin/Serres region, who now led the vanguard of the victorious, ethnically diverse, rebel Turkish forces into the capital (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

At the takeover, a new constitution and grandiose pronouncements to its citizens and to the world followed immediately promising amnesty to rebel units, reforms, internal liberation with emancipation and equal rights to all residents of the empire regardless of religion and ethnicity. Hitherto all were "subjects" of the Sultan. Now, they were declared "citizens" with equal rights regardless of religion or ethnicity. Although widely heralded, this emancipation was also short lived, a flash in the pan, due to internal dissensions among the Junta officers and the Young Turks having reverted back to already well-established practices and infrastructure to control the vast subject populations in the Ottoman Empire still spanning three continents (Lord Kinross, 1969).

Reasons for the Ilinden Failure. Many explanations for the failure of the Ilinden 1903 revolt and insurgency exist, and these can be found in the literature (e.g., Perry, 1988; Rossos, 2008; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008; Vakalopoulos, 1991). However, to confine the discussion to the relevant issue of the Macedonian ethnic identity, what is clear from the evidence is that there was in fact a Macedonia national/political identity finally coming out of the shadows operating openly now, accessible to all the Great Powers, with a well-organized shadow government and a planned course of action toward self-liberation from the Ottoman Turks. Needless to say, the revolt failed. Some of the reasons are not hard to find; for one, the forces arrayed against them were vastly superior. There were also the intrigues and military interventions through sponsored rebel bands to frustrate and defeat the IMRO Macedonians by the neighboring

countries. There was, as well, the policy of balanced interests by the Great Powers to maintain Ottoman Empire control of the Bosporus straights (Perry, 1993; Rossos 1991b). A more basic factor for the failure, however, and perhaps the fatal flaw that has not been cited hitherto is the politically inspired nominal assumption of a Bulgarian ethnic identity.

B. Impact of the Self-Perception of the Macedonians as Bulgarians on the Outcome of the Ilinden Uprising and Insurgency

Macedonians as Bulgarians in Resurgent/revolutionary Macedonia. During the revolutionary period, the Macedonian identity, as seen by the top IMRO hierarchy as well as by the international Great Power players, was a *Bulgarian* identity (Brown, 2003: 12–15; Danforth, 1995; Perry, 1988; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004). Documentation can be found even in the local rebel committee reports during the Ilinden uprising that refer to liberated Macedonian villages as "Bulgarian villages" to distinguish them from "Turkish," "Vlach," and "Moslem Albanian" villages in their midst (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008; Sonnichsen, 1909/1994). Moreover, this assessment of a "Bulgarian" identity was supported by A. J. Evans (1903: September 29, 2003) in his letter to the *Times* of London and by H. N. Brailsford's (1906/1971) post-Ilinden findings of an ephemeral Macedonian identity, now expressed as Bulgarian and Greek, in the four-way post-Ilinden insurgency conflict.

Was this, then, the fatal flaw? Could this have been the fundamental reason why outside help by the Great Powers did not come? Was this the reason why Macedonia was seen as a region but not as a nation waiting to emerge? Is this what gave license to Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria to unite their efforts and wrest Macedonia from the Ottomans and then partition her lands among the three? And, finally, was there a responsibility on the part of the Macedonians themselves to declare at this crucial juncture, by one means or another, that they were not Bulgarians, as they forcefully did later according to the Corfe report of 1923 (Rossos, 1994), the British Foreign Service Reports of 1926 (Rossos, 1994); and, more importantly, during World War II when they fought to rid themselves of Bulgarians and their heavy-handed wartime occupation. All these questions in need of answers are accessible to diligent historical research.

What is apparent and what is relevant to the issue of the Macedonian ethnic identity, however, is that the national Macedonian political identity was closely intertwined with a Bulgarian ethnic identity and

this was a self-contradiction and an inconsistent element in the drive to autonomy and independence (see Perry, 1992). There is also the well-established fact of the IMRO and Supremist ties before the Ilinden revolt but with IMRO and "Vrhovist" bands in the field at cross-purposes with different objectives, before, during, and even after the Ilinden uprising (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).[3] It was also never understood, unfortunately, that the assumption and tie to a "Bulgarian" ethnic identity was inconsistent with the sociocultural features of their society, except for language, as described earlier in chapter 6. Indeed, language, as it was a common practice of the day, was the only diagnostic sociocultural feature used to ascribe an ethnic identity to a sociopolitical group (Bracewell, 1991; see also Borza, 1990: 90–94). Accordingly, it tied them to a Bulgarian ethnic identity, not to what was needed, a unique Macedonian identity that, at the moment, was struggling for recognition and nationhood.

Underdeveloped Macedonian Ethnic Identity. In this early phase, national and ethnic identities were split; and, conceptually, were never linked to the cultural features of the Macedonian society that would have set them apart from the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek identities both for themselves and for the outside world. Thus, against the Postulates of the General Ethnicity model of chapter 10, two of the three necessary characteristics for an ethnic identity at this stage were not obviously present: a consistent name (requirement) [2]) and a tie to distinctive sociocultural features (requirement [3]) setting them apart from the Bulgarian identity. Their absence characterizes the underdeveloped or incompletely developed nature of the Macedonian ethnic identity during this early period (see also Rossos, 1995). Whether there was a covert underground Macedonian ethnic identity, perhaps in the masses, that could not be expressed as indicated by one of the responders in the Survey/Questionnaire (chapter 5) is another line for future investigation.[4] Thus, the first stage shows that only the first requirement was met; namely, the Macedonian ethnic identity acting as a national/political actor/agent productive and reactive to historical events.

In spite of the evidence and notwithstanding the emergence of a national/political Macedonian identity ready and willing to risk a revolution, the world did not see the Macedonians as Macedonians. In the absence of a conscious awareness of a distinctive Macedonian ethnic identity firmly tied to associated sociocultural features, Macedonia, thus, remained a region in the eyes of the world with multiple ethnic

identities with no clear-cut evidence of a legitimate claim to ownership by any one of the component ethnic groups. Given this understanding of the ethnological landscape by outside powers (which is the prevailing notion even today), Macedonia was not seen as a nation waiting to emerge from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire as were Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Therefore, the catastrophic failure of the Ilinden uprising and the subsequent insurgency in the drive for autonomy/independence could not be avoided; and, in the absence of outside help, the eventual dismemberment of Macedonia was one inevitable scenario.

Stage II. Quiescence, Devolution and Interwar Turn to International Terrorism

Introduction. The failure of the Young Turks to carry out liberalization and reform, the failure of the outside world to impose the much-needed reforms and the dissolution of the guerrilla forces in the field ushered in a brief period of uneasy quiescence. Importantly, these failed revolutionary struggles and disastrous consequences were now overtaken by the Balkan Wars, the Balkan Power defeat of the Ottomans in 1912/1913, by World War I, and subsequent partition.

The triggering forces, which led to the Balkan wars of "liberation" of 1912/1913 and to the partition that followed, have been detailed earlier in chapter 4. Here in postpartition Macedonia, the second stage, the evidence is examined both in the domain of political activism by the exiled IMRO organization expressed in the violent cross-border terrorism carried into Serbia/Yugoslavia, Greece, and the capitals of Europe; and, in the domain of reported self-descriptor evidence that emerged in the Serbian and Greek-occupied portions of Macedonia (Pribichevich, 1982; Rossos, 1994).

The turn to implacable terrorism in post–World War I interwar Macedonia was another inevitable scenario in response to Europe's turning her back on the Macedonian national identity and aspirations for autonomy and independence. By now, all the leaders of the Ilinden outbreak and insurgency were gone; the last of the group, Apostol Petkov to a cup of poison (1911) and Jane Sandanski to an assassin's bullet (1915). Remnant IMRO exiles, under a new postwar leadership (first under Todor Alexandrov and then under Ivan Mihailov), looked forward to a fresh start and modeled themselves on the urban guerrilla war of the protracted Irish struggle for Home Rule and independence that had just then succeeded (Rossos, 1994).

The unwillingness and inability of the Western Powers in post–World War I Paris peace conferences to even consider the issue of Macedonia as a nation waiting to emerge according to Wilson's 14 points had a profound impact on the Macedonians. The IMRO, in response, unleashed terrorist attacks on Balkan and Western Powers confined and limited to targeted political assassinations. By default they were also forced to turn to fascist and to radical Socialist/Communist underground movements to support their nationalist aims and aspirations (Poulton, 1995: 79–84; 2000: 79–85, 92–94).

A. Interwar Turn to Terrorism

Introduction. During the interwar period after the Balkan Wars and World War I, the exiled Macedonians in Bulgaria became entwined unavoidably with the intense postpartition terrorist activities of the right-wing IMRO operating out of the Pirin stronghold in western Bulgaria. Over 1,000 assassinations were carried out during this period in Yugoslavia alone (see Poulton, 2000: 92–94),[5] capped by the assassination of the Yugoslavian king, Alexander, at Marseille in 1934 (Graham, 1939; Hoptner, 1963).[6] In Bulgaria, one prime minister (Stambolinski) and one general (Protogerov) were assassinated in the same period besides the countless fratricidal/internecine political assassinations within Bulgaria and outside, in European capitals (Newman, 1945; Poulton, 1995; 2000).

Understandably, what was not obvious then, but, is obvious now, is that these terrorist activities relegated the Macedonian drive to autonomy and liberation to illegitimacy, to subterranean channels and secret alliances with Ustashe underground rebels in Croatia and secret operatives of Mussolini's Fascist Italy and Hungary on the right; and, on the left, to Comintern intrigues of the Soviet Union by the more peaceful IMRO-united left wing (Poulton, 1995). In this way, the legitimacy, which the leaders of the IMRO Ilinden insurgency had so fervently sought, was lost. Fortunately, this right-wing turn to implacable terror came to an abrupt end in 1934 with Bulgaria's dissolution of the IMRO and the external exile of Ivan Mihailov, the architect of the intensified terrorist assassinations. On the left wing, however, the intrigues and machinations with the Comintern continued well into World War II and beyond (Drezov, 2001: Rossos, 1995). In this way, the Macedonian national/political identity as well as the Macedonian ethnic identity became tainted and compromised by terrorism and subversion with a consequent/catastrophic loss of legitimacy for their aspirations to autonomy/independence.[7]

Thus, the right-wing IMRO turn to terrorism was defeated and retreated into the shadows as another lost cause failing to achieve Macedonian nationhood. Remnants of this movement continue to exist in America and Canada in the formerly powerful Macedonian Political Organization (MPO).

B. Emergence of an Unhyphenated Macedonian Ethnic Identity

In the meantime and in another turn of events contemporaneous with the turn to implacable terrorism, the Paris Peace Conference–sanctioned partition did not find acceptance in Serb-held and Greek-held Macedonia. British Foreign Office observer reports on the scene by consulate staff members and by specialized visits by the Foreign Office confirm that the Macedonian population in the partitioned areas would not accept their status as "Old Serbs" or as "Slavophone Greeks" (Rossos, 1994). This surprising hard fact on the ground following the partition that was intended as the final solution to the Macedonian Question, bedeviled the British Foreign Office to the extent of asking the exasperated question "Who are these Macedonian Slavs" (374). The phrase itself betrays tacit acknowledgment of the possibility, not readily perceived, that they, the Macedonians, perhaps, may not be Macedonian Slavs at all. If they were Slavs, they might have had a Slav name for themselves like the Serbs and Bulgars.

In whatever way the question about their ethnic identity was asked, and on every occasions it was asked, there was, in both the Vardar and Aegean parts of Macedonia, an explicit unhyphenated answer: "Macedonian." This rather startling result according to the reports of R. A. Gallop (Belgrade Legation third secretary) and that of O. C. Harvey of the Foreign Office following onsite (1926) visits to the Vardar (Serb) and Aegean (Greek) regions persuaded the British Foreign Office, prior to World War II, to finally accept the idea of a separate Macedonian ethnic identity. However, given the outbreak of hostilities soon after in World War II and the search for allies in the Balkans overshadowed any consideration of a follow-up political action (Rossos, 1994).

C. Origin of the Unhyphenated Macedonian Ethnic Identity

The display of a clear-cut but undefined Macedonian ethnic identity that apparently emerged in the masses in the interwar years, to be expressed openly in spite of repressive measures by each occupier, is quite unexpected. It has no continuity with the earlier tie to the

Bulgarian ethnic identity in the Ilinden and post-Ilinden periods; nor, to the pre-Ilinden *nie, nas, nashesism* nebulous identity reported by Rossos (1995). Whether it existed covertly but could not be expressed due to a "sshsh" factor, or, less likely, whether it was a self-discovery following the end of Ottoman rule, are also questions with no clear-cut answers but in need of reliable research. In any case, it can be said with a high degree of certainty that it could not have come from the intelligentsia that led the Ilinden uprising and subsequent insurgency. Brown (2003: 12) presents some evidence that it did exist in the masses during this early twentieth-century decade as he cites a firsthand account by a participant in the Krushevo (1903) rebellion. The native participant used the phrase, "Macedonians and Vlachs," to describe the Krushevo participants in the revolt rather than "Bulgarians and Vlachs" the actual phrase used by an on-the-spot English journalist reporting directly from Krushevo. While suggestive, this unhyphenated Macedonian self-identity designation by the native participant is compromised by the fact that the account was written in 1952 long after the original event when it might have been a "politically correct" phrasing.

The British Foreign Office reports, taken together with the Corfe report (Rossos, 1994) to the League of Nations at about the same period documenting an expression of a distinctive unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity as well as Capt. P. H. Evans' secret report in 1944 indicate that a fusion had taken place over a 20-year period between the national/political identity expressed in the Ilinden insurgency with that of a unique but, as yet, undefined Macedonian ethnic identity. This was a much-needed step, but, perhaps, a step too late to have had an impact on the Balkan and European political decisions regarding Macedonia. The partition had already taken place and the Paris Peace Conferences imposed it with an unexpected degree of finality.

D. Interwar Intelligentsia and Turn to Peaceful Evolutionary Means to Nationhood

Introduction. The younger, post-Ilinden Macedonian intelligentsia, not tied to the IMRO, including the masses, looked to more peaceful means in achieving their nationalistic aspirations (Poulton, 1995; Rossos, 1995). These elements of the Macedonian society sought refuge and salvation in the ranks of the cosmopolitan Communist international movement as had the left-wing IMRO in the same period. Thus, in the only post–World War I free elections, they and the mass

population voted in disproportionate numbers for Communist Party candidates in Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria (Rossos, 1995; Poulton, 1995).

Alliance with Socialist/Communist Underground Movements. Notwithstanding the signed League of Nations agreements about minority rights, the repressive acculturation practices of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria made it obvious to these Macedonians that the West had abandoned them. They were forced to look to the East, to the Soviet Union, that had at least recognized them as a separate ethnic group seeking nationhood (Poulton, 2000: 94; Rossos, 1995). The Macedonians, in one of the infrequent clandestine international Communist meetings held in the Balkan countries, proposed a solution to their nationhood aspirations by seeking to become a component member of an envisioned Balkan federation comprising Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Greek Communists rejected the idea of including Greece into the federation—Kofos, 1995). This proposal was consistent with a deemphasis on nationalistic aspirations and quite in spirit with the Communist internationalist proletariat outlook (Poulton, 1995). However, and in the meantime, the fusion of the national identity with the ethnic identity of the Macedonians, which had just now become stabilized, was jeopardized by a new factor in the nonactivist general population.

Reemergence of a Hyphenated Ethnic Identity. In interpreting the nature of their ethnic identity, the new Macedonian intelligentsia, once again, and once more, opted for a hyphenated Slav-Macedonian identity. More than likely, it was based on the linguistic criterion of their Slav Macedonian language (see Bracewell, 1991). Misirkov (1903) had already anticipated this development earlier, but his work was suppressed and the Slav-Macedonian identity in the interwar intelligentsia came into being all on its own, quite independently, and continues to persist to the present day in Vardar Macedonia (see survey results in chapter 5). Indeed, following World War II, the Harvard Slavicist, Horace G. Lunt (1952; 1986), helped codify the grammar of the Macedonian language and highlighted it as a pillar of a distinctive Slav-Macedonian ethnic identity. At the time, no one could anticipate what problems this Slav- Macedonian ethnic identity self-designation would bring in achieving international recognition when Macedonia finally became independent in 1991. The current as yet unresolved "name" issue with Greece is just one example (Kofos, 1999: 238–249; see also Shea, 1997).

Stage III. World War II and Postwar Developments Leading to Independence

Introduction. The entry of Germany into the Balkans in World War II was due to two incidental factors: the Italian defeat in Albania in 1941 and the abrogation of German-Yugoslav agreements by Yugoslavia in March of that same year. Its impact, however, was to delay the planned invasion and conquest of the Soviet Union from May to June of 1941, a delay that cost the German army the capture of Moscow. Hitler had not wanted to invade Greece or to be entangled in the Balkans with large troop commitments just when the planned invasion into the Soviet Union was about to begin (Kroener et al., 2003; Mazower, 1993: 15).

Earlier, on the eve of World War II, Italy had occupied Albania in April of 1939 as part of Mussolini's Grand Illusion to recapture past glories of the Roman Empire; especially, as Albania was a major recruiting ground for Roman Legionnaires and now an entry into the Balkans. Libya and Ethiopia in Africa as well as the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea were already part of the empire. After the fall of France in May of 1940, emboldened Italy sought to expand its control of the Eastern Mediterranean by a planned invasion/occupation of Greece modeled on the earlier successful Albanian occupation (Iatrides and Wrigley, 1995). As a member of the Tripartite Pact and in the wake of the victorious German and Japanese armies in Europe and Asia, Italy unilaterally targeted Greece as the next Axis Power conquest. On October 28, 1940, the Italian ambassador personally delivered an ultimatum at 2:50 am to the Greek prime minister, Ioannis Metaxas, at his home, giving Greece three hours to allow Italian troops to cross the Epirus/Albanian frontier and occupy strategic areas in Western Greece (Averoff-Tosizza, 1978; Iatrides, 1980: 234). Three hours had already almost passed between receipt of the coded message, translation, and delivery of the ultimatum. Thus, the astonished Greek PM could only reply with, "Alors, C'est la Guerre."

In the face of stunning German victories in France and the low countries, Greece had made strenuous efforts to remain neutral. Nonetheless, impatient Mussolini tipped his intentions for war by a lightly disguised submarine torpedo attack on a Greek cruiser anchored at an island just off the Peloponnesian coast, sinking it with loss of life aboard and damage to the docks on land on August 15, 1940. This was a major religious holiday, the feast of the Assumption, and the timing could not have been worse (Iatrides, 1980: 214). This

unprovoked incident as well as the occupation of Albania in the previous year prompted the Metaxas government to carry out a rapid mobilization of reservists (officers) and a detailed defensive preparation along the Epirus border with Albania where the major thrust of the attack was expected.

A. Italian Invasion and Defeat

When the expected attack did come, to everyone's surprise, but most of all to Mussolini, the Italian army following some initial successes on the Epirus front was stopped cold and turned back. The invasion of Greece now reversed itself and turned into an unplanned invasion of Southern Albania in pursuit of the retreating Italian army during the winter of 1940–1941 (Stefanidis, 1993).

B. German Entry into the Balkans

Background. At the time of the attack, the Metaxas government (1936–1941) was a fascist dictatorship modeled on the Italian template but without a fascist political party. It did include, however, a youth corps with virtually identical uniforms and symbols as the Italian counterpart.[8] In the authoritarian rightist political environment, which prevailed at the time, there were many who were sympathetic to the German side. Thus, both the military as well as the Greek government exerted maximum political effort to keep Germany out of the Balkans in spite of the ongoing war with Italy (Mazower, 1993: 15–16). Surely, Greece could not hope to win a two-front war on its northern borders especially against German forces even with the promised British help from North Africa (Gerolymatos, 2004; Iatrides, 1995). However, the defeat of the Italian army in Albania and the sudden coup by the Yugoslav military behind Crown Prince Peter and the immediate suspension of the alliance with Germany upset the balance in this Southeastern European region (Kroener et al., 2003).

Alliances had been made previously with Rumania and Bulgaria, besides Yugoslavia. A maddened Hitler, unwilling to renegotiate, issued Directive No. 23, calling for the complete destruction of Yugoslavia and invasion of Greece to extricate his Italian partner from an embarrassing defeat (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). A decade of war, devastation, resistance, and civil war began for Greece; but, for the Macedonians in the Vardar Yugoslav region at least, World War II led to nationhood and eventual independence.

Occupation and Resistance. With the conquest accomplished rapidly and efficiently, Germany, in order to conserve needless troop deployment, allowed her allies to occupy parts of Greece and Yugoslavia. Italy occupied most of Greece and Croatia while Bulgaria occupied Vardar Macedonia including Aegean Macedonia east of Salonica. Central and part of Western Macedonia were strategically important corridors and kept under German control as well as eastern Thrace bordering on Turkey, Crete, some Aegean islands, and, importantly, Athens and its port Piraeus (Kroener et al., 2003; Mazower, 1993: 21). For Bulgaria, the occupation of Macedonia was a fulfillment of a long cherished dream of uniting Macedonia with Bulgaria; a dream that went back to the formation of the modern Bulgarian state in 1876 (Perry, 1988; 1993); a dream based on past glories of the once great Middle Age Bulgarian Empire in the Balkans that included Macedonia. In any case, it was the Bulgarian counterpart to Venizelos' "Megali Ithea" with respect to Macedonia.[9]

C. Resurgence of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

From the start, the occupation of Vardar and Eastern Macedonia proceeded along repressive "Bulgarization" policies to homogeneously incorporate the Slav-speaking population, they considered their own, into a Greater Bulgaria (Bulgaria annexed Vardar Macedonia in 1941). Unfortunately, as on many occasions before, the Vardar Macedonians would not accept such acculturation and saw it as being no different from the previous Serbian/Yugoslavian policies to turn them into "Old Serbs." In this way, the first step toward resistance was decided upon. The Macedonians, who by now saw themselves as Slav-Macedonians, could not, ever again, accept being "Bulgarian-Macedonians;" although, some did.

As early as October 11, 1941, a small native Macedonian unit, inspired perhaps by the dreaded interwar IMRO terrorist/guerrilla organization, about a hundred in number, carried out the first organized resistance to the Axis Power occupation in the Balkans. They were wiped out to a man by the Bulgarian Police unit they sought to ambush.

After a year of occupation by Bulgaria, the Vardar Macedonians began to organize themselves systematically to confront the by-now heavy-handed Bulgarian annexation/occupation (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008: 165). This new more organized resistance force (with distinctive British-supplied uniforms) fared no better against the

Bulgarians. They were massacred by the German-trained Bulgarian army (probably betrayed by their own Macedonian collaborators). Surviving people fled through the porous border to the south into Aegean Macedonia, that is, into the Florina/Castoria provinces of Greece. Ironically enough, here they joined the Bulgarian-sponsored Cheta units, remnants of aging former IMRO members (Comitadjis) to provide protection from the hated Greek security forces of the Greek police now cooperating with the Italian and German occupiers (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). As described in more detail in chapter 4, these units may have sensitized the local population to their Macedonian ethnic identity and aspiration for one Macedonia. They were eventually attacked and driven back into Yugoslavia by the powerful EAM/ELAS Communist-led resistance (1944) that included a disproportionate number of Macedonian recruits baited by promises of postwar equality and fair treatment.

D. Emergence of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia

Back across the border in Yugoslavia, large-scale organized resistance was already being formed into Slav-Macedonian partisan units by the now newly formed independent Macedonian Communist Party, which, following the liberation of Macedonia, would join Marshall Josip Broz Tito's Communist-led partisan war against Italian and German armed forces in Central and Western Yugoslavia. Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Tito's representative, would recruit/integrate these units into Tito's partisan army. The Macedonian partisan units were welcomed as they had no divided loyalties, unlike the Croat and Serbian partisan units within Tito's ranks.

Croatia was by then an independent Ustashe puppet state led by Ante Pavelich, the same Pavelich, who had well-established connections with prewar Ivan Mihailov's IMRO terrorist wing of the interwar Macedonian exiles in Bulgaria (but now provided a refuge for Mihailov in his puppet state). In SE Yugoslavia, in Serbia, the resistance forces, until the end, were dominated by Royalist Chetnik bands under a former Yugoslav army general loyal to the Yugoslav government in exile in London. Drazha Mihailovich toward the end allied himself or, at least, passively cooperated with the German occupation forces to oppose Tito's Communist-led forces and lost his life, as well, in the inevitable postwar treason trial (Dedijer, 1953; MacLean, 1957).

E. Yugoslav Partisan War and the Collapse of the Axis Powers in the Balkans

In a complex partisan guerrilla war in mountainous Central and Western Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945, the cosmopolitan international Communist Josip Broz Tito, with a veteran cadre from the Spanish Civil War, with his multiethnic partisans, attacked, eluded, and survived at least seven German or German-led counterinsurgency operations. According to a *Wikipedia* free encyclopedia report on the seventh and last antipartisan drive, the *Raid on Drvar* (i.e., on the hills overlooking Drvar, a small Bosnian town), Otto Skorzeny (the top specialist in special force Commando raids) planned (but did not lead) a selective airborne commando strike at Tito's headquarters aimed at decapitating the partisan leadership at the top in May–June of 1944. Waffen SS special units in a parachute and glider attack were successful in penetrating the lightly defended Tito's headquarters but Tito had already escaped according to well-conceived and executed contingency escape plan. Importantly, Randolph Churchill (son of Winston Churchill) with a liaison group of British officers including Evelyn Waugh (the famous novelist) were with Tito in his headquarters at the time of the attack but were able to escape by a prearranged train ride to the Adriatic West Coast. There, they, along with Tito and staff, were picked up and subsequently hosted and feted aboard the British destroyer, *HMS Blackmore,* that same evening (advance intelligence information on both sides had provided enough intelligence that helped/hindered the attack).

It is this critical support role by the British that, perhaps, had saved Tito from subsequent capture and may have ultimately decided the fate of the subsequent visionary drive toward a unified/autonomous postwar Macedonia as advocated by Cento and his group during the critical period between 1944 and 1948. There is no doubt that the powerful Yugoslav partisan army at the time could have achieved this goal. However, Tito and his loyal Macedonian follower/supporter, Kolishevski, blocked this early attempt at a unified Macedonia that would have involved the Aegean or Greek part of Macedonia and a major territorial compromise of the postwar Greek state. Earlier in October 1944, the Churchill/Stalin agreement had guaranteed Greek state integrity within a British sphere of influence. Tito—perhaps, keenly aware of this previous arrangement—was reluctant to go against Churchill and the British as well as against Stalin in a risky adventurous territorial aggrandizement in support of the Macedonians.

As the Germans retreated from the Balkans in September/October of 1944 to face oncoming forces of the Russian army in Romania approaching Hungary and Romania, Tito's partisans were able to liberate almost all of Yugoslavia before the Russian armed forces could reach her borders (Tito kept the Russian army from entering Yugoslavia) (Dedijer, 1953; MacLean, 1957; Vukmanovic-Tempo, 1990)

F. Macedonia Becomes a Nation

In his vision of postwar Yugoslavia, Tito looked to the Soviet Union and its federated system of Republics to institute a similar type of political arrangement for ethnically diverse Yugoslavia (Dedijer, 1953). This fortuitous development allowed the Macedonian partisans to form their own Socialist Republic of Macedonia in August 2, 1944, to bring to reality the 50-year-old dream of a Macedonian nation without help from outside powers (Poulton, 2001: 106). Thus, a semi-autonomous Macedonian republic came to be within the Federated Republics of Yugoslavia in 1944 that, after several name changes, became officially known as the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (from 1966 to 1991). It now had its own flag and symbols of power, with rapid economic industrialization within a closed centralized Yugoslav economy.

This led to some special problems: (1) standardization of the Macedonian language as an independent language from the Serbian and Bulgarian languages; (2) establishment of historical origins of the Slav-Macedonian identity, seen as a fusion of sixth/seventh century AD incoming Slav tribes with native Macedonian population (Drezov, 2001: 55; see also Kitromilides, 1989); and (3) establishment of an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church (finally achieved in 1967) with historical roots in the Middle Age Bishopric of Ohrid. All these critical steps described earlier in chapters 2 and 4 were aimed at providing a basis for a legitimate Slav-Macedonian ethnic identity. Of course, both Greece and Bulgaria challenged some of the historical and religious claims but as long as Macedonia remained part of Yugoslavia, claims and counterclaims remained controlled in the face of a powerful postwar Yugoslav army.

Following the Tito/Stalin split in 1948, four years later, Tito normalized his relations with Greece and defused many of these issues. After Tito's death in 1980, the deterioration of Yugoslavia began in a downward spiral as Serbia tried once again to gain a dominant influence on political and economic sectors of the federal republic. Already the Yugoslav army was controlled at the top by Serbian army

officers and they and the Serbian Republic president, Milosevich, plunged Serbia into wars of secession with Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cowan, 2000; Daskalovski, 2006; Udovicky, 1997: x).

G. Macedonia Realizes the Dream of Nationhood and Independence

As Yugoslavia disintegrated, Macedonia declared its independence in September 9, 1991. Immediately, however, disputes, claims, and counterclaims with neighboring countries (except Serbia) flared up with vengeance. The question of "Who the Macedonians Are" boomeranged into an unsolvable dilemma for the Vardar Macedonians because the international community would not recognize them with their constitutional name Republic of Macedonia. As Macedonia sought membership in the United Nations Organization, a compromise name was agreed upon and it has remained since 1993 as its official name: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

H. Problematic International Recognition and Challenge by Greece

Bulgaria and Turkey quickly recognized the new state. The Western European Community, however, hesitated in deference to Greek claims of an infringement on the name "Macedonia," which they sought to convince the world as being Greek property (Shea, 1997). What has yet to be understood is that this dispute about their self-chosen name is unsolvable as there is no logical contact between the one side and the other side in their respective claims and counterclaims. Specifically, the Greek government argues that the word "Macedonia" cannot be a part of an acceptable name for the FYROM. Its people are descendants of Slav settlers coming into Macedonia during the sixth/seventh centuries AD. They have no claim or relation to Macedonia and Macedonians of antiquity. Accordingly, they have no legitimate claim to the name "Macedonia" (historically based argument).

The counterposed argument by FYROM is that every new and emergent nation has the right to choose a name according to UN Charter and international protocol (argument based on cognitive self-descriptor evidence). One argument is a material statement testable against historical documentation as being true or false; while the other is an emotive (subjective/idiographic) statement regarding a group's choice of a name for an ethnic self-identity with no

truth value. It is a fact indicative of a choice or desire as to what is a proper name. Thus, there is no logical contact between these two arguments and, therefore, there can be no impact of one upon the other. Understandably, the "name" issue has remained stalemated since 1991, notwithstanding years of mediation (note the latest unsuccessful November 3, 2007, UN mediated effort and others that followed since). What the Macedonians needed, but did not have available to counter the Greek argument, is evidence for an unhyphenated non-Slav Macedonian identity based on Curta's (2001) findings and on their own distinctive non-Slav sociocultural characteristic features.

I. Untoward Developments in Aegean Macedonia

During the same World War II and postwar period, the fate of the Aegean Macedonians took a turn in exactly the opposite direction. The inaptness of the Communist-led resistance EAM/ELAS movement in attempts to share political power with the Greek government in exile when in fact their armed forces, as in Yugoslavia, could have seized power, but did not, doomed their efforts (Iatrides, 1995: 8). Following their defeat in the battle for Athens (1944–1945) and their decision to disarm with no guarantees for sharing power led to suppression and "white terror" by the British-dominated interim rightist government. Most heavily, it fell on the Macedonians (Gerolymatos, 2004; Iatrides, 1995; Rossos, 2008).

The resurgent Communist Left that followed in the civil war of 1946–1949, shored up by an equal level of inaptness, worsened by the Tito/Stalin split of 1948 when the Greek Communist leadership sided with Stalin (due to potential loss of Macedonia) went down in defeat, unavoidably (Averoff-Tosizza, 1978; Kofos, 1995). This defeat condemned the Macedonian remnants of the democratic army of Greece into permanent exile in Eastern Europe but mostly into the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and to a consequent loss of dreams for one united Macedonia (Rossos, 1997). This, in effect, second round of ethnic cleansing further denuded Aegean Macedonia of Macedonians (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008: 180). They were never to return to their lost villages and lands. Properties were seized, citizenship revoked, while wartime comrades from other parts of Greece were allowed eventually to return to their homes, families, and villages (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). Simultaneously, the fate of the Macedonians remaining in Greece worsened with the civil war defeat (see note 5 of chapter 4).

J. Quiescent Pirin Macedonia

The Macedonians of the Pirin region of Bulgaria did not suffer the devastation and dislocation of the Vardar and Aegean Macedonians. Bulgaria in some ways stayed on the sidelines in World War II except for the occupation of Vardar and Eastern Macedonia (abandoned on the advice of the Russian army in 1944) (Stefanidis, 1993: 74–75; Kofos, 1995). With the approach and entry of the Russian army into Bulgaria in 1944–1945, the Bulgarian Communist Party took over the reins of government and Bulgaria became a Communist state. Nationalist aims and expressions of such aspirations were now muted and remained in the background under the banner of proletarian egalitarianism (with the minor exception from 1944 to 1948). Currently, in today's post-Communist democratic Bulgaria, the Macedonians are struggling to be recognized as an ethnic minority without success (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

World War II and the defeat of the Axis Powers presented an unprecedented opportunity for the Macedonians within the Communist ranks of each country following their successful resistance to Axis Power in the Vardar and Aegean regions of Macedonia. There was a glimmer of hope that Macedonia might emerge as a nation united and independent according to the Atlantic Charter principles. However, the prewar national states of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria even within Socialist/Communist ranks would never allow an independent Macedonian state (the guiding vision of the revolutionary struggle in the first decade). Importantly, the Macedonians in the Socialist Communist ranks were never able to gain sufficient political power at a high enough level to force unification at the crucial point of dissolution of each of these Balkan states. The singular attempt by Cento and followers at the end of World War II was vetoed by Tito and the Communist-led federal Yugoslav state. Instead, a differential outcome for each region emerged dictated by local national interests of postwar Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. The particular internal political factors in each country played a dominant role and only a final accidental factor, namely, the break-up of Yugoslavia as a nation state allowed the Vardar Republic of Macedonia to emerge as an independent nation state in 1991 with a reluctant agreement to EU-imposed prerequisite of recognized stable borders with Greece and Bulgaria. By then, Aegean Macedonia had a radically changed population; inundated as it was in 1923 by more than 500,000 refugees from Asia Minor, by the 1926 population exchanges with Bulgaria, and later by the expulsion of the Macedonian partisan fighters in the Greek civil war.

Aegean Macedonia now was no longer Macedonia but Northern Greece. Similarly, the Pirin Macedonians became acculturated and submerged into a Bulgarian ethnic identity. Pirin Macedonia, as in Greece, was no longer Macedonia but West Bulgaria. Dissidents in both regions continue to struggle for recognition, without success, as legitimate Macedonian ethnic minorities.

Part 2: Integration and Evaluation of Historical, Cognitive Self-Report, and Sociocultural Sources of Evidence for a Unitary, Non-Slav Macedonian Identity and General Conclusions

Introduction

Given that the expression of the Macedonian identity, either or both as a national/political identity or as an ethnic identity, has shown a roller-coaster profile, "now you see it, now you don't" levels of existence at all stages of development, accordingly, the integrated evidence from the different domains is now integrated across stage as well. This renewed presentation of the evidence is occasioned by the fact that the evidence itself is from disparate domains with no conceptual links to tie them and no continuity across the three stages. Moreover, the General Ethnicity Model postulates of chapter 10 can provide little help here. The model has no conceptual categories for achieving linkage in this circumstance of logically independent domains of evidence except by a process of within domain elimination of alternative interpretations of critical evidence as described in chapter 3 and in Postulate 10 of chapter 10. However, the model has a minimalist weighting system to downgrade or upgrade the importance of specific evidential material drawn from the different source domains.

The discontinuity across stages (i.e., the second problem), when the Macedonian struggle at each stage becomes transformed into a new alternative approach to nationhood, at this point, across-stage continuity in the narrative needs, nonetheless, to be reestablished. The emphasis in this section is on the connecting strands that have sustained the Macedonian struggle to nationhood across the discontinuous stages.

The in/out nature of each aspect of the Macedonian identity shows new components emerging while others of the past fade into obscurity. This scenario is repeated in the next stage with a new set

of component elements. The thread is not continuous from stage to stage and an explanation is needed at each transition point in order to bring about an understanding of the facts on the ground in the interpretative narrative. At the end, general statements are made and stated as provisional conclusions/hypotheses contingent upon future resolution of identified unresolved problems of interpretation of specified critical evidence that is needed for an adequate conceptualization of the Macedonian ethnic identity, or more concretely, for an answer to the question "Who are the Macedonians." The presentation of these unresolved interpretative problems is left for the next chapter, chapter 9, where the unresolved interpretative problems are reconceptualized as "Problems in Development of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity."

A. Bifurcation of the National/Political Identity from the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

What at once is immediately remarkable relative to the first stage is the bifurcation of the Macedonian national/political identity from the Macedonian ethnic identity. When measured against the necessary characteristic of being an actor/agent productive of historical events/developments, and, on the receiving end, being acted upon, the evidence from chapter 4 and in part 1 of the present chapter showing a cumulative well-organized gathering of forces aimed at a revolutionary strike against the Ottoman Empire plus its continuance after the Ilinden uprising from 1903 to 1908 argues that there was indeed a Macedonian national/political identity at this period of the struggle.

Against this evidence of hard facts on the ground, the great puzzle and mystery is, why not even one nation in Europe would come to aid the Macedonians and actively intervene as it happened for Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria? This is the same question raised in chapter 2 and in this chapter earlier: why not in Macedonia? Even a minor state like Albania undergoing similar revolutionary struggle against the Ottoman Empire in this same period succeeded with the help of Austria and Italy. Why not Macedonia? By answering this question, one will be able to see what obvious and not so obvious characteristic features of the Macedonian identity played a role or failed to play a role. As already indicated, the critical underlying factor for the failure may have been the bifurcation of the Macedonian national/political identity from the Macedonian ethnic identity, which was seen by both the native intelligentsia and the outside powers as being "Bulgarian" (Anastasoff, 1945; Sonnichsen, 1909/2004).

External Balkan Power Opposition Policies and Intervention. Taking advantage of the bifurcation and inconsistency in the Macedonian identity, the neighboring Balkan states conspired to carve up Macedonia (Shashko, 1995). The unclear/undeclared nature of the Macedonian ethnic identity (Brailsford, 1906/1971) was used opportunistically to redefine the Macedonians as "Old Serbs, "Bulgarians," or "Bulgarophone Greeks" and to eventually partition Macedonia. The echoes of this confusion of the national/political identity versus the ethnic identity can still be felt even now in another century, as evidenced by Danforth's (1995) documentation of a dual Macedonian ethnic identity: one calling itself "Greek-Macedonian"; and, the other, "Slav-Macedonian" (see chapter 5).

The difference between the successful Albanian example as well as the earlier Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian struggles is that in these instances there were no bifurcations of the national/political versus the ethnic identity. In the Greek struggle for independence, the bifurcation was suppressed by Phanariote Pan-Hellenism. Ethnically, the revolutionaries were in the majority Christian Albanians many of whom had served with Ali Pasha of Tepeleni and might, otherwise, have opted for a "Greater Albania" (Brewer, 2001). However, they were not Moslems; they were Greek Orthodox and, therefore, Greek. In contrast, against the declared Bulgarian ethnic identity in the Macedonian leadership and in the absence of a challenge from the mass population to this outside labeling made even worse by the fact that the IMRO was perceived as an agent of the Bulgarian state (e.g., Brailsford, 1906/1971; Vakalopoulos, 1991), the evidence, taken together, is ambivalent and offers no substantial support for a unique Macedonian identity, anchored to a historical past, waiting to emerge as a nation. Thus, the evidence in support of the second requirement, a consistent name, is wanting or vague at best.

B. Sociocultural Evidence for a Macedonian Ethnic Identity

While the evidence cited above leads to a conclusion of ambivalence regarding the Macedonian identity, now seen as Macedonian, now seen as Bulgarian, the evidence from the sociocultural domain, except for language, was/is consistent and would point to a unique non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity, had it been taken into account. It was never referred to or even examined for its impact on the issue of ethnic identity. Moreover, Curta's (2001) subsequent finding of the sixth/seventh-century inundation of the Balkans (including Macedonia) by incoming Slavic tribes north of the Danube as being an invention of

nineteenth-century European historians is consistent with a non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity that can be found when one looks at the present sociocultural features of the Macedonian society (described in detail in chapter 6).

Sociocultural Features as the Basis for Differentiation of the Macedonian from the Bulgarian Ethnic Identity. Given that the Macedonians in the resurgent/revolutionary stage did differentiate themselves from the Bulgarians in terms of their national/political identity, a question that immediately comes to mind is, what was the basis for this differentiation? Could their sociocultural features have operated in the background, unconsciously perhaps, to provide a basis for this differentiation against what appears to be an inconsistent combination of a Macedonian national/political identity with a perceived Bulgarian ethnic identity? Nonetheless, sociocultural sources of evidence were not considered because language at the time was the only generally accepted sociocultural measure of ethnicity and it tilted them toward a Bulgarian ethnic identity (e.g., Evans, 1903).

Unintended Consequences. The inability of the Macedonians to assert a separate Macedonian ethnic identity may have cost them the struggle for nationhood at this early phase. That the Macedonians even now cannot assert a separate, unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity, given their self-proclaimed Slav-Macedonian identity, seen by many, if not by all, as a South-Slav identity, not only raises questions internationally about a proper name for the new state, but it also threatened survival following the declaration of independence in 1991. It certainly delayed recognition of Macedonia by its chosen name "Republic of Macedonia," by the majority of nations in the world community until 2007. Even so, with all that has been accomplished hitherto in the arena of international relations, the Macedonians are, according to one recent analysis, "walking on the edge" (Daskalovski, 2006; Liotta and Jebb, 2003).

C. Foreign Observer Reports of a Self-Designation as Macedonians, Not as Bulgars or Greeks

The foreign observer reports by Corfe (1923) (see Rossos, 1994; 1995) and those of the British Foreign Service in this post–World War I period (Rossos, 1994) show that, mysteriously, an unhyphenated Macedonian identity had emerged in the mass population, if not in the intelligentsia. However, exiled IMRO remnants in their Pirin mountain stronghold still saw themselves as "Bulgarians" as stated in great detail by Anastasoff (1945) and by Ivan Mihailov in a statement

to a Macedonian journalist Boris Vishinski (2001), openly declaring himself to be a "Bulgarian from Macedonia." Thus, although in the mass population the national/political and the unhyphenated ethnic identity self-label had merged and the two components were fused into a consistency, nonetheless, it was an isolated separate development from the IMRO terrorist/activist part of the exile population in Bulgaria. Quickly, however, the IMRO activist endeavors in the Balkans and their transatlantic diaspora supporters in the America, Canada, and Australia fell back into the shadows after the dissolution of the IMRO in 1934—never again to emerge as an influential force (Nedeva and Kaytchef, 2001: 68).

D. New Bifurcation

During the interwar period a new complication emerged, that is, a new bifurcation had taken place. This time it was the separation between the left-oriented mass population and intelligentsia from the extremist right-wing IMRO and their transatlantic diaspora supporters in America and Canada. This development once more clouds any intelligible interpretation of "Who the Macedonians Are." Furthermore, it demonstrates again the in/out nature of the Macedonian identity and the problem of maintaining a continuous interpretive thread connecting local explanations. At the same time, a drive toward legitimacy, apart from the IMRO, resurfaced in these interwar years in the younger Macedonian intelligentsia in all three partitioned regions of Macedonia; most actively in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria that by default was allied and affiliated with the Socialist/Communist parties in their respective countries (Poulton, 1995). These leftist Socialist/Communist parties were underground political movements in the Yugoslav and Bulgarian populations whose opportunity to seize power and attain legitimacy would come only with the German conquest of the Balkans in World War II.

E. Impact of the German Entry into the Balkans and the Emergence of the Macedonian Nation

With the German entry into the Balkans in World War II, an opportunity was provided to the Vardar, Aegean, and Pirin Macedonian activists and intelligentsia allied to underground leftist Communist movements, to gain legitimacy and/or autonomy and independence. However, the wartime resistance movements that followed, and the means and mechanism toward these goals evolved into totally different outcomes in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, the host countries, and success was achieved only in Yugoslavia.

Differential Outcomes. For the Vardar Macedonians, the large-scale active participation in Tito's ethnically diverse partisan army was a path to nationhood as an autonomous, or more accurately, as a semi-autonomous republic from 1944 to 1991 and then as an independent nation since. For the Aegean Macedonians, however, these same dreams to nationhood for one united Macedonia with the Vardar Macedonian republic ended without fruit as the Communist leadership of the democratic of army of Greece gave the Macedonians equivocal Delphic oracle promises that would never be kept (Rossos, 1997). Their drive for power and legitimacy disintegrated in 1949 and led to another round of ethnic cleansing.

The Pirin Macedonians, following the dissolution of the IMRO in 1934, entered a period of quiescence in the interwar years and World War II. In the post–World War II Communist era, Bulgaria never recognized the Macedonians as a separate ethnic identity (except for a few exceptions), maintaining that they are of a Bulgarian ethnicity. Accordingly, Pirin Macedonia became West Bulgaria and the word "Macedonia" drops out altogether. The coming to power of the Bulgarian Communist party did not prove to be a path to liberation as it was for the Macedonians in Yugoslavia. However, an integration with Vardar (Yugoslav) Macedonia was briefly attempted in 1945 but failed as a consequence of the Tito/Stalin split in 1948 (Nedeva and Kaytchef, 2001). Subsequently, in the post-Communist democratic Bulgaria and in a hostile paternalistic political environment, repeated attempts to form a legitimate Macedonian political party all failed (a change in the constitution precludes ethnic groups as political parties); nonetheless, dissident efforts continue (Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008).

Altogether, these differential outcomes for the Macedonians in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria again illustrate at a different level, on a cross-nation landscape, the "in/out" nature of the Macedonian identity. First, the activist leadership in revolutionary Macedonia based in Salonica of the Aegean region of Macedonia drops out in 1908. Then, the implacable terrorist IMRO drive to autonomy/independence from the Pirin Mountain stronghold also drops out after 1934. Both developments faded into the background by World War II with the resurfacing of new Vardar Communist Macedonians and the subsequent organized resistance allied with Tito's partisans. Given this in/out existence of the Macedonian identity over the course of a century, there is no doubt that, if the Vardar republic were to also take a plunge and drop out, this would be a fine ending to the nettlesome Macedonian Problem for Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria,.

However, as is apparent from the evidence, the Macedonians did not go this route. After each catastrophe, at each stage and with each generation they were able to reemerge, regroup, and strive again to freedom and nationhood.

Connecting the threads across the discontinuous stages and ignoring the quiescent devolutionary interwar periods, as well as external power incursions, one is forced to follow the "in" and "out" path to development with appropriate explanation of transition points in order to arrive at some well-supported conclusions about the Macedonian identity and specifically on the issue of "Who the Macedonians Are." At the end of this chronological in/out sequence, a truncated Macedonia emerged by 1991 with complex unresolved political problems both in external and internal affairs. The two embargoes in the interim since the early years of 1990 with the Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian Wars, one imposed by the UN, and the other by Greece, threatened the very existence of the new state. Other internal problems in achieving a power sharing formula with the Albanian minority, the war in Kosovo in 1999–2001, and the 2001 internal rebellion by the Albanians in the northwestern districts, aided and abetted by remnant Albanian insurgents from Kosovo, made for precarious existence, save for the American force on the ground that kept the Balkan wars from spreading into Macedonia (Cowan, 2000; Daskalovski, 2006; Liotta and Jebb, 2004).

Across the border in Aegean Macedonia, inroads by repressive Greek acculturation policies (e.g., Karakasidou, 1997) plus the ethnic cleansing of the civil war Macedonian participants finally achieved a "Greek-Macedonian" ethnic identity as documented by Danforth (1991; 1995) and Karakasidou (1994; 1997). Encouraged by patriotic diaspora organizations such as the *Pan-Macedonian Association*, a schism has taken place that places the Slav-speaking Macedonian population on each side of the border on opposite sides vis-á-vis such issues as the reunification of Macedonia, recognition of the Macedonian Republic by Greece, the "name" issue, return of seized/confiscated properties of civil war veterans, and others.

Unsolved Political Dilemma and Consequences. In the background well-behind the immediate pressures outlined above, lies the major political dilemma for the Vardar Macedonian republic. This dilemma stems from the combined assertion of a "Slav-Macedonian" ethnic identity with a concomitant claim about the new national/political state as being "Macedonian," particularly when the most common perception of a "Slav-Macedonian" identity is that it is equivalent to a

South-Slav ethnic identity (see Kofos, 1995). Indeed, Macedonia, in Academic circles is in an orbit within a East European Slavic constellation of nations. It seems as if the original confusion of the national/political Macedonian identity with a Bulgarian ethnic identity and the problems it brought about have all been forgotten. The original confusion resurfaces again as a national/political Macedonian identity linked to a Slav-Macedonian identity that, in the majority, is perceived to be a South-Slav ethnic identity. As Santayana (1906) wrote, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeated it." The Macedonians since 1991 illustrate the wisdom of this observation by a host of problems that might have been avoided were they able to provide strong support for a single, unitary, non-Slav, unhyphenated Macedonian identity consistent with a claim to a Macedonian national/political identity, a major aim of the present analysis.

Assessment and General Conclusions. In addressing the issue of the Macedonian identity with its component elements of a national/political identity, a consistent self-chosen name, and a tie to distinctive sociocultural features, one looks at what has been shown by the evidence hitherto and what has to be shown by new additional evidence to resolve outstanding interpretive problems. Over the past 100 years, the Macedonian national/political identity, despite its in/out course, succeeded in the drive to achieve nationhood, at the unavoidable cost of losing Aegean and Pirin Macedonia. In contrast, the path to the formulation of a standard self-designation or the choice of a consistent name for the Macedonian identity has gone through a disjointed, disconnected course of development from a *nie, nas, nashe* identity, to a Bulgarian, to an unhyphenated Macedonian identity and then back again to a hyphenated Slav-Macedonian identity (not to even mention, the Greek-Macedonian identity of the Aegean Macedonians). Altogether, this evidence not only points to inconsistency and an unresolved problem but also to the unanticipated/unmanageable/interminable problems in achieving recognition and acceptance internationally.

The evidence, as summarized and evaluated in the present chapter on "Who the Macedonians Are," is clearly strong evidence for a Macedonian national/political entity, active in the production of historical events and being acted upon (requirement [1]). However this by itself is not sufficient without the other two components. The evidence on the second requirement, a consistent self-identity label, is extremely weak (as it shifted back and forth). However, the

unhyphenated self-label "Macedonian" in the interwar years (and before), if connected to the strongly supportive evidence from the sociocultural features of the Macedonians (except for language) would provide nominally sufficient evidence for a single unitary non-Slav Macedonian identity in terms of all three requirements. This conclusion can also be taken as a provisional answer to the question of "Who the Macedonians Are" and as the statement of a tentative hypothesis about the Macedonian identity that, nonetheless, is still contingent upon the resolution of alternative explanations of specified critical supporting evidence for a unitary non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity.

Given the analysis above, it can be concluded that there are three pillars of evidence in support of a single, unitary non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity. (1) The first pillar is to be found in the historical course of events on the issue of a Macedonian national/political identity. This evidence is unambiguous and supportive albeit one may hesitate to count as evidence the interwar right-wing IMRO activist turn to terrorism. This defiant turn to implacable terrorism provided continuity to the struggle after the Ilinden uprising defeat and a balance against devolutionary trends leading to total loss of the Macedonian identity in the Aegean, Vardar, as well as Pirin Macedonia. (2) The second pillar of evidence is to be found in the unhyphenated underground Macedonian ethnic identity that was first documented in 1923 and then again in 1926–1930 prior to World War II, and, finally, in 1944. This is a 20-year span of existence, which, unfortunately, was followed by a resurfacing of two hyphenated Macedonian identities: "Slav-Macedonian" and "Greek-Macedonian." The problem that needs to be resolved in terms of an alternative explanation analysis for this source of evidence is whether the unhyphenated Macedonian identity existed all along as a covert undeclared self-identity in the mass population extending back to the resurgent/revolutionary Macedonia; or, whether it was simply a random event not really representative of the Macedonian mass population. If new research evidence were to be supportive of an unhyphenated Macedonian identity alongside the official hyphenated ethnic identity labels, then, the second requirement as to a consistent name is satisfied. (3). The third pillar of evidence is from the domain of sociocultural features of the Macedonian society, described in detail in chapter 6 and chapter 3. Here, however, there is the negative evidence stemming from the inconsistent component of the Slav-Macedonian dialect/language that needs to be addressed and resolved.

The Slav-Macedonian dialect was evaluated as a linguistic adaptation to Slav Empire hegemony in chapter 6; first to a Bulgarian and then to a Serbian Middle Age Empire rule, prior to the advent of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. While Curta's (2001) findings are consistent with this interpretation, there is still the alternative possibility that Bulgarian and then Serbian settlers inundated Macedonia during the intermittent Slav Empire Middle Age hegemony and brought their languages with them to be distilled eventually into one common intermediate dialect. If this interpretation is not supported by future research, then, the evidence from the three source domains would be sufficient for an inference of a unitary, non-Slav Macedonian identity and would also provide an adequate answer to the question of "Who the Macedonians Are."

One glaring problem and issue is the question of how the Slav languages came to be in the Balkans if there was no massive Slav input in the sixth/seventh centuries AD. In the next chapter, these and other specific issues regarding alternative interpretations of critical supporting evidence will be addressed as "Problems in Development of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity." The hope that genetic DNA methods might be the means to a final definitive solution to the question of the ethnic identity of the Macedonians (or any other ethnic identity) is presently tentative. As indicated in chapter 7, on the one hand, there are not enough peer-reviewed studies to allow a critical review of genetic DNA and ethnic identity association studies and, on the other hand, the commercial organization evidence that is available is not certifiable in the absence of peer-review assessments.

What can be said in answer to the question "Who Are the Macedonians" on the basis of the across domain evidence analyzed above is that "the Macedonians are a nonexclusionary, non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian identity across region and dialect linked to the ancient Macedonians by sparse but critical sociocultural remains from the distant past." A more confident statement, however, especially on the connection to the ancient Macedonians, is contingent upon the resolution of the "Problems in Development of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity," which is the topic addressed in the next chapter. These problems in development are

1. Did the Unhyphenated Macedonian Ethnic Identity Exist in Resurgent/Revolutionary Macedonia?
2. Did the Slav Dialect/Language Come with Bulgarian and Serb Settlers into Macedonia?

3. Is the Slav-Macedonian Dialect/Language a Linguistic Adaptation to Intermittent Middle Age Slav Empire Hegemony over Macedonia?
4. What is the Relationship Between the Ancient and Modern Macedonians?
5. How Do the Macedonians Characterize their Ethnic Identity?

A timely reminder for the reader as to the truth of the analysis above is that the issue will always remain open for further investigation (falsifiability quotient); minimal further research is needed on the interpretive problems indicated above. One does not look here for certainty, as Badian (1967) does in his search for the ancient Macedonian identity, nor in the sciences, and certainly not on the basic issue of "Who the Macedonians Are."

F. Some Unexpected Aspects in the Search for the Macedonian Identity: A commentary

The attempt in the present chapter to bring into an understandable rational framework the evidence for a unique non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity reveals some startling aspects at all stages. What hitherto has not been made obvious is that there were two background factors operating simultaneously in a potent lethal combination, one open and explicit, the other hidden and implicit, but, both in opposition to the ongoing autonomy/liberation struggle of the Macedonians as well as to their ethnic identity. What is generally muted and deemphasized in past treatments of the Macedonian autonomy/independence drive is that it was not just the Ottoman Empire alone that was the principal obstacle. Of equal importance was the opposition by Balkan neighbors through their overt/covert attempts to preempt and takeover the Macedonian movement both at the top and in the field (i.e., the "Supremists" in Bulgaria and the "Makedonomahi" in Greece) (Perry, 1988: 52–54, 120). More importantly, alongside these interventionist efforts, there were also the covert *deethnicization* policies as well. Taken together, these potently framed opposition operative forces required a split in resource and fractionation of effort. By contrast, there were no Balkan state activist attempts to defeat the earlier Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian drives to autonomy/liberation; nor, were there any denials of their ethnic identity. Moreover, in the absence of an explicitly recognized unique Macedonian identity, the major powers of Europe dealt only with their client states and their interests. As a result, there was no Great Power intervention during the 1903 Ilinden uprising, contrary to previous practice and against

all expectations by the Macedonians. Moreover, the subsequent partition was easily ratified after World War I.

The *deethnicization* policies of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria with their denial of a unique Macedonian identity was the more insidious of the two operative factors. Of course, it can be said, and it has been stated, even by a Canadian/Macedonian historian, Rossos (1995), that there was no emergent unique Macedonian ethnic identity during this early period in the struggle. It is alleged that it developed over the years of the national drive to nationhood; and, as suggested earlier, it may have lagged far behind. However, if one examines closely the unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity that, over a 20-year period from 1923 to 1944, was documented by several independent observations (Corfe, the British Foreign Office, Capt. P. H. Evans), it did exist; but, covertly, and, only in the masses, not in the intelligentsia. The latter, depending on their cultural/educational experiences, specifically, the country where these experiences would occur, invariably came back with hyphenated ethnic identities ("Bulgarian-Macedonian," "Greek-Macedonian," etc.).

An important question to the puzzle here is, how could there be an unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity in the unschooled masses? It could not have come from the top! Did it always exist covertly alongside the hyphenated identities imposed upon them by their own educated elites or by their neighboring Balkan states? If it was not there from the beginning, where did it come from? Furthermore, during the Ilinden 1903 uprising and the five-year subsequent continuation of the struggle, including the aberrant interwar terrorism, it probably had an underground existence. Finally, why then did the Great Powers fail to take political cognizance of the Macedonians, minimally, as people—if not as a politically active component ethnic identity?

A likely contributing factor to this negative outcome was the deethnicization policies by the three Balkan neighbors. Deethnicization is a more insidious process than acculturation (euphemistically labeled as "national homogenization" and as "a passage to nationhood" by Karakasidou, 1997). Acculturation has to do with a loss/gain transition from an old to a new identity, whereas deethnicization is tantamount to ethnic genocide. In deethnicization, a socio/political group is denied existence as a people in a very basic sense. If ethnic identity is to have any redeeming quality at all as a sociocultural feature of a given society, it must minimally identify a people as being independently recognized players/agents in historical events. This is what the Balkan Powers denied the Macedonians with their deethnicization

policies; and, as a consequence, led to the failure of external Great Power support.

If one examines in detail the writings on Macedonian issues by Greek historians, even at this late date, the Macedonians are identified as "Slavophones," "Slavs," "Slav-Speakers," and as "alien natives" (e.g., Gerolymatos, 2004; Iatrides, 1995; Kofos, 1995; Mavrogordatos, 1995; Rozakis, 1993; Stefanidis, 1993). Such labels could be linked to "Serbian" and/or "Bulgarian" identities but never to a Macedonian ethnic identity that, apparently, is the subtext in the choice of these semantic expressions. Furthermore, even references to the Vardar republic with its internationally current designated name, FYROM, and the earlier designated name, The Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SROM) are set aside in favor of *Skopjie* (Andriotis, 1991) or *Skopje* (Pettifer, 2001: 24). *Skopia* and *Skopianoi* are the currently fashionable and only acceptable designations within Greece. The word "Macedonia" is not used at all in spite of the fact that the people in question refer to themselves as "Macedonians," and, the acronym, FYROM as well as SROM both include the word, "Macedonia." This practice is more than mere paternalism ("we know your history better than you!"). It is denial and destruction of an ethnic identity culminating, as it did in Greece, in a half-century of ethnic cleansing of the Aegean Macedonians.

There is a recent estimate of 49,017 "Slavophones" in Macedonia (Rozakis, 1993); while in an earlier estimate at the time of the civil war, it was 100,000 (Kofos, 1995); surely, there were more than 200,000 during the Ottoman Era (or even now, if one can bypass the societally undesirable/unacceptable admission to a "Macedonian" ethnic identity within Greece). The forced expulsions that brought about this reduced native population are referred to by such neutral terms as "exodus of the Slavs from Macedonia" (277); or, as "exchange of populations" (Kontogiorgi, 2006: 26). All these ostensively neutral terms and expressions give an impression that the people referred to are not Macedonians at all but foreign interlopers that needed to be exchanged or expelled from Macedonia. This, alongside the current Bulgarian deethnicization policies as well as the continued untoward use of the self-label "Slav-Macedonian" by the Macedonians themselves, leaves little to speculation as to why the Macedonian republic encountered such great difficulties in being recognized internationally and give credibility to the "name" issue with Greece.

What is, and still is, a surprise, nevertheless, is that international recognition was slow and not forthcoming; even as the Macedonians

themselves attained their freedom and nationhood alone at no cost to anyone. Unlike their Balkan neighbors, nationhood was achieved without outside help. Importantly, the latter could not have done so without the help of Russia and Great Britain; nonetheless, the Macedonians had to accept the prerequisite EU-imposed stable borders agreement with their Balkan neighbors; and, at the stroke of a pen, loss of legitimacy to Aegean and Pirin Macedonia. Against these considerations, the 100-year struggle for nationhood speaks to the tenacity of the Macedonians as people, who, after several generations, did succeed to a nation state; albeit, at the unpardonable loss of Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, a ransom to the Great Powers in exchange for recognition.

G. Literary References to a Macedonian Identity

A relatively unexplored area in search of the Macedonian identity can be found in literary references, in poetry and fiction. Lord Byron in his long poem *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (early nineteenth century), identified the Macedonians as troops in the court of Ali Pasha of Tepeleni by their blood-red scarves worn over their vests (see appendix 1). The late English mystery writer Eric Ambler wrote in "The Schirmer Inheritance," in *The Intriguers*, 1951/1965): "The Macedonian comitadji with his cartridge belts and his rifle was becoming a legendary figure, a heroic defender of women and children against the savagery of the Turks, a knight of the mountains who preferred death to dishonor and treated his captives with courtesy and forbearance" (370). More recently, Greece's outstanding living writer of fiction, Vassilis Vassilikos (*Z*; *The Little I Know of Glafkos Thrassakis,* 2002) wrote the following description of the Macedonians: "two long columns of guerilla fighters [ELAS] stretched all the way down Plateia Aristotelous [in Salonica], almost all blond like Gods speaking a strange Balkan tongue and they helped him pass through the crowd" (296). Unmistakably, these were Men of Florina/Castoria/Edessa speaking their Macedonian dialect. Thus, even in the domain of literature there is a beginning, a new spark of recognition of a distinctive Macedonian ethnic identity.

9

Problems in Development of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

In this chapter, the problems generated by the alternative interpretations of specified critical evidence in each of the three domains relative to a single unitary non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity are reconceptualized as problems in development toward a comprehensive final statement of the Macedonian identity. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the evidence summarized from all three domains rests on three evidential pillars. The first is the existence of a Macedonian national/political identity, unambiguous in terms of its past history, and now, definitive, through the existential fact of an internationally recognized Republic of Macedonia. The evidence comprising the second pillar, namely, a proper name for the self-chosen ethnic identity, is indeed problematic. This component of the Macedonian identity has had a checkered uncertain history in the past 100 years. It has been discontinuous, disjointed, and episodic, all characteristics of an ephemeral unstable ethnic identity. As pointed out in chapter 8, this evidence in its past convoluted course has left open the obvious need to rationalize it, or at least, offer explanatory links for the in/out sequential series of unhyphenated/hyphenated ethnic identities, and then, in the end, back again to hyphenated ethnic identities.

One way to address this need is to provide an answer to the question: did the unhyphenated Macedonian identity observed by Corfe (Rossos, 1994), the British Foreign Service in the period of 1926–1930 and by Capt. P. H. Evans in 1944 (Rossos, 1994; 1995; 1991a), covertly exist alongside the changing hyphenated ethnic identities during the first decade of resurgence and revolution? Some evidence suggests that it did (Brown, 2003: 12–15). If it did exist, then, consistency is restored in the narrative because it would show

that perhaps the hyphenated identities were outward, superficial, imposed identities, not the reality. In other words, these identities were the "official stories" favored by Balkan historians. The third pillar of evidence, the sociocultural features of the Macedonian society, is unambiguous and all supportive except for the existence of one inconsistent element, namely, the Slav-Macedonian dialect/language. This inconsistency of the Macedonian dialect/language with the other sociocultural characteristics of the Macedonians, as explained in chapter 6, is resolved by hypothesizing it as a linguistic adaptation to Middle Age Slav Empire hegemony. Nonetheless, there is still the remaining question to be resolved; and that is, that the Slav dialect/language of the majority Macedonian population in Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin Macedonia might have come with Bulgarian and Serb settlers into Macedonia in this same period. Beyond these two issues, there are also others, such as for example, potential links to the ancient Macedonian identity by existing cultural remains and the relevant question of what the Macedonians currently think about their ethnic self-identity, and so on.

Postulate 8 of the general ethnicity model suggests that the existence of disparate independently sourced evidence (i.e., the evidence in chapters 4–6), each with alternative interpretations of some critical evidence, points to an incompletely developed ethnic identity. Toward achieving a comprehensive stable formulation prior to any general statement of an ethnic identity one must, according to Postulate 10, first identify the areas of evidence that have contrary alternative interpretations, and then conceive them as problems in need of resolution; and, in the end, resolve them. This is the objective of the present chapter. Once alternative interpretations of critical within domain evidence are eliminated or downgraded by analysis or further investigation, the evidence from the different domains, which have no logical contact, can, by default (i.e., by elimination of alternatives), converge upon a common conclusion or inference (convergence methodology). This approach is consistent with the most fundamental feature of the basic sciences. That is, experiments are used to test and then reject or uphold alternative interpretations. Except for the absence of experimentation, the elimination of contrary alternatives by further analysis and/or research, the approach taken in the present study is consistent with this most basic feature of the sciences. As problems of alternative interpretation are resolved or eliminated, an ethnic identity statement becomes complete, or, is adequately formulated. If not, the hypothesis/theory of a unitary non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity is then falsified.

Current Unresolved Problems in Development of the Macedonian Identity

1. Did the unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity covertly exist in resurgent/revolutionary Macedonia and thereafter? The question is easy to raise but difficult to answer. The problem lies in adequacy of method. Historiographic and anthropological studies have already yielded a partial answer (e.g., Danforth, 1995; Rossos, 1994). That is, there are in existence hyphenated Macedonian ethnic identities: Slav-Macedonian, Greek-Macedonian, and so on. However and in strong contrast, the unhyphenated Macedonian identity did exist concurrently in the postpartition interwar period for at least a 20-year span as indicated by the Corfe report, the British Foreign Service reports, and by the observations of Capt. P. H. Evans. Moreover, Rossos (2008: 89) cites a report by a Russian Consulate Official of a direct on-the-spot observation of an unhyphenated "Macedonian" self-designation in the villages of Kostur (Kastoria) even earlier, in 1907, with bluntly stated objections that it was outsiders who labeled them as "Bulgarians" or "Greeks." Significantly in the same period, the headmaster of the Bulgarian public school system in Ottoman Macedonia, Vasil Kanchov (1911), in his book *Orohydrography of Macedonia* (transl.), makes the following unexpected admission: "The local Bulgarians and Kucovlachs who live in the area of Macedonia call themselves Macedonians, and the surrounding nations also call them Macedonians. Turks and Albanians from Macedonia do not call themselves Macedonians, but when asked where they are from, they respond: 'from Macedonia.' Albanians, who also call their country Arnautluk, and Greeks, who live in the southern area of Macedonia, do not call themselves Macedonians, hence the borders in these areas according to the peoples' perception are not clearly defined" (1).

A search for tombstones of Macedonian immigrants with dates prior to the partition in 1912/1913 has also been quite informative. Noted historian Eugene Borza (1999), prompted by one of his Macedonian students, did carry out such a search. In the small mill-town of Steelton, PA, many of the Macedonian community tombstones were found to have Macedonia as their place of origin prior to the 1912/1913 partition. A census taker in his report also revealed that out of 250 interviewed individuals, 76 reported that they or their parents were born in Macedonia and that Macedonian was their mother tongue.

While the above evidence may be seen as indirect and, at worst, anecdotal, what is an easier question to answer is the identification

of reasons for the covert existence of the unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity. Both the Corfe report and that of Capt. Evans show that the threat of reprisal by the authorities of the occupying power (Greece) might have been a sufficient reason for its covert existence. Another reason that can be cited is that in the resurgent/revolutionary Macedonia with no public schooling at any level, enlightenment on such matters as ethnic self-identity could only come from outside experts; and, later on, from their own intelligentsia and power elites. The answers did come and they were all of hyphenated Macedonian ethnic identities—to be rejected by the mass population in the interwar period prior to World War II.

Further research using such lines of indirect investigation might provide additional answers. The results of the survey/questionnaire presented in chapter 5 suggest, however, a cautionary note. They indicate that educational and sociocultural influences are paramount on such issues. This type of influence can even lead to rejection of new well-established evidence that contradicts whatever comes from a common received text or educational background. This phenomenon of *cognitive dissonance* in rejecting contrary evidence, first observed in the survey/questionnaire findings reported in chapter 5, goes a long way to explain why the underground covert Macedonian identity was conserved in spite of outside and native intelligentsia efforts to impose hyphenated Macedonian ethnic self-identities (i.e., Bulgarian-Macedonian, Greek-Macedonian, Serb-Macedonian) (Perry, 1992).

2. Did the Slav dialect language come with Middle Age Bulgarian and Serb settlers into Macedonia? Except for Vacalopoulos (1973), the evidence for Serb and Bulgarian Middle Age Empire settlers is largely nonexistent. Jovanovich (as cited in Rossos, 1995) recognized the Macedonians as "Old Serbs," which implies that they were already there in Macedonia. Moreover, the Greek claim for a Bulgarian ethnic identity of the Slav-speaking Macedonians is based on the affinity of the Macedonian dialect to the Bulgarian language (Andriotis, 1991). This is a circular argument; or, minimally, nonindicative of an ethnic identity (see Borza, 1990, and Badian, 1967, for a discussion of language as an ethnicity indicator). Even if the claim for a Slav settler inundation of Macedonia, whether in the sixth/seventh century AD or in the Middle Age Slav Empire period, is unsupportable, the question still remains whether the Slav-Macedonian dialect/language is in fact a linguistic adaptation to Middle Age Slav Empire rule. This is an additional alternative interpretation and is addressed below as a separate issue.

3. Is the Slav-Macedonian dialect/language a linguistic adaptation to intermittent Middle Age Slav Empire hegemony over Macedonia? The origin of the Slav-Macedonian dialect in the present majority Macedonian population, whether it came with the sixth/seventh century AD Slav settlers, Middle Age Bulgarian and Serb settlers, or more globally as a "lingua franca" phenomenon, as suggested by Curta (2001), is not only directly relevant to an inference of a non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity but is also relevant to the issue of continuity with the ancient Macedonians. If, as many historians believe, this is the language of Slav settlers who inundated Macedonia and Greece from the sixth-seventh century AD, one can then infer a break in the continuity of ancient with modern Macedonians and Macedonia. One cannot argue as Shea (1997) does that the modern Macedonian ethnic mix in relation to the ancient Macedonians is no more of a problem than that of the modern Greeks to the ancient Greeks. In both cases, it is uncertain how much of a continuity can be inferred given the asserted and inferred existence of a major ethnic mix. Curta's (2001) findings suggest that this was not in fact the case. Thus, this evidential source for an explanation of origin of the Slav dialect/language can be discounted. As indicated above, Bulgar and/or Serb settler influence can also be discounted.

In chapter 6, the analysis and discussion regarding the existence of extensive ancient Greek vocabulary (probably from the *koine*) consisting of nouns, verbs, and adjectives in household usage in the Macedonian dialect (see Andriotis, 1991) provides an independent method for assessing its origins; specifically, as a linguistic adaptation to foreign rule. The apparent existence of the *koine* (Greek) language in Macedonia during the Eastern Roman and Byzantine Empires clearly is a local adaptation to changing political circumstances as the ancient Macedonians had their own unwritten language/dialect during classical times with no resemblance to the *koine* (Borza, 1990; Badian, 1967). More importantly, it shows a precedent for sociocultural linguistic adaptation to changing sociopolitical circumstances; in this case, Greek being the "lingua franca" of the Eastern Roman and Byzantine Empires.

Another method is to determine a quantitative ratio in years of duration of Middle Age Bulgarian versus Serbian Empire rule over Macedonia and then observe how close this ratio corresponds to the degree of affinity of the Macedonian dialect to the Bulgarian versus the Serbian languages. A correlational relationship would argue for the Slav-Macedonian dialect being an adaptive linguistic response. In fact a correlation is suggested since the intermittent Bulgarian

Empire hegemony was over a much longer total period compared to Serb Empire rule, and the affinity with the Bulgarian language correspondingly is far greater than that for the Serbo/Croatian language. This relative linguistic affinity would be another example of supportive evidence for the hypothesis of linguistic adaptation. A detailed further examination of this issue is needed to determine whether there are other features indicative of non-Slav origins. Research by linguistic scholars have revealed some fundamental non-Slav characteristics in the structure of the Macedonian language. For example, Friedman (2000: 1) cites Kopitar's 1829 formulation of Balkan Slavic, Vlach, and Albanian languages as being of "one grammar with three lexicons." However, Friedman interprets this feature as a *Balkansprachbund* phenomenon of grammar convergence due to linguistic contact. Thus, this source of evidence does not provide unequivocal support for the linguistic-adaptation explanation of the origin of the Macedonian dialect/language.

4. What is the relationship between the ancient and modern Macedonians? The problem of linkage to the ancient Macedonians is crucial as it is implied, if not entailed, in any claim to a modern unitary non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity. This issue is critical because it has to do with ownership of Macedonia's distant past. While both Danforth (1991) and Shea (1997) argue that the modern Slav-speaking Macedonians of the Macedonian Republic (as well as those in Greece's Macedonia) have a legitimate claim to the ancient Macedonian heritage, there is, however, the following problem. If one accepts the present-day political reality of a dual Macedonian identity one Greek and other, calling itself Slav-Macedonian identity, one must automatically disenfranchise the latter from any claim to the ancient Macedonian heritage on the basis of historical evidence because a Slav-Macedonian ethnic identity is tantamount to a South Slav ethnic identity. The Australian Macedonian newspaper editorial quoted in chapter 6 makes the same argument. Of course, Greek writers present more emphatic disenfranchisement claims (e.g., Andriotis, 1991; Martis, 1983; Vakalopoulos, 1991). Fortunately, Curta's (2001) work can now be seen to clear the road for future studies of linkages of the modern Macedonians to the ancient Macedonians, given that the possibility of their being Slavs has been largely eliminated; and, thus, the Slav-Macedonian label, the raison d'etre for discontinuity, would appear to be no longer tenable.

The problem of linkage to the ancient Macedonians is also a critical component problem in the reintegration and reconciliation of evidence from the different source domains. However, the major

problem here is the methodological question of what kinds of evidence can be used to show that the ancient Macedonians have culturally survived into the twenty-first century or that the modern Macedonians are linked to them. An anthropological examination of present-day artistic and sociocultural expressions (material cultural remains in Curta's analysis of ethnicity) may provide some clues on this issue. For example, Pribichevich (1982) states: "According to some musicologists, there is so much *archaism* in Macedonian music, as well as in costumes, dances and customs, for the reason that this region has lived so long in servitude which precluded foreign influence" (224). At the same time he also states, in reference to a current Macedonian war dance called the "Teshkoto Oro": "Actually, it is an archaic Macedonian dance from pre-Slav times . . . recalling border warfare and raids" (222–223). Furthermore, Pribichevich cites the Lake Doiran "bird" fisherman who use trained birds to drive fish into waiting nets recalling Herodotus' fifth-century observation of the same phenomenon while traveling through Macedonia. The existence of such sociocultural evidence as well as the Homeric traditions at home (presented in chapter 6) argue for a link rather than a break with the ancient Macedonian heritage in the modern Slav-speaker majority Macedonian population. Sparse as it is, this evidence does point to a minimal cultural survival of the ancient Macedonians into the contemporary Slav-speaking Macedonian population. Such evidence needs comprehensive and detailed identification, as well as a critical examination by the Macedonians themselves.

An independent but indirect source of evidence is from genetic investigations of current Balkan populations across linguistic and cultural barriers. Bosch et al. (2006) examined both paternal and maternal lineages by typing mtDNA and y-chromosomes in blood samples drawn from Albanian, Romanian, Macedonian, Greek, and Aruman (Vlach) subpopulations to determine if linguistic and cultural groupings could be mapped into genetic stratifications in these Balkan countries. Except for the Arumans, the genetic evidence from these studies revealed a "homogeneous landscape" across language and culture. Such evidence together with the meticulous archaeological research studies of Florin Curta (2001) described earlier, especially the evidence from the material cultural remains of the distant past, would suggest continuity rather than a break. Thus, the evidence sourced from three different source domains, sociocultural characterization, genetic studies, as well as archaeological studies of material cultural remains from the distant past, converges upon a common conclusion suggesting continuity. In the face of this type of evidence, the

grounds for the extant hyphenated schismatic nature of the present Macedonian ethnic identity as Greek-Macedonian, Slav-Macedonian, or Bulgarian-Macedonian appear to be artificial creations after a century or, at least, a half century, of sociopolitical indoctrination of the Macedonians in Greece, in FYROM, and Bulgaria. Genetic DNA methodology can be applied perhaps to the question of linkage of the modern to the ancient Macedonians with a telling finality. Using the specific methodology of Yang et al. (2005) that included ancestry informative markers (AIMs) with selected single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and the particular large set of markers used, if applied to bone tissue samples from ancient graves in each region of Macedonia and, for comparison, bone tissue or other autosomal tissue samples from graves in the early decade of the twentieth century, may provide a definitive answer to the question of linkage.

5. *How do the Macedonians characterize their ethnic identity?* While the question of how the Macedonians characterize their ethnic identity has been addressed by Danforth's (1995) study of self-identity through oral interview reports and by Karakasidou (1997), it must be reassessed using more systematic methods with proper built-in controls (e.g., for "socially desirable answers"). What is needed are *structured* interviews administered to *selected stratified representative (random) samples* of Macedonians in the Macedonian Republic (FYROM), in Greece, and Bulgaria. Specifically, a structured interview might take the form of a comprehensive questionnaire (e.g., as in appendix 3 with topically focused questions accompanied by a brief statement of the available evidence including relevant historical/political, cognitive self-descriptor, and indicator/ascriptor sociocultural domains of evidence that are applicable to each question. In this way, the interviewees will be well-apprized of the issues and currently available evidence relevant to each issue in answering each question.

Importantly, the same question needs to be asked repeatedly but linked to choice of answers based on one domain of evidence, then, in another part of the questionnaire, on another domain, and so on. Questions formulated in this manner would reveal the *salience* of each domain in the choice of a cognitive self-label as well as the *reliability* of the answers to such questions. A built-in "lie-scale" has to be included to control for the alternative "social desirability" for any given answer in the context of the question being asked. In addition, a study as the one proposed can reveal *direction* in the current development of the Macedonian identity in the populations of each country who may be in a stage of search and self-discovery; or, perhaps, in a downward devolutionary trend toward a total loss of the Macedonian

self-identity (e.g., Karakasidou, 1997). Moreover, a study of this type can identify the impact of assimilationist/acculturationist policies in the Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin regions of Macedonia that, for almost a century, have been under different social, political, and cultural environments. A preliminary study along the lines outlined above was carried out with some extremely unexpected results (see chapter 5 for complete analysis).

Some Concluding Observations and a Methodological Commentary

The existence of fragmentation and inconsistency in inferences that can be drawn from the different domains of empirical evidence based on *specific within domain* interpretations of such evidence (chapters 4–7) clearly suggests an incompletely developed Macedonian ethnic identity (Postulate 8). The failure of an inward look into the sociocultural features of the Macedonian identity by the Macedonians themselves and by outside scholars and the failure to even consider what these characteristic features indicate, relying instead on one clearly misleading sociocultural indicator (i.e., language/dialect), or on conflicting historiographic/agiographic traditions, has brought about the present fragmentation and inconsistency as to "Who the Macedonians Are." No doubt, the complete break with the past during the Ottoman Empire allowed a vacuum within which such confusions could develop as well as the different conceptions of just what ethnicity is (see Curta, 2001: 13–24).

According to Just (1989: 71–88), virtually the same problems were faced in the development of the Greek ethnic identity immediately after the Greek war of independence (1821–1831). In the reawakening as a nation after the long dark night of the 400-year-long Ottoman Empire Turkish rule, the Greeks asked themselves, "who are we?" (*pioi eimastai*); "Hellenes," "Romioi," or "Grecki"? "Hellenes" won out. In contrast to the modern Greek example, the Macedonians, after the initial period of *nasheism* and after some further confusion due to foreign-imposed labels (Bulgarian-Macedonian, Greek-Macedonian, Serb-Macedonian, etc.), came to call themselves "Macedonians" or "Slav-Macedonians" at what appears to have been an intermediate phase in their development. They were stumped, however, by the fact that no linguistic continuity could be shown in relation to their alleged ancient ancestors as the modern Slav-Macedonian dialect bears no relation to the native language of the ancient Macedonians. Thus, although initially while the Macedonians may have been regarded

as a historically well-established ethnic identity (e.g., Gladstone's famous phrase, "why not Macedonia for the Macedonians"; and, Lord Byron's reference to them as the crimson-scarved men of Macedon in his early nineteenth-century poem *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (see appendix 1), the existence of more than several languages native to Macedonia at the turn of the century period suggested that Arthur J. Evans was correct in his (1903) pronouncement to the world that there are no Macedonians at all; but only Bulgars, Vlachs, Albanians, Greeks, Turks, and Gypsies. In this way, the Macedonians were seen as Slav interlopers in their own land with no more legitimacy or claim to ownership than the other latecomers into Macedonia, the Turks, Albanians, Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and Gypsies.

A shared belief in a multiethnic Macedonia in Great Power diplomatic circles (i.e., the nonexistence of a single, unique Macedonian ethnic identity) was a congenial development for Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. It gave license to their expansionist dreams of annexing Macedonia to their small Balkan states (Perry, 1988; Shashko, 1995). The failure of a closer inward look into the sociocultural features of the Macedonian society that would point to a unitary Macedonian identity as a counterweight was one other factor that cost the Macedonians their ethnicity and autonomy as a nation state along the lines of neighboring Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania. No wonder Capt. Evans (Rossos, 1991a), who, taking note of their distinctive sociocultural features, described the failure of the Great Powers to see Macedonia as an emerging nation as a "historical oversight." This was, indeed, a historical oversight that was not to be redeemed and corrected until 1991; and even then, only partially, as the partition of Macedonia, in the present context of existing treaty agreements regarding border changes, appears to be irreversible. Thus, the dream of a Macedonia as a whole nation has been lost irretrievably; survived by a truncated Macedonia that is being challenged, all around, regarding its Macedonianism.

Epistemological Criteria in the Evaluation of Evidence from the Three Source Domains

One consequence of the emergent duality of the Macedonian ethnic identity that is of doubtful validity (see chapter 5) is the basic methodological question as to what epistemological criteria one might accept to highlight or downplay empirical evidence from the different domains pertaining to one reintegrated, unified single Macedonian

identity as against a dual or even a multiethnic Macedonian identity. On this issue, what should one follow: the criterion of internal consistency, or the criterion of correspondence with the facts-on-the-ground and/or with those of of a historical past, or, more bluntly stated, distorted recreations of the past?

To achieve internal consistency and, in addition, an agreement with the sociocultural facts-on-the-ground, one is forced to discount dialect/language as a marker of the Macedonian ethnicity as well as the divergent historical accounts since they are all embedded in recurrent vicious circles as detailed in chapter 2. What remains is a unitary non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian identity as an organizing concept and as the simplest interpretation of the evidence sourced from the different domains. This concept corresponds best with the facts-on-the-ground expressed in systems/formulas of first names and last names, native dress, traditions in the home; in short, with the current sociocultural evidence as well as with an unambiguous national/political identity. It allows internal consistency in interpreting the available evidence. Nonetheless, this interpretation also raises a series of problematical issues in further development of the Macedonian identity that the Macedonians themselves must confront, resolve, and link together for a standard solution of "who the Macedonians are" as in the earlier example of the Greek ethnic identity (i.e., choice of exact name for an adopted self-identity, which is rather obvious for the Macedonians). Can this be done against the hard reality of the three Macedonias, in Greece, in FYROM, and in Bulgaria, or, is it too late?

For any successful reconciliation and reintegration of the apparently disparate evidence stemming from the different domains on the Macedonian identity, there has to be, at the outset, an agreement as to proper method and concomitant agreement on the circumscription of the relevant sources or domains of evidence. Importantly, as Curta's (2001) analysis shows, such an agreement is not to be found in the extant literature. In the absence of such a needed basis and foundation for assessing ethnic identity, the present research has attempted to address the issue in a top-down approach by presenting a theoretical model of ethnicity (chapter 10), which identifies the sources or domains of evidence, an explicit methodology on how the evidence from each domain is to be sourced and then integrated across domain. At the end, the solution to the problem and question of "Who the Macedonians Are" is: *They are of a single, nonexclusionary, non-Greek, non-Slav Macedonian ethnicity across region and dialect linked to the ancient Macedonians by sparse but critically important sociocultural*

remains. The significance of such a unitary, non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity formulation is that the Macedonians can no longer be considered as interlopers into Macedonia as are other ethnic groups. Macedonia is, and has been, their land. Furthermore, there is no "Macedonian Question." The Macedonian Question exists if, and only if, ethnically speaking, there are no Macedonians; however, as the evidence shows, they do exist.

The present solution of a single, nonexclusionary Macedonian ethnic identity is a theory/hypothesis-driven inference from the existing sources of evidence that recommends itself as the simplest interpretation in a sea of alternatives in addressing the question "Who the Macedonians Are." Even if the present effort is successful, the question still remains whether a single unitary non-Slav Macedonian consciousness can be linked into individual Macedonians in face of the current ongoing contrary sociopolitical indoctrination in Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin Macedonia that has split the Macedonians into three distinct national/ethnic groups. The linkage of a single non-Slav unitary Macedonian consciousness into individual Macedonians is the great task for the Macedonians of today, if they are to ever reclaim their ancient heritage; and, for themselves, a unitary voice with a place under the sun as a liberal democratic nation among nations.

10

A General Ethnicity Model

Background

Contemporary ethnography can be characterized by a series of bifurcations consisting of opposed sets of concepts that can be used to identify, document, and characterize relevant political/historical/sociological raw materials out of which any ethnic identity could be constructed. According to one comprehensive review of the issues (Service, 1987), ethnographic studies can be characterized by the emphasis and importance attached to the following conceptual categories in the construction/formulation of an ethnic identity for a target group investigated. The descriptive conceptual framework presented by Service (312) is a set of bipolar opposites that may be seen as structural versus dynamic characterization of an ethnic identity. They are: positivism versus humanism, as descriptive operational approaches, including determinism versus free will, environmentalism versus mentalism, comparative versus holistic, generalization versus particularism, evolution versus relativity, social culture versus culture, and, finally, organismic versus language analogies.

Broadly understood, the above conceptual categories stress, as indicated, structural versus dynamic process characterization, emphasizing on the one hand sociocultural features that tend to focus on structural, relatively permanent sociocultural features. These are seen as ahistoric, and present-oriented rather than as dynamic processes over historic periods of time, emphasizing historical/political documentation including subjective or idiographic cognitive self-descriptors of a target ethnicity. Thus, the choice for an investigator wishing to document a group's claim to an ethnic identity is to adopt one or the other view, or some set combining the two and then use the associated methods in each approach for gathering the relevant empirical data. The idea of incorporating into one formal ethnicity model all of the opposing concepts and methods seems to have eluded current

thinking about ethnicity, which is what is attempted by the general ethnicity model presented below. Importantly, however, and as a starting point, the empirical data relevant to an ethnicity identification/characterization based on the methodological analysis of chapter 3 are the three broad classes or reference domains: (1) historical/political manifestations; (2) subjective idiographic cognitive self-descriptor reports; and (3) objective sociocultural characteristics. These three domains of evidence based on the logical functions of "ethnicity" in ordinary language allow, without prejudice, a role for each of the diverse perspectives already described. The general ethnicity model presented below then enables interpretation and integration of evidence selected from the three sourced domains into a formulation and construction of an ethnic identity for a targeted sociopolitical group.

Postulates of a General Ethnicity Model

Postulate 1*. Ethnicity is a group characterization based on a defining set of sociopolitical group characteristics drawn from three different domains of evidence: (1) historical/political manifestations; (2) subjective idiographic cognitive self-descriptor reports; and (3) objective sociocultural characteristic features.*

Postulate 2. *A defining set of sociopolitical characteristics for any particular ethnicity consists of a combination of a partial set of individual/group cognitive self-descriptors functioning as idiographic explicators of a target ethnicity together with examples of historical/political manifestations, and empirically observable sociocultural features functioning as ethnicity indicators and/or a partial set of semantic sociocultural ascriptors functioning as ethnicity explicators.*

Postulate 3. *A defining set of sociopolitical characteristics characterizing a group consisting of a set of cognitive self-descriptors, a set of empirical (historical/cultural) indicators, and a set of semantic (cultural) ascriptors is sufficient only when it can uniquely identify a target group ethnicity and differentiate it from other related and unrelated ethnic groups.*

Postulate 4*. An ethnicity indicator regardless of its source can become an ethnicity ascriptor when its probability as an indicator for a target ethnicity approaches unity; similarly, an ethnicity ascriptor can become an ethnicity indicator when its probability as an indicator of a target ethnicity falls from unity.*

Postulate 5*. Ethnicity as a group characterization is a dynamic process that is changing as reflected by sociocultural shifts in the*

indicator-ascriptor profile including also changes in cognitive self-descriptors as well as in the indicator-ascriptor set composition.

***Postulate 6**. While indicator-ascriptor sociocultural evidence may provide empirical information that is sufficient for an ethnic identification, the significance and importance (i.e., the meaning) of such an identification is to be found in individual/group cognitive self-descriptors expressed as a set of core beliefs about a reference ethnicity.*

***Postulate** 7. The absolute minimal characterization for a claim to ethnicity is the prior existence of an ethnicity self-label by a sociopolitical group and a set of cognitive self-descriptors in support.*

***Postulate 8**. In incompletely developed ethnic identities, the evidence stemming from the three different domains pertinent to a target ethnicity, that is, historical/political, cognitive self-descriptor, and indicator-ascriptor evidence, may be fragmented and unrelated to one another or form inconsistent sets whereas, in completely developed or well-developed ethnic identities, consistent relations may be observed (e.g., Scottish ethnicity); also, interpretations based on one domain of reference especially in incompletely developed ethnic identities may present intractable issues when compared to alternative accounts based on another domain of evidence. That is, there is no logical contact among the three domains (e.g., the "name" issue regarding a proper name for the Macedonian Republic).*

***Postulate 9**. Cognitive self-descriptors when expressed as core beliefs regarding a target ethnicity necessarily incorporate truth value claims that can be evaluated by reference to ethnicity indicator/ascriptor and/or historical/political manifestation domains of empirical evidence.*

***Postulate 10**. Across domain integration of evidence from the three logically independent source domains identified in Postulate 2 can be achieved if and only if the inconsistencies in each domain are reduced or eliminated by further analysis and research until a default interpretation is left standing in each domain that is consistent with that of the other domains—if not, then an inference of an ethnic identity is falsified.*

Corollaries

1. *The relation of an ethnicity indicator to an ethnicity inference is probabilistic varying from low to high probability (Postulates 1 and 2). The relation of an ethnicity ascriptor to an ethnicity inference is definitional (Postulates 2 and 4).*
2. *The combined set of ethnicity indicators and ethnicity ascriptors that are sufficient to identify an ethnic group is a partial set of much*

larger set of ethnicity indicators and ethnicity ascriptors that can be used to characterize and identify a particular ethnic group (Postulates 1 and 2).

3. *Ethnic identity as an objective sociopolitical group characterization can be determined fully from empirical indicator and semantic ascriptor evidence but it is incompletely characterized unless cognitive self-descriptor and historical/political manifestations are included and integrated (Postulates 1–7 and 10).*
4. *Inconsistencies stemming from sets of core beliefs versus sociocultural evidential sources give rise to confusions and claims/counterclaims about an ethnic identity (Postulates 1–6).*
5. *Across domain inconsistencies that give rise to confusion and claims/counterclaims can be resolved by reduction/elimination through further analysis and research of inconsistent interpretations and claims/counterclaims based on evidence from different domains (Postulates 1–6 and 10).*
6. *When evidence from different domains is presented (i.e., from sociocultural, idiographic, historical/political sources) on some disputed aspect of an ethnicity, the likelihood is that the dispute is exacerbated (Postulates 1–5 and 8).*

Interpretation

Postulates 1 and 2 present the claim that the concept of "ethnicity" as used informally in historical, political science as well as in sociocultural and anthropological contexts to characterize a targeted ethnicity can be specified fully as a formal concept by three broad descriptor concept categories: *ethnicity indicators, ethnicity ascriptors, and cognitive self-descriptors.* Accordingly, "ethnicity" can be interpreted fully by these three concepts. Actual empirical usage and application of these concepts can be illustrated by a targeted example (e.g., the Macedonian ethnic identity). The core concepts of ethnicity indicators, ethnicity ascriptors, and cognitive self-descriptors function in the model as truth value estimations and as confidence estimates as to the validity of the evidence sourced from each category domain in the characterization or explication of an ethnic identity. Contrary to the modern anthropological trend in defining a claim to ethnicity as a personal cognitive construction of a self-identity designation, the general ethnicity model enables a behavioral scientist to construct and characterize an ethnic identity independently.

Postulate 3 specifies a sufficiency rule, namely, that an ethnic identity specification comprising a cognitive set of self-descriptors, a set of ethnicity indicators, and a set ethnicity ascriptors, when it

can separate and uniquely identify an ethnic group from related and unrelated groups, becomes adequate or complete. Of course, this rule does not preclude further enrichment by additional specification, nor does it specify or identify what the actual indicators and ascriptors would be in a concrete instance. Moreover, it leaves open the possibility that ethnic identity can be specified by any combination of indicators and ascriptors as long as the sufficiency rule is met. For example, the ethnic identity of the Icelanders can be specified most simply by their geographical location (ascriptor) and by the past historical event (circa eleventh century AD) of the Viking migration to Iceland (indicator). This limited characterization of Icelandic ethnicity leaves open the additional specification due to such sociocultural features as language (ascriptor) and other sociocultural features such as first names, naming formulas for last names, traditions, and rituals (indicators).

Postulate 4 specifies the relationship and linkage of ethnicity indicators to ethnicity ascriptors. Given the dynamic sociocultural processes out of which emerge the raw materials for an ethnic identification, such features as national dress, dances, rituals, and traditions that are linked empirically to a target group ethnicity in a relatively permanent or in a relatively transient manner, are all grouped as ethnicity indicators, whereas the more stable sociocultural elements that have achieved a strong linkage to an ethnic self-identity in the cultural history of a target group: e.g., Russian ethnicity and Russian language, or, Scottish ethnicity and Scottish bagpipe, kilt and tartan color scheme are classified as ethnicity ascriptors. The latter features can be considered as a part of the semantic description of a given target ethnicity or are elements in the definition of that ethnicity. However, this linkage is susceptible to changes as specified in Postulate 5 and this aspect in the present structuralistic description of ethnicity allows a dynamic input to the development and evolution of an ethnicity within sociopolitical and historical processes. Thus, the difference between an ethnicity indicator and ethnicity ascriptor lies in the hierarchical probability or degree of association to a target group ethnicity.

Postulate 5 specifies the underlying dynamic parameter to all sociocultural features that are subject to the influence of historical, economical, political, and sociological variables. In more formal terms, what Postulate 5 specifies is that the elements comprising a set of ethnicity indicators and a set of ethnicity ascriptors can be dropped and replaced by new elements and, of course, indicator-ascriptor category classification can also change in the context of a dynamic sociocultural environment.

Postulate 6 specifies a comprehensiveness requirement, namely that cognitive self-descriptor evidence expressed in individual/group core set of beliefs regarding a reference identity must also be included. This domain, of course, refers to subjective factors that may or may not be factually based, but importantly, can be evaluated by reference to sociocultural group characteristics and/or historical/political sources of ethnic-related evidence.

Postulates 7 specifies the minimal necessary characterization needed for an ethnicity ascription: an ethnic self-label and a core set of shared beliefs. An ethnic self-label obviously has a historical point marking its emergence and, subsequently, its development, maturity, and possible devolution.

Postulate 8 points up the possible dissociation that can take place between ethnicity as expressed in sociocultural manifestations and ethnicity expressed in a individual and/or group core set of beliefs in partially or incompletely developed ethnic identities. In the case of the Macedonian ethnicity, this aspect is to be found at a maximal level, that is, there is almost a complete schizophrenic isolation between Macedonian ethnicity expressed socioculturally and Macedonian ethnicity expressed as a core set of beliefs concerning the Macedonian self-identity. Confusion and intractable issues can be traced to the existence of fragmented, un-integrated domains of evidence stemming from these different sources.

Postulate 9 states that cognitive self-descriptor reports may include beliefs with an empirical content that can then be assessed regarding their truth value by reference to historical, sociocultural, and anthropological evidence. The logical basis for the dispute over the name "Macedonia" reflects this aspect. That is, the Greek claim is that the self-label "Macedonian" is *historically based*, whereas the Macedonian claim is based on international rules and practice permitting choice of self-label by an emerging nation that is buttressed by an appeal to legalistic/historical precedents of its use. There is no logical contact in the evidence drawn from the two domains nor in the claims and counterclaims. Therein lies the intractability of the whole "name" issue between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia.

Postulate 10 states an operational rule for integration of within and across domain evidence. In the case of the Macedonian ethnic identity, five issues drawn from the three source domains, historical, cognitive self-descriptor, and sociocultural characterization were identified as needing resolution for a consistent basis in support of a unique Macedonian ethnic identity.

Appendices

Appendix I

Reference to Macedonians in Lord Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (1812)

Canto 2

57

Richly caparison'd, a ready row
Of armed horse, and many a warlike store
Circled the wide extending court below:
Above, strange groups adorn'd the corridore;
And oft-times through the Area's echoing door
Some high-capp'd Tartar spurr'd his steed away:
The Turk, the Greek, the Albanian, and the Moor,
Here mingled in their many-hued array,
While the deep war-drum's sound announc'd the close of day.

58

The wild Albanian kirtled to his knee,
With shawl-girt head and ornamented gun,
And gold-embroider'd garments, fair to see;
The crimson-scarfed men of Macedon;
The Delhi with his cap of terror on,
And crooked glaive; the lively, supple Greek;
And swarthy Nubia's mutilated son;
The bearded Turk that rarely deigns to speak,
Master of all around, too potent to be meek,

Canto 72

4

Macedonia sends forth her invincible race;
For a time they abandon the cave and the chase:
But those scarfs of blood-red shall be redder, before
The sabre is sheath'd and the battle is o'er.

Appendix II

Plates 1–4

Plate 1 Dancers from "Tanets" folk dance group (Vardar Macedonia) performing *Russalija*, a warrior's dance (Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia, circa 1967).

Plate 2 A company of dancers from "Tanets" folk dance group (Vardar Macedonia) performing *Russalija*, a warrior's dance (Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia, circa 1956).

Plate 3 The author at a more youthful age (1952) ready to perform Greek national dances in an original men's dress (except for the vest) worn in Proti, Florina (from the Aegean region of Macedonia).

Plate 4 An ancient Macedonian soldier from a wall painting found in a tomb at Vergina, Macedonia in Greece.

Appendix III

Survey/Questionnaire: Who the Macedonians Are

Instructions

In the following, you are asked a number of questions regarding the Macedonian ethnic identity. Specifically, these questions are designed to assess what the Macedonians think or believe about the issue of "Who the Macedonians Are." This is a modern-day issue and there have been many attempts to address it in the past by Balkan and non-Balkan historians, political scientists, and anthropologists. The present study will use the statistical method of selected stratified random samples from the Macedonian Slav Speakers of the Macedonian community (Republic of Macedonia, Hellenic Republic, and Bulgaria). The rationale for this narrow choice of sample is that they represent the majority population who, importantly, have taken the label "Macedonian" to designate their ethnic identity (other ethnic groups will be surveyed in associated studies). The answers you will select below to each question are neither right nor wrong (they may, however, be true or false). Please try to the best of your ability to avoid "socially desirable" answers. Instead, search your conscience and provide "authentic" choices from the alternative answers provided with each question.

Questions

1. As a contemporary Macedonian, you would trace your ancestry and origin to
   a. Macedonian, Illyrian, Paeonian, Agrianian ethnic mix
   b. a fusion of ancient Macedonians with incoming Slav settlers into Macedonia during the sixth/seventh century AD
   c. ancient Greek, as the ancient Macedonians belonged to the Greek family

   d. a Bulgarian identity as the Bulgarian Empire dominated and then settled into Macedonia territory during the Middle Ages
   e. a Serbian identity, as the Serbian Empire dominated and then settled into Macedonia territory during the Middle Ages
2. A recent publication by the prestigious Cambridge University Press (Florin Curta, 2001) describes the great sixth/seventh century AD inundation and settlement of Macedonia by Slavs as an invention by nineteenth-century European historians. It never happened. Instead, diverse raiding groups, described as separate tribes, opportunistically came down south from their bases north of the Danube river when Eastern Roman Empire armies were engaged elsewhere. Importantly, they returned to their home bases. Assuming this is true, choose the best answer regarding the origins of the modern Macedonians.
   a. Macedonian, Illyrian, Paeonian, Agrianian ethnic mix
   b. a fusion of ancient Macedonians with incoming Slav settlers into Macedonia during the sixth/seventh century AD
   c. Greek, as the ancient Macedonians belonged to the Greek family
   d. Bulgarian, as a result of the Bulgarian Empire domination and settlement of Macedonia during the Middle Ages
   e. Serbian, as a result of the Serbian Empire domination and settlement of Macedonia during the Middle Ages
3. During the Middle Ages, a Byzantine emperor, Basil II (of the Macedonian dynasty) defeated the forces of Samuil, emperor of the Slav/Bulgarians circa 1014 AD. Basil II subsequently came to be known as "Voulgaroktonos" (Bulgar slayer). What does this fact suggest to you about the Macedonian ethnic identity?
   a. Macedonians are not Slavs
   b. Samuil was not a Macedonian but a Bulgarian Slav emperor
   c. a fabrication by Byzantine historians
   d. a fusion of Bulgarian and Macedonian Slavs
   e. none of the above
4. Given that in the 500-year Ottoman Turkish occupation of Macedonia, the prior Roman, Eastern Roman, Byzantine Empire rule followed by intermittent, Bulgarian and Serbian rule during the Middle Ages from 900 to 1385 AD, there was as a consequence
   a. a loss and a break in the linkage to the ancient Macedonians
   b. historical accounts of these epochs can give some useful information on the issue of "who the Macedonians are"
   c. A sociocultural study of the main features of the Macedonian identity such as language, religion, traditions in the home, dress,

and dances, will probably provide more useful information on the question of continuity and linkage with the ancient Macedonians
   d. the question of linkage to a possible ancestry for the Macedonians is unfathomable as there are no adequate methods to answer such a question
   e. none of the above
5. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, language was used by outside and local observers as a criterion or marker of the ethnic identity of the Macedonians. According to this marker the Macedonians are
   a. Bulgarians because the Macedonian dialect is a west Bulgarian dialect and was seen as such by the Macedonian intelligentsia
   b. "Old Serbs" because the Macedonian dialect is linked to the Serbian language and the Macedonian Slavs had come to Macedonian before the Bulgar invasion
   c. language is not an infallible indicator of ethnicity, especially about the Macedonian ethnicity
   d. unique structural features of the Macedonian dialect point to a non-Slav origin of the Macedonians
   e. none of the above
6. Besides language, religion was also used as a marker of ethnic identity during the Ottoman Empire. For example, for the Ottoman Turks, all Christians were "Rumlei" (Romans). Given this factual reality, choose the best answer below.
   a. The Macedonians in the Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin regions are all of one religion: Orthodox Christian
   b. The Macedonians are in three religions: Macedonian Orthodox, Bulgarian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox
   c. historically, religion was in fact used as an indicator of ethnic identity in Macedonia; e.g. Patriarchate versus Exarchate Church affiliations (i.e., Greek versus Bulgarian identity)
   d. religion was used in this way, but it is not a valid indicator of ethnicity
7. Misirkov (1903) was the first Macedonian to describe the ethnic identity of the Macedonians in his book *Macedonian Affairs*. In it, he describes the Macedonians as being of a Slav-Macedonian ethnic identity based on the Macedonian dialect that he saw as an independent language. You would say that
   a. "Slav-Macedonian" is a technically correct statement of the Macedonian ethnic identity

b. "Slav-Macedonian" is not a correct label as it ignores all the non-Slav sociocultural characteristics such the native dress for men, dances, and so on.
c. Macedonia is multiethnic if language is sole criterion of ethnicity; therefore, there are no Macedonians
d. The Macedonians are in fact Bulgarians as the Macedonian dialect is simply a west Bulgarian dialect
e. none of the above

8. Arthur J. Evans, the archaeologist who discovered the ancient Minoan civilization at Knossos, Crete, traveled widely in Macedonia; and, in his letter to the *London Times* dated September 29, 1903, informed the world that there are no Macedonians, but only Bulgars, Greeks, Albanians, Roumans, Turks, and others. You would
   a. agree with this assessment as being currently valid even now
   b. disagree
   c. agree with the statement because at the time of his travels, the Macedonians were uniformly seen as "Bulgars" by the outside world
   d. disagree because the outside world had a false perception of the Macedonians as "Bulgarians" during this early period
   e. b and d
9. H. N. Brailsford came to Macedonia following the "Illinden" defeat to aid Macedonian victims of Turkish atrocities. In his assessment, the Macedonian ethnic identity was "unfathomable" because he had observed in the Macedonian villages the *coerced* shifting of loyalties from Exarchate (Bulgarian) to Patriarchate (Greek) affiliations (and vice versa). You would
   a. agree with this assessment as being currently valid
   b. disagree
   c. agree with the statement because at the time of his travels, the Macedonians were uniformly seen as "Bulgars" or as "Greeks" by the outside world depending on church affiliations
   d. disagree because the outside world had a false perception of the Macedonians as "Bulgars" or "Greeks"
   e. b and d
10. Given the assessments above by Arthur J. Evans and H. N. Brailsford of the Macedonian identity, you would conclude that
    a. the Macedonians had no idea who they were during this period as they do not seem to have a voice. The Macedonian identity at this time was nonexistent

b. other than *nie* and *nashe* (we, ours) the Macedonians at that time had no other concepts to identify their identity and distinguish themselves from the Greek, Bulgar, and Serb identities
c. the Macedonians during this period, however, could say what they were not: Serbs, Greeks, or Bulgars
d. all of the above
e. none of the above

11. In your understanding of the concepts of national identity and ethnic identity, they are
    a. the same
    b. different
    c. the same because they are often used interchangeably
    d. different because as the examples of Switzerland and the former Yugoslavia show, the national identity in such cases includes a number of different ethnic identities
    e. none of the above
12. Applying your understanding of the Macedonian national identity, you would say that
    a. the Macedonian national identity includes Slav, Vlach, Albanian, Turkish, and Gypsy ethnic groups
    b. the Macedonian national identity and ethnic identity are one and the same
    c. Macedonia is a multiethnic state/country
    d. Macedonia has only one ethnic identity and that is the majority population; all others are interlopers into Macedonia who held Macedonia captive and/or cooperated with captors and conquerors in the past
    e. b and d.
13. If you believe your ethnic identity is "Macedonian," not Slav, Greek, Serbian, or Bulgarian, what do you base this belief on; what is your evidence for this belief?
    a. historical texts by Macedonian and non-Macedonian historians
    b. a belief handed down to me by my parents and grandparents
    c. a comparison with other ethnic identities in the Balkans
    d. sociocultural features of the Macedonians such as traditions in the home (e.g., placing symbolic objects on newborn children as an appeal to the three fates—Florina/Bitola provinces)
    e. all of the above

14. What do you believe is the relation to the ancient Macedonians whose name the Macedonians carry on?
    a. there is no linkage as the ancient Macedonians were Greek
    b. there is a linkage as there are some distinctly Homeric traditions in the home as well as the "warrior" dances, Rusalija, Teshokoto Oro, Mashko Aegitsko Oro, all reminiscent of the *telesias,* a warriors dance of the ancient Macedonians
    c. the Slav-oriented Macedonian language has structural features that suggest a non-Slav origin
    d. the more than 500 words from the *koine* (Hellenistic Greek) during the Byzantine Empire rule that are currently in household usage in the modern Macedonian language suggests that the Macedonian dialect was a linguistic adaptation to intermittent Bulgarian and Slav Empire rule (e.g., *Armas* = engagement; in the *koine armosis* = to join together]
    e. none of the above
15. In his book *The Making of the Slavs,* Florin Curta (2001) states that the alleged sixth/seventh century AD settlement of Macedonia by Slavic tribes never happened. If this is true, then
    a. the Macedonians cannot be Slavs
    b. the Macedonian Slav-oriented dialect has other alternative explanations as a linguistic adaptation to intermittent Bulgarian and Serb Empire rule, more akin to Bulgarian as the Bulgarian ruled Macedonia for a longer period
    c. Curta's revelations plus a growing number of writers showing evidence for an ancient Macedonian ethnic identity apart from that of the Greek identity (e.g., Badian, 1967; Borza, 1990; Green, 1991) provide a new impetus in the search for a connection with the ancient Macedonians
    d. the Macedonians can begin to make a claim to the ancient Macedonian heritage and history
    e. all of the above
16. Outside observers of the Macedonian ethnological scene have provided a variety of conflicting answers on the question of the Macedonian ethnic identity. In your best estimate
    a. the Macedonians were first labeled as "Bulgarians" based on linguistic affinity
    b. Misirkov (1903) labeled the Macedonians as "Slav-Macedonians"
    c. a League of Nations Report (circa 1926) by Col. Corfe revealed that the Macedonians who were interviewed during the Bulgarian-Greek "exchange" of populations claimed that they were "Macedonians," not Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgars

d. Danforth's (1995) study of the Macedonian Diaspora in Australia revealed two identities: "Greek" and "Macedonian"
e. all of the above

17. What in your opinion is the reason for these diverse answers regarding the Macedonian ethnic identity?
    a. the 500-year Dark Age period of Ottoman Empire rule and consequent loss of continuity with the past
    b. claims by neighboring states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece on the Macedonian population as being "Serb," "Greek," and "Bulgarian," which were accepted as being legitimate by the Great Powers of Europe
    c. language was used as the sole criterion of ethnic identity
    d. religion was used as the sole criterion of ethnic identity
    e. none of the above
18. If, as some of the studies and reports in the past show, the Macedonian identity is labile to changing political situations and outside influence, then you would say that the Macedonian ethnic identity is
    a. a work-in progress even now and needs further critical study to formulate a standard solution as to "who the Macedonians are"
    b. a confused subject because past assessments were superficial as they were based on language and/or religion (e.g., Patriarchate versus Exarchate Church affiliations)
    c. at this early stage, not yet formed as the Macedonians did not know who they were
    d. all of the above
    e. none of the above
19. Studies by Danforth (1995) and Karakasidou (1997) show a transition to Greek ethnic identity in the Aegean region within Greece; and one can assume a parallel process in the Pirin region in Bulgaria. You would conclude from these developments that
    a. the Aegean and Pirin regions are lost lands and represent a devolution of the Macedonian identity in these countries
    b. these end-results are due to an assumption of a Greek ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians in the Macedonian population in Greece and due to linguistic affinities with the Bulgarian language in Bulgaria
    c. there are, nonetheless, Macedonians in Greece as well as in Bulgaria who have asserted their Macedonian ethnic identity even now

d. there are serious dangers ahead that can result in the total obliteration of the Macedonian ethnic identity subject to political changes in the Balkans
e. none of the above

20. A noteworthy finding of the Danforth (1995) study was that one brother claimed to be "Greek" and other "Macedonian" (Pribichevich, 1992, has a similar observation of a Macedonian émigré family in Sofia). From this, you would conclude that
    a. the responders were victims of acculturation and propaganda in two different states
    b. this is a legitimate possibility because anthropologists such as Danforth and Karakasidou define ethnic identity as a "personal cognitive construction"
    c. this is an absurd outcome as it violates both common sense and scientific grounding as the responses represent two "socially desirable" answers in two different societies (Greece and Yugoslavia)
    d. analyses of this type add to confusion and conflict already in existence with regard to the Macedonian ethnic identity
    e. none of the above
21. The connection to the ancient Macedonian ethnic identity is an important issue that must be addressed if the Macedonians are to have a claim on the ancient Macedonian heritage. How would you go about in a search for such a connection?
    a. make use of historical methods of investigation into the past
    b. look into sociocultural traditions in the home and in the Macedonian culture of today which suggest linkages to a Homeric world of the ancient Macedonians
    c. use Curta's (2001) archaeological/historical methods into material cultural remains from the past especially during the Middle Ages and earlier
    d. use modern genetic DNA methods in comparisons with archaeological remains from the ancient past
    e. all of the above
22. Evangelos Kofos, a Greek historian, has suggested that the Macedonian ethnic identity evolved by a process of "morphogenesis" from the parent Bulgarian ethnic identity. You would
    a. agree
    b. disagree
    c. agree because the Macedonian language is really a west Bulgarian dialect—not an independent language
    d. disagree because Bulgarian nationalism that led to the emergence of the Bulgarian State was virtually concurrent with the

emergence of the Macedonian national identity (1876 versus 1896)
e. b and d

23. How would you conceptualize the Macedonian national identity in relation to the present constitutional statement of the Macedonia state as being a multiethnic rather than a national state?
    a. establish a sense of national Macedonian identity along the lines of Switzerland (successful case) and Yugoslavia (unsuccessful case)
    b. eliminate Macedonian national identity as a useful self-identity as none of the ethnic minorities of Macedonia see themselves as Macedonians
    c. change the constitution back to a statement of a Macedonian nation state but follow the earlier model of France and state in the constitution that juristic rights and responsibilities will not consider ethnicity, origin, titles, and so on, as any basis for rights and responsibilities—only individual merit/competence
    d. search for a new construct to bring together Macedonia's diverse ethnic groups under a new name
    e. none of the above
24. On the issue of who owns Macedonia's modern or recent historical past (i.e., the early twentieth-century struggle for autonomy and independence from Ottoman Empire rule) as well as the ancient Macedonian heritage, I would
    a. distinguish the recent past from the distant past and confine ownership to recent past
    b. claim both the recent past and the distant historical past of the ancient Macedonians as our own
    c. establish dialogues with Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian scholars and attempt to reach common ground on this issue
    d. say that this is not an important issue
    e. none of the above
25. Write a short essay answer to the question "who the Macedonians are" according to your own unique and personal perspective (use the back of page if necessary).

Complete

Name:
Educational level: a. elementary school; b. high school;
c. college/university
Age:
Occupation:

Notes

Preface

1. Damianopoulos (1961).
2. "Adult Development and Aging: Human Development and Social Policy." Professor Alexandra M. Freund, Department of Sociology, Northeastern University. Boston, MA.
3. Damianopoulos (1967)
4. Damianopoulos (1987).
5. Damianopoulos and Carey (1992a; 1992b).
6. Nicolletta Retsou was my young, beautiful, idealistic, and immaculately professional elementary school teacher in 1939/1940. I found her again after a long search of more than 50 years and had the honor of visiting her and her family at home in Athens in 1997. It was the time I had participated in the meetings of the *Hellenic Society for Neuroscience*.
7. Solzhenitsyn (1968).

1 Summary Overview: Some Historical Facts on the Ground

1. "Skopia," or "Skopje" technically, is the name of the capital of the *Republic of Macedonia*, now recognized by more than 100 countries. In Greece, however, the Republic of Macedonia is recognized as "Skopia" and less frequently by its UN recognized name, FYROM (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Direct translation from the Cyrillic alphabet would be "Skopje" but this is needlessly cumbersome and the "i" in Skopia is more consistent with Latin alphabet usage/function. Thus, "Skopia" (meaning "look out" or "view" from the Greek) is retained at some points in the text in place of the cumbersome "Skopje." Another example would be "Yugoslavia" (Latin script) versus "Jugoslavija" (Cyrillic script).
2. "Dialect" is used throughout the text to mean, in a basic sense, an unwritten language. In fact there are four or five Macedonian dialects from which the Bitola/Prilep dialect was selected and brought to a level of a modern literary language whose grammar was finalized in 1951.

3. Overall command of the Greek rebel/guerrilla forces was offered to Ali Pasha of Tepeleni. Whether this is purely anecdotal or whether there is substance to this statement is unclear. In any case, on the eve of the Greek revolution, Ali Pasha was on a life-and-death struggle with the military forces of the Sultan sent to destroy him. He sought support from his Greek subjects including from some of the *Kapitans* who had served him earlier in his military contingents. David Brewer in his book *Greek War of Independence* (Woodstock and New York: Overlook Press, 2001, pp. 45–46) states that there was an expectation for Ali Pasha to convert to Christianity; and, thus, would have become the natural choice to lead the Greek revolt against Ottoman Rule in 1821. Certainly both parties had common interests and shared an opposition to Turkish rule. However, by 1822 Ali Pasha was, at last, eliminated by the immense forces of the Sultan. The troops needed for this operation were not available to quell the revolution in the South, which would otherwise have failed in Brewer's estimate.
4. A traditional Macedonian song ("Phrosino Mome") about Ali Pasha relates the story of his liaison with "Kyra Phrosine," young wife of a local Greek merchant at Janinna, who in some accounts was his mistress while in others a mistress of his son (Brewer, 2001: 37). In any case, at some point, she was abducted, taken to his court, and held hostage before coming to her tragic end. She was bound, placed on a small row boat with some other women, and thrown overboard to drown in the middle of the picturesque lake by the city of Janinna. All songs recalling these events focus on her youth, her beauty, and her innocence. The life that was lost is emblematic of the ruthlessness of an era when events like this were not infrequent. There is also a traditional Greek folk song, "Ali Pasha Pou Kimase," that is more celebratory of his exploits on the field of battle.
5. My maternal grandfather, Dimitri, early in the twentieth century left for America in fear for his life after daring to charge with only the long pole of a butter churner and his horse under him toward a group of armed Albanians (seven in number) waiting in ambush in reprisal for an earlier incident. Taken by surprise, the Albanians were overcome, tied, and then brought over to local Turkish authorities in Lerin/Florina with their lives spared. My grandfather wisely withheld his rage and did not kill them. No doubt, his family was spared for this reason.
6. Albert Sonnichsen (1909/2004) relates an incident in which he and the captain of a guerrilla/rebel band were hosted secretly by a Moslem Albanian Bey in his Estate Mansion near Lerin/Florina. The Bey apparently had signed on with the Macedonian rebel forces because he himself was part of an organized group of Albanian rebels in nearby Albania seeking autonomy and/or independence from Ottoman rule as were the Macedonians. At this stage, the Macedonians were better organized and had the experience. The Bey, apparently, was still in the learning stage as, otherwise, this was a totally strange alliance.

7. My mother also narrated another incident, which she vividly recalled, evocative of a different side to the Moslem Albanian occupiers/settlers into Macedonia. As a young girl of about nine–ten years in age, she was shepherding back to her village her household animals, an oxen team (for plowing) and a cow. Unfortunately, these animals, as they crossed the public road below the village, ran into an armed Moslem Albanian group of men on horseback and women in brightly colored pantaloons walking alongside a Landau or coach on its way to Bitola from nearby Lerin. My mother was extremely frightened and frozen with terror as she watched this unfolding catastrophe happen right in front of her eyes. However, one of the riders, who noticed this, approached my mother and talked to her gently: "come child; go about your work, take your animals home back to the village. Do not be frightened of us; no harm will come to you. Go, do your work, don't be afraid." My mother never forgot this unexpected show of kindness and humanity.
8. The Phanariote Philiki Etairia was a secret society within an international Greek merchant class with offices and business interests outside the Ottoman Empire but with nominal headquarters in the Phanar section of Istanbul. Under the guise of a loose association of commercial enterprises in the capitals of Europe, overall plans for the Greek revolution were being developed in tight secrecy as well as for the leadership of the rebellion from among its members. The organization was planning to take overall command of the loosely organized rebel/guerrilla bands within Greece; however, this was never accomplished.
9. A. J. Evans (1903) and H. N. Brailsford (1906/1971), perhaps, were the first to use the simplistic "Bulgar," "Vlach" (Rouman), or "Greek" as language-based appellations when in fact the more complex hyphenated designations, for example, "Bulgar-speakers," "Vlach-speakers" would have been closer to what was then known about the people or groups referred to by these appellations.
10. Panagiotes I. Pappas of Kiaton, Corinthias, Greece, uncle of my wife, participated in the war of "liberation" of Macedonia as a cavalryman in the Greek army during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.

2 Statement of the Problem and Basic Questions

1. Badian (1967) has been the original source for much of the evidence pertaining to the issue of "who the ancient Macedonians are." For example, he points out the almost complete absence of Macedonians (save for the Royal family) from the surviving lists of Olympic champions. He also meticulously cites direct and indirect evidence for a separate Macedonian language and for the alleged lineage of the Macedonian Royal family from the Temenid Kings of Argos as well as other sources. Yet, he himself does not infer from the available evidence that the Macedonians were

of a separate ethnic identity apart from that of the Greek based on the uncertainty of the evidence. In contrast, Borza (1990) as well as Green (1991) do make such an inference based on the weight of the evidence. The latter emphasizes this view but with a few cautionary remarks. An additional relevant point to this issue is that, if we are to accept the four markers for Greek ethnicity put forward by Herodotus (Bowra, 1957) (common language, common history, common culture, and common religion), the Macedonians would fail this basic test for Greek ethnicity on the basis of their separate language. Although there is a lack of direct primary evidence or cultural remains pointing to a separate Macedonian language (something like 500 words at least have been documented to exist), one can, nonetheless, infer from this limited but critical evidence that the Macedonians were of a separate ethnic identity. Badian (1967) confines himself to the evidence and not wishing to exceed it, indicates that a conclusive statement cannot be made.

2. Alexander I and Philip II are the only two instances of Macedonian participation in the Olympics. Legitimacy was based on an alleged claim of descent from the Temenid Royal Family of Argos. For the Macedonian population in general such a claim to Greek ethnic identity did not avail. Importantly, the surviving lists of Olympic Champions do not show any from Macedonia (Badian, 1967)
3. The same evidence of a Slav horde incursion for a Slav ethnicity of the Macedonians has also been used to conclude that modern Greeks might instead be of a Slav ethnicity as the Slav horde excursion reached as far down as Southern Greece (Falmerayer, 1922, as cited by Shea, 1997). Recently, Florin Curta (2001) in his book *The Making of the Slavs* denies that there was in fact a massive Slav incursion into the Balkans in the sixth/seventh centuries AD but only sporadic raids by a multiple number of ethnic groups southward from Danube river. According to Curta, the idea of a massive Slav incursion is a nineteenth-century invention by historians, and the Slav label was a blanket term of convenience used by Byzantine historians to refer to the widely differing raiding groups that would enter and leave Roman/Byzantine Empire territory from areas to the north of the Danube river at times when the Roman armies were engaged elsewhere in a distant part of the empire.
4. Vigorous efforts to impose this view on the world, especially, the name "Skopia," for the Macedonian Republic by Hellenic Republic political initiatives from 1991 to 1997 failed completely (Shea, 1997).

3 The Methodology of Ethnicity Research

1. Adapted from a website posting by *Lindsays International*, which in turn was adapted from a *Glossary of Genetic Terms, Division of Intramural Research, National Human Genome Research Institute.*

4 Historical/Political Manifestations of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

1. The activist secret membership of the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) in villages and towns throughout Macedonia in the period from about 1900 to 1908 was organized along a tiered two-track hierarchical system of organization as described in chapter 1 with a civilian political and, parallel to it, a military committee. The democratic interaction of the two was observed by Sonnichsen (1909/2004: 134–136) when he was surprised to find that the captain of the local military committee (i.e., the fighting unit to which Sonnichsen was attached) carried with him handwritten notes about plaintiffs and accused, including quotations of applicable Articles of the Constitution to properly adjudicate in a formal local court a case brought before him by the villagers. In one such case, the captain in his final judgment advised the accused to take out a passport to Bulgaria, to find a job there, and support his wife and children back in the village. If he were to fail to comply with this sentence, he would regret it! Here then is justice according to Socialist/Democratic ideals but rendered in rough Balkan terms. Brailsford (1906/1971) found this kind of justice and retribution quite disturbing.
2. According to Sonnichsen (1909/2004), a small cadre from one of the local Comitadji rebel/guerrilla groups headed by Christo Tchernopeev, Jane Sandanski, and Krste Asenov with eight other rebel/guerrillas, operating secretly on their own, took hostage, on September 3, 1901, the American missionary Ellen S. Stone and her companion Caterina Tsilka outside the village of Bansko (to avoid Turkish military reprisals). An Albanian guard who had attempted to resist was killed on the spot to impress the hostages with the severity of their situation (the Albanian guard had been previously condemned by the village for having raped two young girls). To further emphasize the fear and terror, the captors spoke fluent Turkish during the ambush and then made off with the hostages toward the mountains and safety away from immediate pursuit, leaving no clues as to their identity. Thus, no one knew who they were, not even the IMRO leadership. Alternately speaking Turkish, Bulgarian, and Greek the captors were successful for a long time in confusing the captives by leaving no telltale signs of their identity for potential rescue or ransom. The kidnapping, however, was a major embarrassment to the Turkish government as it occurred in the center of Macedonia not too far from the chief city of Salonica under the eyes of almost all foreign diplomats. Moreover, the kidnapping received wide coverage in American newspapers and came to be known as the "Ellen Stone Affair." Intense efforts to track down the captors by select Turkish military forces, Bulgarian-sponsored rebel bands and even by Greek-sponsored Andartes bands intent on rescuing or killing the hostages

to show the world the savagery of such outlaw bands, in the end, all failed. Eventually, American representatives in Sofia succeeded in making suitable arrangements for the release and ransom for US$66,000. As a postscript to these events and as a tribute to these Macedonian rebels, Ellen Stone gave talks and helped collect funds to aid their cause after she came back to America. The obvious humanity of the captors eventually surprised Ellen Stone and her companion, Caterina Tsilka, who had in the process given birth to a baby girl in the middle of a winter night high on a snow-clad Macedonian mountain. See L. B. Sherman, *Fires on the Mountain; The Macedonian Revolutionary Movement and the Kidnapping of Ellen Stone* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

3. A confirmation of this assessment of Sonnichsen (1909/2004) comes from a story told by my paternal grandfather. A Greek-sponsored Andartes guerrilla band, pursued by a Turkish military extermination unit, was given refuge in my ancestral home, which at the time consisted of a large extended family according to old traditions. The guerrillas were hidden in a storage area in the basement of the house. Apparently, betrayed by someone in the village (with rival Comitadji sympathies), a Turkish sergeant sent to the house to investigate together with an armed cadre asked my great grandmother, "Grandmother, what are you hiding underneath the stewing pot you have over the trap door?" "Nothing, sir; we just had no room in the kitchen for another pot to cook." "No, grandmother, take the pot off and open the trap door." The seven members were apprehended without struggle and handed over to the authorities in Monastir. My grandfather said to me, "We all thought that they would never be seen again; jailed and executed in one way or another. Yet in seven days we saw them miraculously walking free in the streets of nearby Lerin/Florina" (The Greek consulate in Monastir, actively supporting such bands, had arranged for their release—the enemy of my enemy is my friend). Importantly, my ancestral family was spared.
4. In Florina in the fall of 2000, when I visited my hometown area, Pavlos Voskopoulos, a top Macedonian minority activist was being taken to court and tried on a charge that he had publicly disturbed the peace and tranquility of Florina by displaying a sign in front of his office in the Cyrillic alphabet with the Macedonian language phrase for architectural services that included the word LERIN (the native Macedonian name for the town). I attempted to intervene in what was, in my estimation, a completely laughable charge. First, I asked to make a statement as a friend of the court pointing out the ludicrous nature of the charge according to international standards (which I was denied). Next, I pleaded with the local government hierarchy including the mayor and acting governor of the province that they were sending a wrong message to the world about Florina and Greece. The past traditions of hatred, bigotry, and intolerance, I insisted, were out place in the democracy that

is Greece now and that the trial was a blot on Florina. It would only show ignorance and backwardness. The reply was that the matter was out of their hands and in the judicial system and process. As this was an extreme and blatant violation of the Helsinki agreements on human rights signed by Greece, the Greek government eventually persuaded the local court to drop the charges.

In the first day of the court trial proceedings, which I attended, a young idealistic woman defense lawyer from Athens asked the citizen (probably, a resettled refugee from Asia Minor, to judge from his appearance,), giving testimony on behalf of the local government, "Do you know what the phrase on the sign means?" "No! I don't know that language; and, we here in Florina should not be subjected to it; that is part of the past we should not be reminded of." "Well, if you do not know what the sign means, how can you be offended by it?" and so on (The formal charge was that the sign offended the sensibilities of the good [non-Macedonian] citizens of Florina, and, therefore, merited censure and punishment by the authorities.)

5. The bigger prize in the Balkan wars of 1912–1913 eluded the Greek and Bulgarian leadership obsessed as they were with Macedonia and the chief city of Salonica. The Bulgarian army superbly trained by German advisors had not only defeated the main Ottoman Turkish armed forces defending Thrace, it also had succeeded in completely cutting off the Turkish army from Turkish forces fighting deep in the interior of Macedonia and Epirus. The Chaltaldja line was the last line of defense and only 30 km from Constantinople when the Turkish army units were retreating pell-mell across the Bosporus. Instead of looking east to Constantinople, the bigger prize, the Bulgarian army was shifted westward toward Macedonia and quickly reached the outskirts of Salonica. In the meantime, the British Consulate had advised the Turkish governor to surrender Salonica only to the Greek army, which also lay in wait outside the city at its outskirts. To retaliate, Bulgaria having had to bear the brunt of the war and having achieved the decisive victory against the Turks, suddenly struck both Serbian and Greek forces, giving the Turkish army a breather allowing it to recover Eastern Thrace. Thus, enmeshed, Bulgaria could not sustain a four-front war, as Romania had also joined the allies against Bulgaria. The bigger prize Constantinople was there for the taking had the Greek and Bulgarian leadership stayed united in the war against the Ottoman Empire forces.
6. Within a decade, seven elementary school students from one small village, Bitusha/Parori, in the Lerin/Florina province continued their education to become professionals: in medicine, law, army (a general), banking, education, veterinary medicine, and neuroscience within Greece, in the former Belgian Congo and in the United States (the present author).

7. An elderly woman from the provinces who had lived in Athens but now in Toronto, Canada, related to me the horror of how during the Battle for Athens her first cousin burst in in her modest one-room apartment with a rifle and bayonet at the ready tracking down an EAM/ELAS fighter who had been last seen entering the building. Behind a curtain separating the kitchen from bedroom was a doctor, a relative who had just finished dressing the wounds of the guerrilla fighter (the latter, wisely, had already left in fear of reprisals to those giving aid). With the doctor behind the curtain, the woman, trying to stave off a tragedy, pleaded with her cousin to leave and emphasized that no one had come to her apartment. The cousin took her at her word, most likely, according to her account, because, had he found her with either the EAM/ELAS fighter or with the doctor dressing his wounds, he might have had to kill both or all three. This type of scene was probably repeated throughout Athens. Her emotional reactions even after so many years vividly brought back the brutality of urban guerrilla warfare on the noncombatant civilian population.
8. The wife of a boyhood friend from my mother's village related the following story. In her childhood the wife had resided in one of the villages in the contested guerrilla held territory northwest from Florina. She was rescued from the war zone and eventually sent to Poland. There she received a fine education in three languages, in Greek, Macedonian as well as a high school education in Polish. After 15 years, she was repatriated to Greece and came back to Florina, eventually married my boyhood friend, came to America, and raised three fine daughters, a doctor, a lawyer, and a university administrator. Philip Shashko and Andrew Rossos, frequently cited in the present text, each had a similar experience and came from the same region. Philip Shashko went to Romania while Andrew Rossos to Czechoslovakia. In their late teens, they came back to Greece but just as quickly emigrated to Canada (Communist-associated Macedonian youths could not hope to have a future in Greece). Eventually both earned their Ph.D.s in history from major universities in California and are now noted historians. Each in his/her own account praised their host nation and each indicated that it was a humanitarian effort that motivated the host nation to accept them as refugees, as children rescued from the horrors of war. Nicholas Gage's version of this same phase of the Greek civil war of 1947–1949 in his autobiographical work *Eleni* (New York: Random House, 1983) seems to present a distorted fanatical rendering of events in which he himself was involved except that he was *saved* in the nick of time (according to his testimony) from such a calamity as what the Greeks call the *paidomazema*, that is, children being sent to a Communist Iron Curtain country. As the stories of repatriated Macedonians show, however, the fine education received in the host countries especially for the children, plus their sustenance, make the contemptuous *paidomazoma* label a rightist

Greek propaganda effort against the obvious humanitarian relief efforts on the part of the Socialist East European Democracies.

5 Cognitive Self-Descriptor Evidence for Macedonian Ethnicity

1. In an article published in the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram* (April 5, 2003) commemorating the 200th anniversary of Mohammed Ali coming to Egypt with his contingent of 300 Albanian soldiers, the author of the article, Yunan Labib Rizk, identifies Mohamed Ali as a Macedonian Moslem born in Kavala, a town in Eastern Macedonia. Importantly, he is credited with founding the modern Egyptian state through his efforts to modernize Egypt by establishing a national Egyptian army conscripted from the native population for the first time and through his successful effort to achieve autonomy for Egypt from the Sultanate in Istanbul in the second half of the ninth century. The painting of "Oriental Soldiers Playing Chess" (referred to in chapter 1) by a French artist Alexandre Bida (1823–1894) showing "Arnaut" (Albanian) guards must have been executed during the late years of the Mohamed Ali reign as provincial governor of Egypt under the Sultan. Later he assumed the role of vassal overlord and founded the modern royal Egyptian dynasty that ended with Gamal Abdel Nasser coming to power in the 1950s.
2. As indicated in note 3 of chapter 4, the cooperative alliance between the Ottoman Turkish Security Forces and the Greek-sponsored Andartes bands is independently confirmed by two different sources
3. The two criteria of language and religion were opportunistically used by Greece during the period of Ottoman Empire rule over Macedonia. From 1900 to 1912 the claim over Macedonia was presented on the basis of Patriarchate versus Exarchate village affiliations to the Orthodox Church. Since the Macedonians in the more central and northern provinces did not speak Greek as their native dialect was Macedonian, they were then designated as "Slavophone" Greeks or as "Bulgarophone" Greeks. After the liberation/occupation of the Aegean region of Macedonia in the Balkan wars of 1912/1913, these same "Bulgarophone" Greeks were expelled and/or their villages burned as "Bulgarians." Eventually they were exchanged for "Greeks" with Bulgaria in 1926. In 1923 during the population exchanges with Turkey for the Moslem "Turkish" population still residing in Macedonia, the linguistic criterion was totally relaxed (most Christians from the interior of Asia Minor did not speak Greek). Christianity was the sole criterion while the linguistic criterion by necessity was dropped. The properties left behind by the Moslem Turks were then given to the exchanged Greek population that was armed and settled into Macedonia as the new "Akrites." They were to watch over hostile activist Macedonians. Since the population exchange was forced upon Greece, it is unfair to

label it as a deliberate social engineering to turn Macedonia into Greek territory. Indeed, it was one of the great humanitarian efforts by the modern Greek nation in the ashes of the "Great Catastrophe" as the Greeks refer to the war with Turkey (1921–1922). Newcomers and native Macedonians, uneasy at first, were both tired of war and suffering. Peaceful coexistence prevailed quickly with many intermarriages. The eventual calamities that befell both groups during World War II and the civil war of 1947–1949 turned the two sides into a strange alliance as the majority of both sides fought for the same leftist Communist forces each with a different vision for a better Greece; the Macedonians for recognition as Macedonians and the newcomers for more social justice and for the defeat of the formerly fascist Monarchy that had now been returned to Greece by the British forces in 1944–1945.

4. Albert Sonnichsen (1869–1950) was an American journalist born and raised in San Francisco at a time when San Francisco had a population of 30 percent foreign-born immigrants. He himself was of Danish/German immigrant parents and had a limited early education. Nonetheless, in this environment of foreign accent and flavor, he wanted to travel, to see the world, and learn from experience. As a late teenager, he enlisted as a sailor aboard a merchant ship that took him to the Philippine Islands just then rebelling against the American excursion into Empire Building. He was captured by the rebel/guerrilla forces held for six months and released. On the strength of this experience, he wrote an account of his captivity and survival. Having shown a gift and talent for writing with his first book at such a young age, he obtained a position as a journalist with the newly formed *McClure Magazine*. He was to be sent to Ottoman Macedonia to obtain an exclusive account of Ellen S. Stone's ordeal following her release as a captive of the Macedonian rebel/guerrilla forces seeking to liberate Macedonia (this was a major sensational story at the time—1902). This arrangement fell through and it was a NYC newspaper that eventually sent him as an investigative journalist into Macedonia to give readers a firsthand account of the rebel/restless Macedonian provinces in Ottoman Turkey. He first went to Sofia, where he made his initial contacts and apparently stayed long enough to learn the Bulgarian language. Eventually he did enter Macedonia from Bulgaria in 1905 legally with a Turkish Visa. Once in Macedonia, he managed to become attached to the numerous clandestine rebel/guerrilla bands whom he mistakenly identified as "Bulgars," based on the similarity of the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages. This was, in any case, the common labeling of the Macedonians at the time. As a valued outsider/foreign member of each "Cheta," he went from rayon (region/area) to rayon in the Ottoman provinces of Macedonia disguised as a native "comitadji." In the process, he was able to meet almost all the leaders of the then post-Ilinden insurgent Macedonia, which at one point he labels as the Underground Republic.

Through shared experiences as an outlaw bandit pursued by Turkish Security Forces and rival guerrilla bands, he eventually developed a high degree of respect for the worldly sophistication of the youthful rebels and students almost all with higher education. With the passage of time, however, the deadly mix of rebel and security forces compounded by roving rival contending rebel groups opportunistically cooperating with the enemy (i.e., with the Turkish Security Forces), took its deadly toll on the leadership of each rebel band with whom he had made close personal ties and whose struggle he understood and respected. The horror and futility of their loss with no major achievements were too much for Sonnichsen to bear and he reluctantly returned to Sofia and back to America where he would write his *Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit* (Santa Barbara, CA: Narrative Press, 1909/2004).

6 Sociocultural Characterization of the Macedonian Ethnic Identity

1. The terms "dialect" or "dialect/language" are used in a generic sense, as there are multiple dialects; however, they should be seen in the present chapter as well as in the entire text as referring to the Macedonian dialect/language as it existed prior to its standardization and codification as a modern language with an update on technical terms and expressions achieved only in 1951 with the help of the Harvard Slavicist Horace G. Lunt.
2. In the generalization and inference of a unitary Eastern Orthodox religion and a unitary non-Slav Macedonian ethnic identity across dialect and region, the Albanian Moslems in FYROM have to be taken as a contrary exception. That is, they do not regard themselves as Macedonians, unlike the Albanian Orthodox and Vlach speakers of Macedonia in Aegean Macedonia nor are they Christians. Moreover, in the Republic of Macedonia, they have been, since 1991, a major source of internal conflict, clamoring for a greater share in the power structure of the new Macedonian nation. Furthermore, after the recent Ohrid (2002) agreements worked out between rebelling Albanian Moslem dissidents and the government, the constitution of the Macedonian Republic was changed from a national to a multiethnic state (Daskalovski, 2006)

8 Who the Macedonians Are: An Across Domain, Evidence-Based Answer

1. See note 1 of chapter 4; however, for a more detailed account, see Sonnichsen's book (1909/2004). As can be determined from Sonnichsen's memoir and from Perry (1988), the general outline of the IMRO organization at local, province, and at top level, with overall

headquarters at Salonica, is clear; a similar understanding of the Supremist (*Vrhovisti*) organization is less clear. The Supreme Committee, as it was called, was conceived as an executive over and above all other committees including that of the IMRO. In contrast to the IMRO, it was a mixed organization of both Macedonians and Bulgarians with branch organizations all over Bulgaria (to be fair, the reader must be reminded that the Bulgarians did not consider the Macedonians to be of a separate ethnic identity). Ostensibly, the Supreme Committee was to facilitate acquisition of material needs through collection of membership dues throughout Bulgaria and acquisition of weapons from various outside sources (Nagant pistols, Mauser, and Maanlicher rifles). A lesser function of the Supremists was the distribution of funds and weapons to the field committees. The "Supremist" ties to the Bulgarian government and attempts to gain control of the Macedonian autonomy/liberation movement with officers from the Bulgarian military (Col. Tsontsev, Capt. Sarafov) was a clear signal to the IMRO leadership, to Gotse Delchev, Damian Gruev, and Giorgi Sugarev that there was an intent to align the drive to autonomy/liberation to Bulgarian state aims of annexing Macedonia. Moreover, each group had its own bands in the field at cross-purposes with conflicting objectives. On the eve of the 1903 uprising, Gotse Delchev divested himself and the IMRO from these ties and assigned Giorgi Sugarev the unenviable task of uprooting suspected Sumpremists within the IMRO ranks in the field. This may have contributed to his subsequent betrayal at the village of Paralovo as a retaliatory move on the part of the Supremists. After the failure of the 1903 uprising, the balance shifted to the Supremists who by now were busy recruiting and enforcing village affiliations to the Bulgarian Exarchate Church competing with emboldened Andartes bands enforcing village affiliations to the Patriarchate Church (see Brailsford, 1906/1971; Seraphinoff and Stefou, 2008). All these lightly disguised activities were precursor events to the eventual partition of Macedonia by Bulgaria and Greece joined later by Serbia with a similar drive toward affiliation to the Serbian Orthodox Church.

2. Sonnichsen (1909/2001) in his memoir describes how he met officials of the "Underground Republic" in Monastir/Bitola. One of these officials was identified as the "Eagle" (names were to be avoided in meetings with strangers as was Sonnichsen). The contempt for this higher-up official of the underground republic was openly expressed by Sonnichsen's fellow comitadji, "Sandy," who was immediately responsible for him during his clandestine travels: "I have never heard of a hawk in eagle's feathers (92). Following the meeting during the preceding night, the Eagle had left early for his own business in Bitola leaving a note that they would dine in a designated house later where he (Sonnichsen) would meet and dine with the local committee treasurer of the Underground Republic. In that same evening, the Eagle brought Sonnichsen his mail

from Bulgaria including a bundle of American newspapers describing an earthquake back home in San Francisco, CA. In the meantime, the Eagle was headed for Salonica where he would spend a week to ten days. He advised Sonnichsen to maintain his American identity secret and to move from house to house because of increased Turkish security measures. Importantly, the Eagle had been made aware of Sonnichsen's admission to the Chetas with permission to go from one to the other of these rebel/guerrilla units and, thus, the Eagle would hold the overall responsibility for his safety, at least while in Bitola. What this report of Sonnichsen shows is that, though imperfect, there was a functional underground Macedonian Republic ready to takeover in the event of autonomy/liberation.

3. In a documented court certificate dated May 26, 1910, showing declaration of intent to become citizen, a Pennsylvania court identified my grandfather, Christo Traice, not as a citizen of Turkey but as a subject of Sultan Hamid II. The printed phrase "citizen of Turkey" was crossed out and replaced with a handwritten phrase over it, "subject of Sultan Hamid II." During this same period, at the dawn of the twentieth century, the "Young Turks" overthrew the autocratic/theocratic Ottoman government of Sultan Hamid II and installed a liberal constitution (1908). All Ottoman subjects, Moslem and Christian alike, were declared to be equal citizens with equal responsibilities. Thus, my maternal uncle was drafted into the Turkish army in 1911 under the new constitution. Until then, Christians could not become soldiers of the Sultan; only Moslems could. In 1912 with the "liberation" from the Ottoman Turks, my uncle was immediately drafted into the Greek army and assigned to a frontier guard post at a nearby village on the new border with Serbia. This border effectively separated the villages of the Lerin/Florina–Monastir/Bitola area placing them into two different countries. My village was in between; but it fell to Greece. Thus, I became "Greek" and not "Serb." On the other side, our relatives became "Serbs." This was the Macedonia of the early decades in the twentieth century.
4. Professor Alexander Gegeroff's analysis of the covert unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity (in his reply to the essay question of the survey/questionnaire) identified several parameters of the underground unhyphenated Macedonian ethnic identity. Under foreign rule, there was the "sshsh" factor to avoid jail and persecution (e.g., Metaxas Dictatorship, 1936–1941). In a friendlier immigrant environment in the New World, it was unwise to identify one's self with a relatively obscure and controversial ethnic identity in place of the mainstream new identity. Then there were also the "crypto-Macedonians" who might reveal their identity in the new lands as well as at home, only under absolutely secure conditions of privacy and confidentiality. All these facets contributed to the unknown existence of the covert unhyphenated identity in

the masses (Macedonia had no public schools in the Ottoman Empire era) and gave an external impression of an ephemeral Macedonian ethnic identity that remains prevalent in today's academic circles.

5. A *Focus Magazine* article (no. 531, September 3, 2005) posted on the Internet, "Vida Bueva personal secretary of the last leader of the IMRO," provided detailed information for the first time by a primary source on the internecine struggle between the right-wing IMRO and the left-wing IMRO-United including the deadly conflicts, assassinations, and murders carried out within Bulgaria and outside of Bulgaria. This was a time when the Macedonians had their unwanted notoriety as the deadliest terrorist organization in Europe. Ivan Mihailov who headed the IMRO over a decade from 1924 to 1934 maintained an unassailable stronghold and a center of operations located in the Pirin region of West Bulgaria. What can be determined in some detail is that the assassination of Todor Alexandrov in 1924, who was the then titular leader of the right-wing IMRO (allegedly carried out by left-wing IMRO-United operatives) as well as the earlier assassination in 1915 of the last surviving revolutionary leader of the 1903–1908 insurgency, Jane Sandanski, trace out a deadly cycle of violence within the IMRO and against any opponents who stood in their way at every level in the Bulgarian political landscape. Prime Minister Stambolinski, who attempted a rapprochement with Serbia/Yugoslavia as well as an army general, Protugeroff, who was accused of having ordered the assassination of Todor Alexandrov, the successor post-Balkan war titular leader of the IMRO, were both eliminated. Assassinations and counterassassinations followed, exacting vengeance and retribution of opponents in cities all over Europe, until international pressure, in the wake of repercussions after the assassination of the Serbian king Alexander forced the young Bulgarian officers who had engineered a coup d'etat earlier in May of 1934 to finally eliminate the Pirin IMRO stronghold. Ivan Mihailov escaped to Turkey with three death sentences behind him but from the enforced exile he mercifully ordered the dissolution of the right-wing IMRO. Since then, numerous plots on his life failed; and after the safe haven in Pavelich's Croatian puppet state in World War II, he died naturally in Rome, Italy, graced at the end by an Obituary in the *New York Times*. For all his energy and destructive terrorism on behalf of a good cause Ivan Mihailov, nonetheless, is in the dustbins of history like many failed Irish revolutionaries after whom he modeled his right-wing IMRO interwar operations. At least he is survived by a commemorative statue over a monument somewhere in Sofia.
6. The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in May 1934 in Marseilles, France was the high point in the interwar turn to terrorist activism by the right-wing remnant IMRO exiles in Bulgaria under Ivan Mihailov. However, the decision to assassinate the king of Yugoslavia, just then sitting atop a repressive military dictatorship over the new

Yugoslav state, was initiated by a recently formed secret Croatian terrorist organization, the Ustashe, under the leadership of Ante Pavelich. As the Croatians had no experience in terrorist underground activity, they were referred to the IMRO organization in Bulgaria, specifically to make contact with Ivan Mihailov that they did. Pavelich visited Mihailov in a small village just outside of Sofia. Subsequently, in coordinated effort, three assassination attempts were organized in secret Ustashe terrorist camps located in Italy and Hungary. These assassination attempts were to be carried out in sequence, if necessary. They were to start at the point of embarkation at Marseille; and, then, on to Paris and London should any preceding attempt fail. In the end, it was the experienced Macedonian assassin Vlado Chernozemsky (*nom de guerre*) who broke through the huge crowd of well-wishers, jumped on the slow moving open car, and shot the king with pistol shots at close range. Chernozemsky was killed on the spot by the French Cavalry escort. Due to intensified international diplomatic pressure, the Bulgarian military dissolved the IMRO, and Mihailov was forced into exile.

7. Soon after arriving in America (1940), I worked side by side with a genial ex-IMRO Comitadji, Todor Gorchiloff (*nome de guerre*), who like many Macedonians of his time, following the partition of Macedonia, was drafted into the Greek army and served in the Greco-Turkish war of 1921–1922 as a frontline soldier deep in Asia Minor (the Macedonians, like the Irish, were expendable). At the catastrophic defeat in the summer of 1922, he was evacuated back to Greece safely, while the civilian Greek population, especially, those in Smyrna, were left behind at the mercy of the marauding Turks who retook the city, looted it, burnt it, and murdered and raped the Christian population. Upon returning to the mainland, Todor was reassigned to the Eastern Thracian frontier with Turkey. After surviving the calamity at Smyrna and with four years in the army, Todor had enough. Moreover, he suspected a resumption of the war at the Thracian border. Thus, he deserted and crossed over into Bulgaria on foot. The Bulgarian authorities almost immediately advised him that since he was Macedonian and well trained in the military, he should join the exiled IMRO bands in Bulgaria to carry out secret missions into occupied Aegean Macedonia in his homeland area. He was given work as well; but the job was contingent upon his acceptance of the new obligations. Thus, Todor took the oath of the IMRO Comitadji with his hand on a pistol and dagger over an open Bible; with it, he was also given a new name. He carried out sporadic insurgency missions in the Lerin/Florina province villages (these assigned missions, while extremely dangerous, were not like being in a shooting war).

   Todor retired when I reached the age of 18 and had just received my driver's license. At about the same time, Todor purchased a used car, but as yet, did not have a license. I offered to train him on both the written and driver's part of the test. After he had passed both successfully, I felt

secure enough to ask him the one hard question I needed to ask. My grandfather, even before 1940, had told me who the suspected members in the secret IMRO Comitadji organization were in our village. Moreover, on the eve of World War II, as if on orders, the son of one of the alleged activist IMRO members quietly left for Bulgaria, an event confirming my grandfather's suspicions. The question I asked was, "Who were these secret IMRO members in our village, Bitusha?" He replied, "I have taken an oath and cannot reveal their names as long as I live." For me, at this young age, this was a totally ludicrous or at least a humorous reply as the village had gone through World War II occupation by the Germans and then there was the bloody civil war fought by my own follow students back in the village. After all these calamities, nothing remained of what once was or had been. Despite my pleading, the answer came back, always with a simile, "No, I cannot tell you." After his second visit to Bulgaria, Todor came back married happily to a woman he knew as a handsome young Macedonian IMRO Comitadji and lived out his retirement life with great joy and satisfaction until he passed on. I never could ask him the more difficult question of what his clandestine missions into Macedonia were; but now, after all the research in connection with the present work, I could easily guess what he was up to and what he had done.

8. From 1938 to 1940, I belonged to the Youth Corps (*Neolaia*) during the Metaxas dictatorship in Greece in the peaceful prewar years of World War II. The Youth Corps was almost a carbon copy of the Fascist Youth Corps of Mussolini's Italy except that our uniforms were dark blue, not black, as in the Italian template. Unbelievably, we had a similar fascia emblem on the military style cloth cap. As boys at the subteenage level, we wore shorts, cut just above the knees while older teenage boys wore trousers with white getties over their shoes tucking their trousers. The uniforms were obligatory at each family's expense. Punishment for not having one was administered by the local Greek police, until compliance was achieved from recalcitrant, nonconforming Macedonian families. While we went on parade at least once a year on the National Independence Day at which time we would also present patriotic school plays (obviously, not in uniform), the older boys (already out of elementary school by then) were engaged in compulsory roadside tree-planting projects and road repairs, which were the only societally useful features of this brutal Metaxas dictatorship.
9. Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936), the Greek politician, political leader, and perhaps the most outstanding statesman of Modern Greece, envisioned a greater Greece following the Balkan wars that included not only Macedonia and Thrace but also the Aegean coastal regions of Modern Turkey. This area had for many millennia a sizable Greek population and after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan wars of 1912/1913, and, soon after that, in World War I (1919), the

wartime victories of the Allies enabled a Greek occupation, not only of Macedonia and Thrace, but also of the SE Turkish coastal regions on the Aegean Sea. These achievements were based on the Greek participation on the Allied side, especially with the opening of a second front in the Balkans by France and Great Britain in the Salonica and Florina-Monastir region (which Venizelos' aggressive politics had allowed). All these achievements were based on continued support by France and Great Britain. Once the Royalist Greek government decided to expand the occupation into the interior of Asia Minor, in a campaign to destroy Turkey once and for all, support from the Allies ceased and the Greek Expeditionary Forces suffered a catastrophic defeat dragging with them into ruin the hapless civilian population left behind. The Greek army could not hold to the expanded *megali ithea* territories in Asia Minor but did hold on to Macedonia and Thrace in the post–World War I peace settlements as a reward for Greece's past contribution.

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